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URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES AND THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IN JAPAN: A CASE STUDY*

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I. Scope and Method

This paper represents a partial and experimental approach to two complex problems: urban-rural political differences, and their relationship to the process of political modernization in contemporary Japan. Several separable but possibly related research goals are involved. They may be briefly described as follows:

There is much discussion and concern today about the process of political modernization. This is often linked to specific projects of "modernizing" the economies of so-called "underdeveloped areas" undertaken by so-called "advanced" states or agencies. We are frequently told that something called "political modernization" is either prerequisite to the success of such projects or a probable consequence thereof. But the term seems to be used with relatively little precision. What is it that changes when a society modernizes its political institutions and practices? At what pace does change proceed, with what priorities, and towards what kind of goals? How consistent is the process involved and how may it be measured? These would seem to be essential questions about the process of political modernization, questions of basic importance if we are to set operational goals in this field with any clarity or realism.

The requirements of a satisfactory answer to such questions are numerous and complexly related. At a minimum they would seem to include:

1. An attempt to determine the salient characteristics of the socio-political base from which the changes involved in political modernization stem. Some point of departure is necessary for any characterization or measurement of change. One must look for the "traditional" political basis of pre-modern societies. Since such a hypothetical basis is not a fixed or unchanging quantity itself, difficult and more or less arbitrary assessments must be made as to what best represents "traditional" practice and how generalizable one's model is to other societies and cultures.

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2. A comparable attempt to define the goals of the political modernization process. "Where is it going?" and "where do we want it to go?" Problems of control and controlability as well as variance among definitions of what is "modern"--itself a shifting concept--must be raised. At stake also is the deeper question of whether or not the political modernization process everywhere carries with it certain built-in goals or consequences which are more or less independent of any engineering controls exercisable by political or economic leadership.

3. At attempt to determine what happens between the above two termini--between the traditional political base or point of departure and the status known as "political modernity," however defined. How do political institutions, attitudes, and behaviors "progress" from one condition to the other? What specific changes occur and in what order? To what extent are these objectively identifiable or measurable? Are there objective and reliable indicators that political modernization is occurring in more than superficial institutional terms?

All three of the foregoing attempts are expansive endeavors, so that it would seem necessary in the early stages of inquiry at least to approach the total question in piecemeal and experimental fashion. My concern in the present paper is primarily with the first and third of the items set forth above--what are some of the characteristics of the traditional political base in Japan and what specific changes occur between this and the current terminus of the modernization process.

There are perhaps two ways in which such a problem could be studied. The first and more usual would utilize the historical approach to determine the nature of the traditional base and of the changes wrought therein by the modernization process. Such an approach has unique and essential values. But a second approach may also be possible, and its values, too, seem promising though less certain. This is an adaptation of the concept of the urban-rural continuum to the study of political modernization. Redfield's original theory rested upon the assumption that cultures are classifiable along a continuum running from most rural, i. e. "the folk society," to most urban and that it is possible to construct valid, generalized descriptions of the principal traits characterizing various waypoints along such a scale. What is here proposed is somewhat different:

1. Only a single culture, that of Japan, is of immediate concern, and it is by any standards reasonably advanced or "modern."

2. It is assumed that within this culture political development has proceeded from a common basis but at a differential pace in the countryside and in the major cities, and that this pace has been more rapid in such urban areas. This is to say that political institutions, attitudes, and behavior patterns in Japanese villages are probably on the average closer or more similar to the traditional base for Japan than are those in major cities. It is not intended to assert that they are identical with some ideal type of traditional Japanese society; obviously important changes have taken place in the villages as well as in the cities, particularly since the outbreak of the last war.

3. If these assumptions are valid, it should be valuable to compare rural and urban political practice in Japan. The rural findings might cast some light

upon the probable nature of traditional political practice and thus supplement, confirm, and possibly enrich historical conclusions; while the urban findings might indicate in some detail what it is that changes in the course of at least this phase of the modernization process.

These are the principal premises upon which the paper rests. They are separable. The paper may be viewed either as a distinctly experimental and partial approach to the problem of political modernization along the lines described, or as a somewhat simpler and more clear-cut statement on urban-rural political differences in contemporary Japan. In either event, the attempt has been to build up by inductive means--in a field marked so far by a predominance of speculation and theorizing--a body of observations and data bearing upon these problems with the hope that they might contribute to further investigation and theorizing in Japan and elsewhere. The observations concerned apply directly to only two specific parts of Japan, the prefecture of Okayama and the city of Ōsaka. They are based upon work done in these areas in 1950 and in 1956-57. It seems probable, however, that political practices in these two jurisdictions, with exceptions which will be noted, are reasonably representative of those in much of rural and metropolitan Japan.

II. The Setting: Okayama - Osaka

Okayama

Okayama Prefecture lies midway along the northern shore of the Inland Sea. We will be primarily concerned in the sections which follow with its rural areas, especially its villages, and in particular those which lie within its second election district (Okayama II). Comprising the western half of the prefecture, it is a predominantly but not unrepresentatively rural section of Japan. The general setting may perhaps best be described in terms of the vital statistics of the second election district.

Okayama II embraces an area of 2,918.59 square kilometers, of which 96.4 percent was classified as rural and 3.6 percent as urban in 1950.** The total area concerned was then apportioned among three cities and nine rural areas known as gun. In these civil divisions resided a total of 840,345 people, 15.6 percent in the cities, and 84.4 percent in the gun. The meaningfulness of this distinction is partially confirmed by the corresponding figures on average density of population: 1,254.8 per square kilometer in the cities to 251.9 in the rural areas. More significant, however, are the figures on the employment characteristics of these populations. These are not comparably affected by the distorting effects of the amalgamation program, although the 1955 figures do provide an interesting insight into the continued prevalence of rural characteristics in the so-called "new cities." (See Table I). In 1955 throughout the district as a whole 50.1 percent of the labor force fifteen years of age or above

** The 1950 census figures are used here in preference to the 1955 ones to avoid the distorting effects of the vast 1953-56 town and village amalgamation program which artificially created six new cities in this area.

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Table I. Okayama II, 1950-1955

	Area (sq. km.)		Population Density (Per sq. km.)		Population	
	1950	1955	1950	1955	1950	1955
Kurashiki City	38.25	124.05	1,393	997.3	53,301	123,714
Tamano City	33.70	91.69	1,312	680.2	44,223	62,365
Kojima City	32.72	34.37	1,304	1,102.4	33,822	37,891
Tamashima City		44.85		1,091.1		48,934
Kasaoka City		108.31		645.6		69,926
Ihara City		89.50		442.2		39,573
Sōja City		128.17		284.1		36,413
Takahashi City		228.95		161.7		37,030
Niimi City		352.82		111.0		39,155
URBAN						
SUBTOTALS	104.67 ^a	1,202.71 ^c	1,254.8 ^e	411.6 ^e	131,346 ^f	495,001 ^h
Kojima Gun	218.61	122.66	456	477.1	99,748	58,621
Tsukubo Gun	116.42	69.77	660	728.9	76,859	50,854
Asakuchi Gun	170.26	87.75	796	601.2	135,500	52,758
Oda Gun	262.24	173.06	401	217.1	105,182	37,568
Shitsuki Gun	155.08	80.80	305	152.9	47,373	12,356
Kibi Gun	369.25	212.63	212	224.1	78,387	47,642
Jōbō Gun	306.65	245.35	169	123.9	51,686	30,404
Kawakami Gun	419.64	271.54	117	115.2	49,206	31,283
Atetsu Gun	795.77	441.80	82	61.1	65,058	26,991
RURAL						
SUBTOTALS	2,813.92 ^b	1,705.36 ^d	251.9 ^e	204.3 ^e	708,999 ^g	348,477 ⁱ
OKAYAMA II						
TOTALS	2,918.59	2,908.07		290.0 ^e	840,345	843,478

- a. 3.6% of total
- b. 96.4% of total
- c. 41.4% of total
- d. 58.6% of total
- e. averages
- f. 15.6% of total population
- g. 84.4% of total population
- h. 58.7% of total population
- i. 41.3% of total population

(continued on next page)

Table I (continued)

	Employment Characteristics (1955)			
	Size of Working Force	% in Primary Industries	% in Secondary Industries	% in Tertiary Industries
Kurashiki City	54,735	33.3	29.8	36.9
Tamano City	25,395	16.6	49.0	34.4
Kojima City	18,737	19.3	54.1	26.6
Tamashima City	22,006	40.2	28.4	31.4
Kasaoka City	32,407	50.9	20.9	28.2
Ihara City	19,707	49.6	29.4	21.0
Soja City	18,240	59.8	16.4	23.8
Takahashi City	17,650	62.4	11.0	26.6
Niimi City	18,292	59.9	25.2	14.9
URBAN SUBTOTALS	227,169	41.4	28.8	29.8
Kojima Gun	30,387	38.1	44.6	17.3
Tsukubo Gun	23,849	43.5	27.3	29.2
Asakuchi Gun	25,252	55.5	20.8	23.7
Oda Gun	19,482	74.9	8.9	16.2
Shitsuki Gun	6,057	77.7	8.3	14.0
Kibi Gun	23,543	68.6	10.4	21.0
Jōbō Gun	14,855	81.8	4.9	13.3
Kawakami Gun	15,842	74.3	8.7	17.0
Atetsu Gun	13,358	78.0	6.9	15.1
RURAL SUBTOTALS	173,625	61.4	19.1	19.5
OKAYAMA II TOTALS	400,794	50.1	24.6	25.3

were employed in primary industries, i. e. agriculture, forestry and hunting, or fisheries and aquaculture. Even in the cities the average proportion of those so employed was as high as 41.4 percent, while in the countryside it stood at 61.4 percent. This is perhaps the most accurate of the several possible statistical indices of the rurality of this area.

Small-scale, intensive agriculture is by long odds the most important occupation in Okayama II. Farms average between one and slightly over two acres in size and are typically operated by the household owning them. The characteristic rural settlement unit is the *buraku*, sometimes translated as hamlet. *Buraku* are most typically a cluster of households which may number anywhere from six or seven to over a hundred. They have no legal identity, but afford the most intimate and meaningful form of socio-political experience beyond the household to which the average farmer is exposed. Such communities exist throughout the rural areas of Okayama II, and in a broader sense are characteristic of all rural Japan. They and the villages which they constitute are the prime datum areas for the rural aspects of this study.

At least two words of caution are advisable with respect to the villages of Japan and their inhabitants. First, forms of social organization and, hence, popular political attitudes and behavior patterns are not neatly uniform throughout rural Japan. The available literature would indicate, for example, that

there is a significant difference between the basic social structure of many buraku in the Tōhoku Area (and perhaps in parts of Kyūshū as well) and elsewhere in Japan. Hokkaidō may be different again. Conclusions based upon observations of Okayama II do not necessarily apply to such markedly differing parts of rural Japan.

Second, even the relatively sophisticated Westerner is apt to harbor quite erroneous stereotypes with respect to the inhabitants of "rural" areas in any part of Asia. In contemporary Japan these people are not "peasants," at least in the sense that Redfield and most modern anthropologists use this term. There is too little "isolation," too much of the "marketplace" in their lives and economies to admit of such a characterization. They are the products of a unified national primary school system; they are literate and read newspapers and magazines quite extensively; they own and regularly listen to radios; they know and frequently visit cities; their agriculture is primarily a profit-seeking not a subsistence operation. In terms such as these, at least, we are here dealing with farmers in a reasonably modern sense of the term, despite the prevalence in other spheres of their life of attitudes and behavior patterns which we regard as pre-modern, "Asian," or traditional. In other words, these are a rural people, but they are in no sense polar opposites of some hypothetical urban type. However, the process of change would seem to have been slower and more piecemeal in the countryside than in the larger cities. Contemporary village life is in many important respects far closer to the ways of life in "old Japan"--however defined--than in contemporary city life. It is in this sense, and for experimental purposes, that it has been felt proper to use Okayama II as an exemplar of the surviving rural and traditional aspects of Japanese culture.

Ōsaka

There are in Japan six really great cities which might be considered as theoretically appropriate locales for an investigation of urban and modernizing political attitudes and practices: Tokyō, Ōsaka, Kyōto, Nagoya, Yokohama, and Kōbe. For present purposes, however, Tokyō might be excluded from the list on the grounds of its peculiar political position as the national capital and its unique political organization. Of the remaining cities, Ōsaka is the largest and most industrialized; a financial, commercial, and communication center for all of southern Japan; and the center of a vast metropolitan region stretching from Kyōto on the north to Kōbe on the west, which includes some forty-two satellite cities. It is well qualified to serve as a datum area for research on urban political attitudes and behavior. The 1955 population of Ōsaka City was 2,547,316. This was distributed over a total area of 202.31 square kilometers with an average density of 12,591.2 per square kilometer. This represents the second largest urban agglomeration and the highest urban concentration of population in all Japan.

The city is divided into twenty-two ku or wards. These function primarily as administrative and electoral units and have no real autonomous powers. Table II sets forth a description of the city in terms of these twenty-two component parts. It is apparent from these figures that the ku differ quite widely from one another. The city's occupational characteristics are also of interest and provide a further measure of the difference between this area and Okayama II. One notes first that, despite its heavily urban setting, some primary industry (agriculture, forestry, hunting, fishing and aquaculture) is still found

Table II. Osaka City: 1955

	Area (sq. km.)	Density of Population (per sq. km.)	Population	Employment Characteristics			
				Size of Working Force	% in Primary Industries	% in Secondary Industries	% in Tertiary Industries
Kita-ku	5.58	14,696.8	82,008	40,220	.1	31.2	68.7
Miyakojima-ku	5.86	14,123.7	82,765	35,798	.3	53.1	46.6
Fukushima-ku	4.68	19,376.9	90,684	41,274	.1	44.2	55.7
Konohana-ku	10.43	6,257.6	65,267	26,534	.3	53.5	46.2
Higashi-ku	5.92	9,547.8	56,523	31,243	.4	25.7	73.9
Nishi-ku	5.27	12,124.5	63,896	30,055	.1	27.8	72.1
Minato-ku	8.26	8,679.4	71,692	29,344	.5	36.4	63.1
Taisho-ku	9.10	8,572.7	78,012	31,382	.2	51.9	47.9
Tennōji-ku	4.67	15,321.0	71,549	31,648	.1	34.3	65.6
Minami-ku	2.96	23,008.8	68,106	37,278	.0	20.4	79.6
Naiwa-ku	3.83	18,492.7	70,827	30,784	.0	36.6	63.4
Ōyodo-ku	4.47	12,426.2	55,545	24,257	.2	55.6	44.2
Nishiyodogawa-ku	11.16	8,418.7	93,953	37,528	.9	59.7	60.6
Higashiyodogawa-ku	26.10	7,998.5	208,762	83,589	2.3	50.8	46.9
Higashinari-ku	4.51	29,553.1	132,430	56,653	.1	56.3	43.6
Ikuno-ku	8.10	27,553.1	223,180	88,004	.8	52.8	46.4
Asahi-ku	6.07	20,601.8	125,053	49,165	.4	44.6	55.0
Jōto-ku	16.58	10,150.7	168,299	67,887	2.2	56.2	41.6
Abeno-ku	5.98	25,441.6	152,141	60,432	.3	33.6	66.1
Sumiyoshi-ku	19.99	9,137.6	182,660	68,270	2.3	40.4	57.3
Higashiumiyoshi-ku	25.37	8,486.9	215,312	81,720	4.6	40.4	55.0
Nishinari-ku	7.42	25,424.8	188,652	77,859	.3	42.6	57.1
Totals	202.42	12,591.2*	2,547,316	1,060,924	1.1	44.1	54.8

*Average

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within the city. This is almost entirely agriculture, with a bit of fishing along the waterfront. However, 98.9 percent of the city's working force of fifteen years of age or over is divided between secondary industries (mining, construction, and manufacturing) and tertiary industries (wholesale and retail trade; finance, insurance and real estate; transportation, communications and other public utilities; services; government; and otherwise unclassifiable occupations). In the former category manufacturing is dominant; in the latter wholesale and retail trade predominates, followed by services. Table III gives an overall picture of this distribution for Ōsaka City as a whole in 1955. These figures show that from an occupational standpoint as well, Ōsaka is a very advanced type of urban community, far removed from Okayama II.

III. Areas of Rural-Urban Political Difference

In this search for significant differences between rural and urban political attitudes and behavior patterns, a number of subjects have been selected for examination, e. g. political leadership, popular participation in the political system, patterns of political allegiance, general attitudes toward government, and a few others. Significant differences between rural and urban practice do seem

Table III. Industry of Employed Persons Fifteen Years of Age and Older in Ōsaka City, 1955

<u>Industrial Group</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
I. Primary		
Agriculture	10,291	1.0
Forestry and Hunting	370	.03
Fisheries and Aquiculture	508	.05
II. Secondary		
Mining	624	.06
Construction	57,729	5.4
Manufacturing	409,526	38.6
III. Tertiary		
Wholesale and Retail Trade	293,871	27.7
Finance, Ins., Real Estate	29,148	2.7
Trans., Comm., & Public Utilities	76,236	7.2
Services	152,708	14.4
Government	29,747	2.8
Not Classifiable	166	.02
TOTAL	1,060,924	

to exist in these and other spheres, but they are not absolute in nature. While not always quantifiable, it perhaps helps to think of them as central tendencies within their respective rural or urban environments. Both environments are changing and both contain a wide spectrum of political attitudes and behavior patterns. They can only be discussed as units, that is, in averaged terms which inevitably do violence to their actual uniqueness and richness.

1. Political Leadership

Political leadership is a difficult quality to assess in Japan, whatever the setting. Both traditionally and presently the Japanese display a pronounced preference for techniques of group rather than individual leadership. The system works typically through advance conversations and private prearrangements among subgroups, broad participation and extensive discussion by interested parties, compromise settlements, and--at least superficially--unanimous consent to the decision thus reached. Steadfast, open, and uncompromising opposition in either public or private contexts is not traditionally approved in Japan for it is likely to raise sensitive issues of "face" and to render settlements more difficult. One "leads" from within the group by persuasion and indirection to a far greater extent than is customary in Western politics. Leadership does, of course, exist in Japanese politics but it is a subtle and elusive phenomenon. This complicates the problems of identifying rural-urban differences with any degree of specificity.

The political leaders of Okayama and Ōsaka--whether elective, appointive, or informal--share some characteristics. They are, for example, overwhelmingly male, although some women manage to get elected in the cities. Almost no women achieve high appointive positions of leadership in either setting. Furthermore, very few possess important political power in an informal sense, although when such instances occur they are almost certain to be urban. Beyond this, the average age of political leaders tends to be pretty much the same in Okayama and Ōsaka, usually in the low fifties. However, this may be a fairly recent development, and average ages may have been higher in the countryside than in the city before the younger element became more politically active in postwar times.

In both locales also political leaders are local in the sense that they live and have established backgrounds in the area concerned. Japanese law does not require such local residence for either elective or appointive offices, but in practice firmly fixed popular views and customs make it almost mandatory. The dynamics of the local electoral system normally make a candidate's immediate neighborhood of residence his most reliable source of support. Once in office the person concerned has a primary responsibility to protect and foster the interests of this area as sedulously as possible. There are, however, some differences in this quality of localism in rural and urban settings. First, its focus is usually both more precise and more restricted in the rural parts of Okayama II. This is due to a difference in the operational units concerned. The prime unit of political support beyond the household in the countryside is apt to be the *buraku*. This is an intimate face-to-face living group bound together by a large number of social, economic, and historical ties as well as by the sheer force of constant proximity and interaction. Under these circumstances it provides a well-established and quite exclusive focus of loyalty in local politics.

The village itself tends to be regarded as a later, relatively artificial, and externally imposed form of political unity which is sometimes regarded with vague hostility and suspicion as a local representative of the outside world and a minion of the distant and dubious authority of the prefectural and national governments. In these senses then the *buraku* provides a very strong and precisely delineated focus for primary political loyalties in rural Okayama. In Ōsaka, on the other hand, there is no basic political unit of equal cohesiveness and meaningfulness. The population is more transient in many parts of the city, settlement patterns more recent (especially since the war and bombing) and neighborhood interrelationships relatively more fleeting and casual. The block organizations are the closest approach to the *buraku*, and, while of major importance in local politics, they provide a definitely weaker focus for political action and loyalty than do the rural *buraku*. In this sense localism in political leadership patterns is more intensive in Okayama II than in Ōsaka.

A second difference may also be noted in this quality of localism. It is more apt to have genealogical aspects in the countryside. Save in the reclaimed areas, settlement patterns in the rural areas of Okayama II have been pretty well fixed for at least several centuries, sometimes for upwards of a thousand years. Thus in the countryside one might add a corollary statement about the advantages of local identification for political leaders: "The more local, the better." You are still a relative newcomer if your family has lived in the vicinity for only a generation or two. It is usually different in Ōsaka City, especially since the war and in the newer *ku*. Local residence is essential, but it is not of very great importance if your forebears have not lived there as well.

Other and more explicit rural-urban differences are also found in the qualities of political leadership. Superior lineage provides a case in point. Other things being equal, it would seem that in many villages of Okayama II the descendants of former samurai families, village headmen, or similar pre-Restoration or Meiji local functionaries enjoy a competitive advantage. To some extent this may be due to a surviving local regard for the traditionally superior status of members of such families. Probably more important is the practical consideration that such families have long been active in the management of local politics. They are able to combine political connections in neighboring villages and at higher political levels with some degree of political knowledge and experience. These are usually significant advantages in the average villager's eyes. Politics at this level is still largely a personal rather than a programmatic process. It helps to have established personal or family connections. In the less stable milieu of Ōsaka, while connections still count strongly, lineage seems to matter less, particularly in the sense of noble or samurai descent.

One notes also a difference between Okayama and Ōsaka with respect to the ambit of leadership status. It is more generalized in the countryside, more specific or particularized in the city. This is to say that politics as such is not normally a specialized or full-time career in rural Japan. One does not usually distinguish at the village level among a community's political, economic, and social leaders. There is a high probability that they will be the same individuals. In this sense political leadership may be said to be of a generalized or undifferentiated nature. It is quite different in Ōsaka. Political leadership in this context is most apt to be a full-time specialized activity. Its practitioners may and usually do have other professions or businesses as well, but both

observation and their uniform testimony indicate that these are badly neglected. Under these circumstances political leadership tends to become a much more specialized activity than in the countryside. At the same time it is apt to lose the attributes of economic and social leadership so often linked with it in the countryside. The result is the emergence of a type of urban political leader quite similar in many respects to that encountered in the large cities of the United States or Western Europe.

In either rural or urban locales politics takes time. One must attend meetings, cultivate support, and talk to people. This has different consequences in Okayama II than in Ōsaka. Farmers in this area usually have little spare time for activities not directly connected with earning a living. Only those with some leisure are able to participate seriously in politics. In general this tends to restrict rural political leadership to the relatively prosperous or to those few who have somehow managed to free themselves from the obligations of full-time farming. This is one of the reasons for the staunchly conservative character of most rural politics. Ōsaka affords more opportunities to the aspiring politician. First, urban employment is usually less demanding of time and effort than is farming. One has more leisure time, or can more readily arrange for it. Second, there are organizations such as labor unions, interest groups, etc. with a strong stake in securing political representation. They often make it financially possible for sympathetic and well-situated individuals to give the bulk of their time to politics. Even women may occasionally obtain such assistance. Finally, many political positions in Ōsaka are quite well paid by Japanese standards. They are considered full-time jobs and carry appropriate salaries, thus permitting political aspirants to view politics as a career in its own right. The context of political leadership is, therefore, quite different in this respect in Ōsaka from what it is in Okayama. It furthermore, produces in the city more opportunities to seek leadership status, a more specialized type of political leader, and a more meaningful system of political competition.

A greater measure of diversity characterizes urban leadership patterns in still other ways. An obvious example is the nominal or background profession of political leaders. In the villages of Okayama II, an overwhelming proportion of political leaders are naturally farmers or fishermen. In Ōsaka the principal professions represented are those of businessman, banker, organization representative, medicine or dentistry, construction, etc. The party affiliations of local political leaders are also different. At the local scene, a technical absence of formal party affiliation is almost the rule in the villages. As of 1955 in Okayama Prefecture, for example, 805 of a total of 811 members of town and village assemblies (99.2%) classified themselves as political independents. The remaining six openly admitted affiliation with "progressive," i. e., socialist or communist, parties. Of the 805, however, 201 (25%) were known to be of conservative party affiliation, while only 46 (5.6%) could be similarly identified with the progressive parties. The great bulk of the remaining 558 so-called "pure independents" were doubtless also of conservative orientation. The situation in the Ōsaka City Assembly in the same year may be contrasted to this. The progressive parties as a group polled 36.2 percent of the vote and controlled 35 percent of the seats. In Ōsaka, therefore, in local elections and in the city assembly the progressive parties offer real competition to the conservative majority. The extent and limitations of this will be described more fully in an ensuing section. It would also seem that the turnover among political leaders

is less rapid and extensive in the villages than in Ōsaka. There was, of course, some initial upset along these lines in both rural and urban locales as a result of the extension of SCAP's political purge to the local level in 1947. This seriously affected the positions and influence of many local leaders. Since 1949-50, however, the local political scene seems to have become quieter and the leadership situation more stabilized, though even so it is considerably more mobile than before the war. In Ōsaka, although one encounters quite a few long-time political leaders blessed with fairly secure status and positions, the political casualty rate is higher. There has been, in recent years at least, more turnover among the political leadership than is encountered in the villages. This is perhaps because so much more is expected of an urban than of a rural political leader. The contexts in which government is of immediate importance to the citizenry are far more numerous and urgent in the city. As a consequence more is demanded of urban leaders and their tenure is more conditional and less secure. This lack of security is reflected by still another aspect of urban political practice which is notably different from the rural scene. This is the intense and constant public activity demanded of any metropolitan political leader. A day spent with almost any member of the Ōsaka City Assembly, for example, is no mean test of one's powers of endurance. Politics is constantly with such men; it is a professional and highly exacting activity. The pace is far slower for political leaders in the villages, especially for the elective or informal categories. In Okayama II a village assembly normally meets only four to ten times a year, and then usually only for a day or two. Committee responsibilities are negligible, while campaigning and the cultivation of relations with one's constituents are apt to be more intermittent, far less systematic and calculated, and much less time-consuming. Politics for the village leader--accepting those with administrative positions--is apt to be a part-time and relatively unspecialized type of activity, with occasional peak periods when election time approaches.

There are other categories of difference between political leadership in Okayama II and in Ōsaka, but these will perhaps suffice to indicate in general terms the major types involved.

2. Popular Participation in the Political System

A second subject of broad interest for an analysis of political modernization is popular participation in the political decision-making system--in general who participates, by what means, and with what effects? These are questions of fundamental importance but of staggering ambit and ramifications. Only a small segment of the total subject will, therefore, be treated in the following remarks.

a. Formal Political Participation: the Voting Rate

The type of popular political participation to be considered here is of an official and public nature, primarily voting. Japanese elections are noteworthy for the relatively high proportion of those eligible who actually vote. This is particularly true in a national sense vis-a-vis, for example, current practice in the United States. There are, however, several notable differences in this respect between rural and urban performance as exemplified by Okayama and Ōsaka. Table IV indicates some of these.

Table IV. Voting Rates in Representative Postwar Elections in Okayama Prefecture and Osaka City (in percentages)

<u>Election</u>	<u>Local Assemblies</u>		<u>Prefectural Assemblies</u>		<u>House of Representatives</u>	
	<u>Okayama</u>	<u>Osaka</u>	<u>Okayama</u>	<u>Osaka</u>	<u>Okayama</u>	<u>Osaka</u>
1947	84.3*	65.5*	84.0*	65.5*	66.1	61.7
1949					75.5	67.3
1951	94.6	72.0	88.4	65.3		
1952					79.1	51.2
1953					74.6	51.0
1955	<u>86.7</u>	<u>60.9</u>	<u>79.8</u>	<u>60.5</u>	<u>77.5</u>	<u>59.5</u>
Averages	88.5	66.1	83.8	63.8	74.6	58.1

*Indicates elections held simultaneously

Table IV sets forth the percentages of eligible voters participating in a selection of representative elections in Okayama Prefecture and Osaka City from 1947 to 1955. Several things are immediately apparent. First, the voting rate in all elections is notably higher in rural Okayama than in urban Osaka. The average of averages for the elections here concerned would give a rate of 82.3 percent participation for Okayama against 62.7 percent for Osaka, a difference of 19.6 percent. The citizens of Osaka are much less apt to vote in any election than are the citizens of Okayama. This is generally true of rural-urban electoral behavior throughout Japan. Furthermore, in general the larger the city concerned, the greater the tendency to stay away from the polls. Second, a distinct hierarchy of interest in elections at different levels is implicit in these figures. This is the reverse of recent experience in the United States. The voters of both Okayama and Osaka are more interested in local than in national elections; furthermore, the more local the election, the greater the participation. Elections for the members of city, town, and village assemblies (or their mayors) produce the greatest turnout, followed by comparable elections at the prefectural level. General elections for the lower house of the National Diet--the House of Representatives--produce a distinctly smaller vote. Elections for the less powerful upper house, the House of Councillors (not shown in the Table), have the lowest voting rate of all. Third, the participation rate falls off more rapidly in rural areas than in urban as the election concerned moves from the local to the national level. This is to say that not only do the citizens of Okayama Prefecture turn out in far greater proportion for the most local elections, but also their curve of participation declines more sharply than does that of Osaka as the candidates and issues become less local and more remote. Finally, in both Okayama and Osaka the greatest decline in voting participation seems to take place between the prefectural and general elections rather than between the local and prefectural levels.

If, as is possible for elections held since 1951, one were to compile similar figures for the rural section only (gumbu) of Okayama Prefecture and compare these with the results for Osaka City, a still more refined comparison of rural-urban electoral behavior patterns would emerge. The results confirm in even more accentuated fashion the two major differences noted in Table IV.

The rural-urban discrepancy in average participation rates is even greater in this case, amounting to 25.7 percent rather than 19.6 percent, and the local to national hierarchy of descending interest in elections obtains in even more spectacular fashion.

A satisfactory explanation of these rural-urban differences in voting rates is a complicated undertaking requiring further study, but this much may be ventured. The total socio-political context within which elections takes place in the countryside and in the city is probably more important than differences in political interest or information levels among individual electors. No satisfactory polls or surveys which would shed light on the quantitative aspects of this issue are available, but my own research and experiences would indicate that levels of political information and sophistication are higher in Ōsaka than in the villages of Okayama II. Indeed, if as indicators of political interest one accepts informal as well as formal categories of political participation, I should be inclined to say that the people of Ōsaka are also more politically interested or involved than are those of rural Okayama, despite their far lower voting rates. The explanation for this discrepancy in voting rates seems, therefore, to lie elsewhere.

It is a truism that in Japan the foundations of conservative political strength lie in the countryside. The way in which this strength is organized and the social characteristics of villages and villagers probably explains the higher rates of political participation in the countryside. Briefly the situation is as follows. Compared to a large city like Ōsaka, the villages are tight-knit and cohesive communities. Their external political interests are fewer, more specific, and more modest. Political leadership within both the villages and their constituent *buraku* is more concentrated and far more uniform in its party allegiance, which is predominantly conservative. Within such an environment sentiments of in-group cohesiveness and of mutual obligation seem to be stronger than in the more diffuse and centrifugal environment of cities. Consequently, there exists a feeling that voting is a social obligation in support or defense of their *buraku*'s, or village's, or prefecture's leaders against those of competing constituencies. The rural voter seems to picture the political process primarily in personal rather than programmatic terms. From it he hopes for a modicum of favor where local roads, schools, irrigation projects, etc. are concerned. In these ways he is more mobilizable politically and more manipulatable, within limits, by his traditional leaders than is his urban counterpart. The conservative campaign apparatus is based upon an excellent understanding of these factors and a highly developed ability to exploit them by turning out the village vote regularly and reliably. This situation cannot be matched on a similar scale in Ōsaka or in any of the larger cities.

The explanation of the descending rate of participation from local to national elections is probably corollary to this. Political identification in both rural and urban Japan still remains primarily local. The problems and leaders closest to home are the most meaningful and stimulating; those at the prefectural and national levels progressively less so. Consequently, the apparatus for political mobilization and turning out the vote is apt to be more effective as the election level becomes more local.

Perhaps the most interesting question regarding these patterns of political participation, however, is whether changes are occurring. Are there

indications that the present ratio between rural and urban voting participation is changing or that national or prefectural political identifications might challenge the primacy of local ones? It is difficult to say with much certainty. None of the figures presently available, however, yield convincing evidence that either rural or urban voting participation patterns in Japan are developing in the direction of the existing pattern in the United States, i. e. higher urban participation rates and a scale of interest and identification descending from national to local. It is an interesting commentary on a country which we tend to regard as both unusually homogeneous and politically centralized that their voting behavior and political identifications should be so locally oriented. Beyond this, the figures would seem to caution against the assumption that in contemporary Japan there is any positive correlation between the overall rate of voting participation in a jurisdiction and the level of political information or even interest of its citizenry. The general reasons for this statistical superiority of rural areas, I have already tried to explain. A more specific explanation might also be tentatively advanced. Another dimension of political participation may well have been added to voting in Japan's great cities. This takes the shape of systematically organized interest group activities which open to the citizen of Ōsaka an area of effective, if informal, political participation which is not as yet available on an even relatively comparable scale to the villagers of Okayama.

b. Informal Political Participation: Political Interest Groups

Political interest groups exist in the villages of Japan but most often in forms so unorganized, latent, and inarticulate that their identification and evaluation is difficult. First impressions of a postwar village in Okayama II can be somewhat misleading since almost any village office will readily produce on request a list of some twenty-odd groups organized within its jurisdiction. Such a list would regularly embrace a women's association, a PTA, a youth group, a supply and perhaps a marketing cooperative, a merchants' organization, an irrigation association, a social welfare committee, an association for the advancement of culture, a village employers' organization, a variety of religious groups in support of local shrines and temples, and a number of others. Without exception, there are numerous areas where the theoretical interests of such groups impinge on politics and administration. Yet they seldom engage in any form of political action or pressure that exceeds the bounds of a vague likemindedness on the relevant issues.

There are exceptions to this rule. Irrigation, for example, is a subject of vital personal interest to all members of farm households. It has profoundly affected their livelihood and fortunes for centuries. Without question the irrigation cooperatives make systematic representations to the village governments as to their water and drainage rights--especially in times of drought or flood. Occasionally the priests of shrines or temples will form a political support group for a favored candidate or a pressure group for some measure affecting them or their property. Recently also local members of the national teachers union have increasingly attempted to mobilize the PTA associations in the villages for political purposes or campaigns. There are also villages where one or the other of the national federations of farmers' unions maintains a local. Where these exist, they are almost certain to function as a political interest group, but in general they have a relatively weak and dispersed hold.

A more common type of rural interest group activity, however, is the brief ad hoc emergence of some local group from its normal condition of latency.

I have seen this happen in seemingly almost spontaneous protest against the over-assessment of a buraku's rice requisition quota or against the mounting costs to the village of electric drainage pumps which benefited only a section of the village's lands and people. It also may be occasioned by the presentation of an important local problem to a village, such as where to locate a new school, meeting place, or recreation facility. In cases such as these, however, it is usually difficult to detect any group planning or overt action. Only on the occasion of the rice quota protest was there anything approximating identifiable group action. In the other cases, however, there seemed to be no need for group action. Everyone took it for granted, for example, that every buraku wants a new school as close by as possible without disturbance to its fields, and that every village assemblyman would, of course, appreciate this fact and protect the interests of his buraku to the best of his ability. Consequently, such issues were largely decided by negotiation and compromise within the village assembly without any real need for the interested groups to organize or take overt action. Their known interest simply provided more than the usual stimulus and pressure to negotiations in the assembly.

Most of the above instances of low-grade interest group activity apply primarily to intra-village problems and decisions. If one looks for occasions where interest groups at the village level, either alone or in combination, seek to influence attitudes or decisions at higher political levels, examples are very hard to find. The regional irrigation cooperatives would provide one. The prefectural and national associations of town and village mayors would perhaps be another. The farmers' unions also have larger political interests and objectives, but they are relatively weak and unimportant. Beyond this there is little.

A word should be said about the general characteristics of the few interest groups that exist in the villages. They have a modicum of organization or structure, if any at all. The village records showing committees, duly elected officers, etc. are misleading in this respect. SCAP and the postwar democratization movement brought to Japan a spate of committees. Both national and prefectural governments are constantly urging the villages to create new committees for this or that worthy purpose; so committees are appointed and officers named. Usually nothing more happens, unless the villages too have a real interest in the subject. The typical rural interest group, ad hoc in nature and purpose, will be called into brief existence by a particular urgent need and will quietly and speedily return to its normal condition of latency soon thereafter. Furthermore, the occasions which evoke such temporary mobilizations are more apt to be negative than positive. They represent a protest against something which seriously threatens the common interests. Groups with positive programs are rarer. Finally, their normal techniques of operation are almost completely local and unobtrusive. If any overt representation is made, it tends to focus on the mayor or the members of the village assembly; occasionally it may involve someone having access to a prefectural politician or, very seldom, a national politician.

What impresses one most though is the relative absence of identifiable interest groups at the village level. This requires a word of explanation. First, it should be understood that interest group activities of an organized or systematic sort stem from a positive attitude towards government. People who have not accepted the proposition that government should be in the popular interest and that the citizenry should play a positive part in the public decision-making

process are not apt to do more than launch sporadic protests. Second, not many meaningful decisions are made at the village level under the Japanese system of government. Consequently, a village office or assembly is not often a fruitful focus for the activities of pressure groups. This is not to say that devices for the aggregating of interests on subjects of real concern do not exist in the Japanese countryside. They most obviously do, as the efficiency of the irrigation systems or of the conservative campaign apparatus testifies. But they function in an atmosphere notable for its likemindedness with respect to many issues as well as for its traditional passivity vis-a-vis the organs and officials of government. Under these circumstances local interests tend to be aggregated and expressed through a sort of social osmosis more congenial to the traditional preferences for personalized and indirect methods of operation than are the more overt, impersonal and systematic methods of the great cities.

From the standpoint of interest group activities a great city like Ōsaka is a completely different world from Okayama II. Systematically organized groups with well defined political interests and programs press on one from all sides. Each of the twenty-two ward offices, for example, publishes annually a directory of organizations within its boundaries possessed of public-affecting interests. The 1955 edition of the Minami Ku directory has seventy printed pages listing the names and top officers of such groups and their local branches. Unlike their rural counterparts, such lists are meaningful in the city. Practically all of them actually exist, meet, formulate programs, and take action to promote their interests. The great majority also seem to have interests which affect politics or administration in significant measure and which require representation before both ward and city officials. These are interest groups in a mature and structured sense of the word.

These urban groups tend to be organized along two lines which often overlap. The first is by interest or trade, the second geographical. There is seldom an interest or trade that is not somehow represented by the web of organizations covering Ōsaka. Cutting across such interest alignments are the great street and sectional organizations of Ōsaka. Take Minami Ku again as an example, a district lying in the heart of the city's teeming entertainment, commercial, and small-industrial sections. Each of its great shopping streets or areas--Shinsaibashi-suji, Dotombori, Ebisu-machi, Sennichimae, Matsuyamachi-suji--has one or more street organizations representing the combined interests of all the shops and businesses of its particular locality. This situation is multiplied countless times throughout the city.

One does not have to search far for evidence of the political interests, activities, and connections of most of these groups. The calling card of a prominent local political figure will do as a starting point. On its face its owner describes himself as a member of the city's Election Administration Commission, chairman of a major branch of the city's Red Cross organization, and director of the association of subway shopping areas. On the back he lists his chairmanships and directorships in twelve other organizations ranging from the Association of Natives of Mie Prefecture Resident in Ōsaka to the Minami Ku Cooperative Society for Fire Prevention and Public Security. An important function of practically all such groups is to support the political campaigns of their leaders and affiliates. A brief look at one of the most unpolitical sounding of the organizations mentioned on this calling card is instructive in this connection.

There was a time when the local service units of the Japanese Red Cross (Niseki Hōshidan) in Ōsaka were largely what their title would indicate. This has not been true since Japan's defeat and the dissolution by SCAP order of the wartime block organizations in Japanese cities (tonarigumi). These block organizations were a network of hierarchically structured groups covering every part of the city. Its elemental unit, the han, consisted of a bloc of about twenty neighboring households. Membership was compulsory. These organizations had proven themselves of great administrative value during the war, especially for rationing, civil defense, and so-called spiritual mobilization programs. Since they were tightly organized and included the entire population, they were also a practically ideal system for the organization and mobilization of political support. They were in this sense the urban equivalent of the buraku (the liquidation of which were also ordered by SCAP). Consequently, when SCAP ordered their dissolution in 1947, the system was not allowed to perish. After a brief period of dormancy, the network was resurrected under new auspices, those of the Red Cross. For some years now, this Red Cross system of block and district organizations has provided one of the most important elements in the organization and conduct of conservative political campaigns in the city of Ōsaka. The same is said to be true in some other major cities. In the political campaigns of the progressive parties the major labor unions perform similar functions. The political involvement of the Red Cross service units is perhaps an extreme case, but many other urban interest groups from the PTA to the League of the War Bereaved also play qualitatively similar political roles.

Interest group activities in Ōsaka are by no means limited to local issues or arenas, as is usually the case in the countryside. The more important groups are branches of national associations with headquarters and staffs in Tōkyō, and which operate there before the national ministries and the Diet. This is true, for example, of the Widows Organization, League of Middle and Small Industries, the major unions and employers' associations, and others. Occasionally, their interests even transcend national boundaries. The League of Middle and Small Industries, for example, probably constitutes the principal support for the long campaign to bring about expanded trade and diplomatic relations with the Chinese Peoples Republic. The local representatives of big business have been similarly active in the national protests against United States tariff and quota policies restricting the further expansion of Japan's trade with this country.

In almost every important way interest groups in Ōsaka differ markedly from those in the villages of Okayama II. In the latter environment interest groups are few, and tend to be of the latent, inarticulate, ephemeral, ad hoc, local-focussed, and unorganized variety. In Ōsaka, they are numerous, very vocal, continuous, programmatic, and of expansive focus, and well organized. This would seem to be one of the most dramatic and significant of the differences between rural and urban Japan. It perhaps also in some measure explains the habitually low voting rates in Ōsaka. Involvement in the activities of one or the other of these interest groups provides the people of Ōsaka with an alternative dimension of political action. At the same time they offer a more personalized, convenient, and accessible means of accomplishing one's more immediate political aims and needs. Furthermore, they probably seem to those concerned a more effective form of political action. This may account in part for the relatively low esteem in which the citizens of Ōsaka hold the ballot. Beyond this, it also seems highly probable that this familiarity with interest groups and their

potentialities is one of the important factors explaining the far more positive and demanding attitudes towards politics and politicians which also distinguish Ōsaka from Okayama.

3. Patterns of Political Allegiance

Postwar Japan has seen a notable rise in the fortunes and strength of "progressive political parties." The term includes the entire range of socialist affiliation from extreme right wing socialists to the Communists. There had been left-wing parties with legal status in prewar Japan, but in general their support was small and localized. However, with socialism's accession to respectability and its development of nationwide support since the war, it has become possible to analyze popular political sentiments and loyalties in somewhat more meaningful terms. The voter now has a range of readily available and really different political alternatives not previously available. It is of some interest to see how he has used these and, for present purposes in particular, to determine whether there are significant differences in the voting records of Okayama and Ōsaka from the standpoint of political party affiliation. Table V supplies the relevant figures expressed as percentages of the total votes cast in Okayama Prefecture and Ōsaka City in a series of elections held between 1947 and 1955. All were based on universal adult suffrage. Examination of this Table suggests a number of conclusions.

First, although the conservative group of political parties are predominant in both areas, their strength is notably greater in the countryside. Just how much greater is not immediately apparent. It must be understood that the bulk of the so-called independents are really concealed conservatives. This means that at the local level in Okayama some ninety percent of the independents are very probably conservatives and their strength should properly be transferred to the conservative column. The same is true of approximately sixty-five percent of the independents at the prefectural level, and practically all of them at the House of Representatives level. The categorization of such candidates as "conservative-affiliated," "progressive-affiliated" or "pure" independents is distinctly misleading in this sense. The rating is self-assessed by the candidates concerned, and the "progressive-affiliated" response is perhaps the only remotely meaningful one. The actual party orientations of the so-called independents in Ōsaka City are even more heavily conservative. Consequently, to gain a true idea of the dimensions of conservative strength in Ōsaka City it is necessary to transpose practically all of the independent strength to the conservative column. When this is done, there will emerge in both Okayama and Ōsaka a pattern of conservative political strength graded downward from the local assemblies to the House of Representatives, and uniformly stronger on the rural than the urban side.

The popularity of progressive political orientations is, of course, a reciprocal of conservative strength. In a total sense, it is perhaps most accurate to view the strength of this group in terms of the combined vote of the progressive group and the Communist Party. When so combined, it will at once be seen that the progressive cause is far weaker at all levels in the countryside than in the city--considerably more than those figures indicate, since in most cases they contain the urban as well as the rural elements of the Okayama prefectural vote. Despite this, left-wing political affiliations cannot be regarded

Table V. Party Preferences in Selected Postwar Elections
(In Percentages of Total Vote Cast)

	Okayama Prefecture ¹						
	Conser- vative Group			Progressive Group ⁴		Independents	
	Conser- vative Group	Communist Party	Minor Parties	Conser- vative Affil.	Progressive Affil.	Pure	Total
1947	2.2	0.6					94.3
Local Assemblies ²	49.7	4.3	1.1				27.2
Prefectural Assembly	69.4	5.1					0.7
House of Representatives	66.5	10.4		34.4	10.1	55.5	7.8
1949	0.3	0.3		56.8	37.6	5.7	98.5
House of Representatives	57.4	0.4	0.8				19.8
Local Assemblies ³	68.0	2.8	1.0				8.1
Prefectural Assembly	66.7	1.8					0.07
House of Representatives	53.1	0.3		35.2	5.5	59.3	98.8
1953	60.8	0.2		60.8	31.4	7.7	32.6
House of Representatives	65.7	1.9					0.6
Local Assemblies	0.8	0.4		34.8	7.8	57.4	97.2
Prefectural Assembly	53.4	1.6	0.6	58.7	34.5	6.7	26.5
House of Representatives	67.3	4.4	0.2				3.4
Averages							

1. The nature of the available statistics makes it necessary to use the whole of Okayama Prefecture as a datum area.

2. This category for 1947 includes the Ōsaka City Assembly plus all city, town and village assemblies in Okayama Prefecture. The available statistics for 1947 do not distinguish between the urban and rural vote in local assembly elections.
3. This category for 1951 and 1955 includes the Ōsaka City Assembly and town and village assemblies only in Okayama Prefecture.
4. Exclusive of the Communist Party.

		Ōsaka City				
		Conservative Group	Progressive Group ⁴	Communist Group	Minor Parties	Independents
1947	Local Assemblies ²	55.4	24.3	4.3	2.0	14.1
	Prefectural Assembly	54.2	32.1	6.3	3.8	3.6
	House of Representatives	45.1	33.7	7.8	11.8	1.6
1949	House of Representatives	55.3	12.1	24.3		8.3
1951	Local Assemblies ³	49.2	21.8	5.7	0.6	22.7
	Prefectural Assembly	55.0	26.0	4.6		14.4
1952	House of Representatives	50.4	37.9	7.6		4.1
1953	House of Representatives	47.6	38.7	6.9		6.8
1955	Local Assemblies ³	47.9	30.7	5.8	0.5	15.4
	Prefectural Assembly	43.0	36.0	5.6		15.3
	House of Representatives	45.9	35.8	12.6	1.2	4.5
<u>Averages</u>						
	Local Assemblies	50.8	25.6	5.3	1.0	17.4
	Prefectural Assembly	50.7	31.4	5.5	1.3	11.1
	House of Representatives	48.9	31.6	11.8	2.6	5.1

as an urban monopoly in Japan. They are stronger in the cities and more conspicuous, but they also have a substantial and probably increasing hold in the countryside. One notes also that the focus of combined progressive strength in both Okayama and Ōsaka is at the national election level and that it falls off steadily from this high point through the prefectural to the local level. Finally, the angle of this decline is far sharper in the rural than in the urban area. Similar patterns obtain for the progressive group and Communist Party figures if they are examined separately, though they are somewhat skewed by the abnormal size of the Communist vote in 1949, largely gained at the expense of the other socialist parties.

The Communist column provides some grounds for speculation about the size of the reliable or hard core Communist vote in rural and urban Japan. In Okayama the Party obviously cannot count on more than a tiny fraction of the vote at either the local or prefectural assembly levels. The vote shown at the prefectural level is largely derived from the cities of Okayama. Only at the national level does it become appreciable and here attains a most unrepresentative maximum of 10.4 percent in 1949. If one adjusts this to more normal performance levels, about three percent of the vote would seem to be a generous estimate of their overall average support, while this maximum in recent national elections has been less than two percent. The situation in Ōsaka, long one of the areas of strongest support for the Communist Party in all Japan, is markedly different. Here, too, the support level is somewhat higher at the national than at the prefectural or city assembly level, but the relative strength of the Party at all levels is more notable. The 1949 showing is again unrepresentative, but even if this is adjusted, their average vote at the national level in Ōsaka is between eight and nine percent. A range of five to eight percent depending on the level of election would then seem to be a fair estimate for Ōsaka. It is doubtful if this is matched in any other city in Japan.

The anomalous status of the independent vote has already been mentioned. One might add to the former remarks that the size of the independent vote tapers off sharply from the local to the national levels, especially in the countryside. It is standard practice in rural areas to run for local office as an independent. Mostly local issues are involved, and only a very few of the national or regional political parties strive to maintain a party apparatus that is active in the countryside except during general or prefectural election campaigns. Party identifications at the local level are then largely irrelevant. At the national level the independent vote tends to lose any but marginal significance. The situation is less clearcut at the prefectural level, but here too party organizations would seem to be preempting the bulk of the votes at the expense of the independents and minor party candidates--the latter being unimportant in both Okayama and Ōsaka.

In general these figures also show a greater tendency in Ōsaka than in Okayama towards the leveling out of differences in voting behavior at the local, prefectural, and national levels. The range of voting behavior in practically all categories of Table V is appreciably narrower in the urban than in the rural sample. This would seem to indicate a growing uniformity in the urban voters' perception of the issues involved in elections at all levels, attributable perhaps in part to a more selected electorate, and in part to the better organization and greater effectiveness of a modern form of political party organization in Ōsaka.

4. Patterns of Political Support

The rural-urban differences in political allegiances already noted are based in part on correlative differences in political support systems. Both political parties and the support organizations of individual political figures are organized differently and function along different lines in Okayama and in Ōsaka. The situation is not simple, however; it not only varies from countryside to city, but also with the level of election campaign involved--local, prefectural or national. For present purposes, it will perhaps be adequate if we describe rural-urban differences at the two ends of this scale, i. e., in the cases of local and national elections.

a. Local Political Support Systems

An electoral campaign in Okayama at the village assembly or mayoral level is a rather strange experience for a Western observer. To begin with, despite the high rate of voting participation noted earlier and the presence of genuine local interest in the results, nothing unusual seems to be occurring in the village. There are no speeches, no signs or handbills, no obvious changes in the patterns or tempos of daily life. The reasons for this state of affairs become clear once the villagers' attitudes towards local politics are understood.

Contests for seats on a village assembly, for example, are organized primarily along buraku and family rather than personal or programmatic lines. Each buraku feels a definite stake in having its interests represented on the village assembly. Hence, although a solid bloc vote by the inhabitants of a given buraku is not assured, the group tends to vote as a unit. Exceptions usually occur only where serious social rifts exist. Such cases do not normally have a serious effect on buraku solidarity in village-level elections, however. Outside his buraku of residence a candidate's primary campaign appeal is through the ranges of kin relationships. Within the buraku itself, personality and status become important in determining the community's candidate. Considerations of program, however, except for the group's general likemindedness on issues of local concern, seem to play a negligible part. What the voter wants and the candidate must supply is the quality of representation for the buraku concerned.

As for techniques of mobilizing political support, it should first be noted that once a buraku has chosen its candidate, the votes will follow more or less automatically. A campaign in the Western sense is, therefore, superfluous. So few votes are uncommitted or available, that it would be largely wasted effort. Local conceptions of appropriate public deportment reinforce this view. It is not considered proper either to make overt display of one's aspirations to public office or to engage in open struggle with one's competitors. To do either would be apt to endanger community solidarity and to raise publicly delicate issues of "face." For such reasons the draft--sometimes self-arranged--is the normal means of choosing candidates at this level. Once chosen, they are expected at least to preserve the appearance of modestly and passively awaiting the decision at the polls. The system in general operates with such precision that often the number of candidates precisely matches the number of seats available, in which case no election is necessary. Any sizeable excess of candidates over seats is most uncommon.

In generalized terms the principal characteristics of such a system of organized political support can perhaps be described as follows. First, it is almost completely self-contained within the village concerned. Outside agencies such as political parties seldom intrude, although occasionally the progressive parties try to influence the process. Second, it is organized primarily in terms of elementary rural communities, i. e., *buraku*, and secondarily along kinship lines. Third, the system serves the interests of these communities by providing reliable representation of their interests in the assembly; individual interests are of secondary concern. Fourth, organized or overt campaigns are rare. And fifth, the system tends to minimize the difference between the total number of candidates and the number of seats at stake.

In contrast to the above situation, the Western observer feels almost completely at home in an election campaign for the Ōsaka City Assembly. All the familiar hallmarks are present. Candidates appeal personally to the voters; party labels are either used or are known; the local press, radio, and television facilities concentrate on the campaign; sound trucks cruise the streets; there can be no doubt as to what is going on. The differences from the village scene are great at both the visual and deeper levels. To begin with, such an election is no longer a self-contained matter. The results of an Ōsaka City election are of national interest and of more than local concern. The regional headquarters of the national political parties mobilize for the occasion; notable speakers are imported on behalf of this or that candidate; national Diet members return from Tōkyō to join the campaign; prefectural assemblymen from the city's districts are also involved. This is metropolitan politics with national connections and consequences. The basic unit of organization is different and far larger. It is the ward (*ku*) with a population sometimes in excess of one hundred thousand, which makes large-scale political organization essential. Candidates usually reflect a confluence of active and public pursuit of the position by the individual concerned and the choice of city-wide party organizations and local interest groups. While a candidate usually enjoys some vested and dependable support from the voters of his immediate neighborhood of residence, this is both less solid and much less significant than in the countryside. Far wider support is essential, and a candidate's success depends upon his ability to aggregate and maintain this.

The techniques of aggregation are not qualitatively different from our own. Each candidate usually has one or more support organizations (*kōenkai*) in his own ward, which promote his political career. They are held together by personal bonds and expectation of patronage of many varieties. Practically all candidates are inveterate joiners; their relations with interest groups, either directly or through members of their support organizations, are of critical importance. Such groups are the key to the aggregation of sufficient political support. There seems to be some difference along party lines in the interest groups involved. Left-wing socialist candidates, for example, depend very strongly on labor union support--a distinct weakness at the local election level since the voting residences of the laborers concerned are almost certain to be scattered throughout a number of the city's twenty-two wards. Right-wing socialists draw some union support but usually concentrate their energies on competition with the conservatives for access to the whole arena of non-labor interest groups. The conservatives in general are strongest with the big business groups; the merchant associations, the Red Cross service units, the Widows Society, the war-bereaved groups, the PTA, etc.

Organized political parties also play an important role. Progressive candidates usually but not always run as socialist or communist party nominees. Conservative practice varies. Some run under national party labels; others run under the banner of a city party affiliated with the national conservative party apparatus; still others prefer the more traditional but not significantly different status of independents. Whatever the choice, most of them have connections with the local conservative party, obtain its endorsement, and often some campaign assistance. Little direct financial assistance is available from this source, however.

Campaigns are public, intensive, and highly competitive. Japanese law attempts to regulate campaign activities in minute and most unrealistic detail in order to insure ethical conduct and equality of opportunity. Its successes have been modest and confined to the short month before the election when "campaigning" as such is legal. Actually in a professionalized system of this sort, campaigning is a more or less continuous year-around process. At the legal level it involves all the resources of modern mass media, though the candidates' access to radio and television is rather drastically regulated. Beyond this, the usual techniques of influencing groups and voters are called into play. Particularly important is the lavish entertainment of critically placed individuals. Campaigns are deservedly popular with the restaurants and entertainment houses of Ōsaka.

In generalized terms, therefore, political support systems in local elections in Ōsaka are not qualitatively different from those in many Western metropolises. They are part of an increasingly nationalized rather than an exclusively local political system. They are organized primarily along party or interest group lines; and in this sense they have significant programmatic content. Candidates usually are either professional politicians or aspire to become such. Campaigns are organized, public, and intensive, and the competition is keen. A great gap divides such a system from that prevailing in the villages of Okayama.

b. Political Support Systems in National Elections

The organization of political support in a national election in Ōsaka is basically similar to local elections. The public furor is greater, national parties are more active, party lines are more rigidly drawn, a greater emphasis is placed upon the platforms of both parties and candidates, and far more money is spent. But the elements involved and the processes and techniques employed are essentially similar. In the villages of Okayama, however, national elections differ in interesting respects from both local elections already described and practiced in Ōsaka. These differences add up to a system of political support which provides the organizational basis for the continued dominance of conservative parties and politicians in rural Japan.

As in local elections, this system rests ultimately on the buraku and the political attitudes and practices of their inhabitants. We have seen that as the level of election becomes more remote, the voting rate in the buraku drops. While still very high by American standards, it is lowest in national elections. The buraku residents see the relationship between national decisions and policies and their well-being, but apparently consider the stakes involved as less immediate and tangible. As a result the voting solidarity of the buraku in local

elections tends at the national level to break down. Feeling that the community no longer must vote en bloc to insure and protect its immediate interests, some of the villagers become more susceptible to programmatic appeals. Some may vote for a socialist, labor-farmer, or even a communist candidate.

The majority react differently, however, for rather complex reasons. They seem to feel inadequate to judge the relative merits of the candidates involved. They usually also feel some attachment and loyalty to the political group which has dominated Okayama politics since the 1890's. Again the habit of group solidarity against the outside is deeply ingrained; a common front on important issues is traditional practice in the buraku, not only for emotional reasons, but also because of practical considerations. One such is the realization that the policies of conservative national governments in postwar times have been quite consistently favorable to village interests in general. Tax structure, price supports, and import policies all cater to farmers. An amalgam of such motivations interact to produce a second consequence of interest to us: the tendency to seek and take local advice on how to vote in a prefectural or national election.

There almost invariably exists in each buraku some individual generally regarded as having superior political knowledge or political contacts outside the community, usually both. Actually this regard is not necessarily confined to the political sphere; the person concerned often enjoys a superior status in more generalized terms. Sometimes there is more than one such person in a buraku. This is apt to cause problems. Normally the way they assess elections and candidates carries great local weight. There is nothing compulsory about their political advice. In fact it may be both sought and given only in quite indirect ways. In practice, however, it seems usually to be followed. This is the basis of a far ramifying system. These individuals typically have either direct or mediate contacts with important local politicians in their own or adjacent villages and towns. These men in turn are connected at the regional or prefectural level, and thence the path leads directly to the prefecture's conservative representatives in the two houses of the National Diet or to their major factional rivals, where it ends. At the upper levels of this communication system in particular strong personal loyalties and common interests, reinforced by a variety of types of patronage, bind the actors together. At lower levels it is more often long association, occasional entertainment, petty favors, and a regard for the local status conferred which secures the cooperation of the individuals at the buraku and village levels. Open bribery is far less common than before the war. The point to note is that the system almost always operates on behalf of the conservative political parties and their candidates.

The present system was established by conservatives in the 1890's to cope with the new problems of popular elections. The introduction of the single-vote, multi-member constituency system strengthened its hold. It was absolutely essential, even with the restricted franchise, to devise some way of effectively apportioning a party's total vote among its several candidates. This system was the answer, and it functioned with admirable precision and efficiency before the war, especially prior to the introduction of universal manhood suffrage in 1925. It was always an apparatus of the dominant conservative parties, however, and it has continued as such until today. With the postwar emergence of a real opposition to the conservatives, the further expansion of the suffrage, and the vast improvement of communications it has been sorely tried. Still it

regularly provides the conservative candidates with approximately two-thirds of the popular vote in general elections. This is a formidable accomplishment and an obstacle which the socialists must surmount before they can make much progress in the countryside.

Traces of a comparable system are to be seen in Ōsaka, but they are relatively faint. The circumstances of life and politics in a metropolitan setting seem hostile to the flourishing of a system as personally and unprogrammatically oriented as this. The system is probably declining in the countryside as well, but its continued ability to adapt and survive is most impressive.

5. Popular Political Attitudes

Perhaps the most fundamental and important of the differences between the villagers of Okayama and the citizens of Ōsaka lie in their political attitudes. Although difficult to generalize about accurately in the absence of reliable survey data, some account of salient impressions in this area is essential. Since the situation is changing in both environments, it is hard to give a precise account.

In traditional terms the Japanese villager neither feels he has the right or responsibility to participate in the political process. The average farmer was enfranchised only in 1925, his wife in 1946. In a political sense the 1868-1945 period of Japanese history produced more legal than actual changes at the village level, while the previous centuries offer an unbroken vista of oligarchic rule during which few even dreamed about peasant participation in the political process. The theories and practices of democracy are really new to these people, and, despite the Occupation's missionary zeal, they are gaining a foothold only in slow and piecemeal fashion. A very sizeable gap continues to separate statutory fancy from political fact at the village level. The consequences are interesting to observe.

First, the notion that government is something which is done to or for people rather than by them persists. The people do not sense the possibility or potentialities of themselves assuming political initiative. Only a very serious issue produces concerted political action of a positive type--other than voting--in the villages of Okayama. The relative absence of interest groups and the effectiveness of the local system of political support are added testimonials to the extent and effectiveness of this attitude. Corollary to this is the relative lack of political alternatives. The possibilities of protest votes or of the adoption of socialist political allegiance seem to occur to relatively few. These considerations lead farmers to adopt political attitudes which are not so much apathetic as they are resigned. One cannot help but be impressed by the prevalence of the "shikata ga nai" (it can't be helped) psychology, the feeling that things have always been this way for the peasant and probably always will be.

Yet to end the discussion here leaves a misleading impression. While this is the basic attitude and still the most common, the forces of change are also active in the villages. Woman suffrage, lowering the voting age, the limited successes and continuing activities of the "progressive" parties, changes in the household and inheritance sections of the Civil Code, expanded civil rights

and social security programs, the new educational system, the newspapers and radio, and a variety of other factors are gradually affecting village attitudes and practices. Important changes are in process, but, even so, at the moment it is the continued vitality of the traditional attitudes and practices which impresses one most at the village level.

Popular political attitudes in Ōsaka are considerably different. It would be an exaggeration to claim that they view government as a servant of the people. Perhaps it takes a French revolutionary-type background really to substantiate such a viewpoint. But they do definitely consider it to be accessible and manipulatable. There is little of the sense of awe and resignation so often encountered in the countryside. Living perforce in a metropolitan environment with many and continuous points of contact with the agents and works of "big government" seems to produce such views. Politicians actively seek their votes at election time; they have some experience with interest groups and their political activities; they are aware of the existence of political alternatives in the form of support for aspiring candidates and parties other than the official conservative nominees, and do not hesitate to make use of these; political scandals are common and widely publicized. Circumstances such as these breed a certain cynicism about the political process, but they also produce a measure of independence and acumen in one's political attitudes. This is perhaps the most fundamental political difference between the people of rural Okayama and those of urban Ōsaka.

IV. Conclusion

It might be helpful in conclusion to sketch in generalized terms the major categories of rural-urban political differences we have been discussing. The following profiles would emerge.

A. Political Leadership

<u>Okayama</u>	<u>Ōsaka</u>
1. Males	Males
2. Average age: low fifties	Low fifties
3. Long local residence important	Local residence important
4. Superior lineage advantageous	Lineage relatively unimportant
5. Leadership status generalized	Leadership status specialized
6. Politics a spare time activity	Politics a full-time, professionalized activity
7. Profession: farming	Business, banking, the professions, etc.
8. Party affiliation: independents of conservative orientation	Explicit conservative or progressive party affiliation customary
9. Turnover: slower than in Osaka	
10. Political activity: intermittent	Constant

B. Popular Participation in the Political System

The Voting Rate

1. The voting rate is uniformly higher in rural areas at all levels of elections.
2. The available evidence suggests that the larger the city, the higher the abstention rate.
3. In both rural and urban areas, the voting rate falls off markedly as one ascends the scale from local, through prefectural to national elections; the more local the election, the higher the turnout.
4. The rural voting rate falls off more sharply than the urban as one ascends the scale of local to national elections.
5. Some tendency is discernible in urban areas for the curve of voting participation in various types of elections to level off.
6. There seems to be no uniform correlation in rural and urban areas between overall voting participation and the level of political information or interest.
7. As yet no tendency is apparent for urban-rural patterns of voting participation in Japan to approximate those in the United States.

Political Interest Groups

<u>Okayama</u>	<u>Osaka</u>
1. Few in numbers	Very numerous
2. Organization: loose and ad hoc	Structured and systematic
3. Duration: usually ephemeral	Continuous
4. Emphasis: usually negative or protestant	Positive or negative
5. Focus: strictly local	Local, national, or international
6. Program: usually ad hoc or vague and latent	Explicit and systematic
7. Style: usually inarticulate, personalized, and secretive	Vocal, often public, and rationalized

C. Patterns of Political Allegiance

1. Conservative political allegiances predominate in both rural and urban areas.
2. At all levels--local, prefectural, and national--the dimensions of conservative political strength are greater in the countryside than in the city.

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3. In both rural and urban areas the dimensions of conservative political strength are greatest at the local level and thence scale downward through the prefectural to the national level. The curve of declination is steeper in rural than in urban areas.

4. Progressive political allegiances in general are notably weaker at all levels in the countryside than in the city. Still progressive political allegiances are far from being an urban monopoly.

5. In both rural and urban areas progressive political strength is greatest at the national level and thence falls off to the prefectural and local levels. The angle of decline is far sharper in rural than in urban areas.

6. Communist Party affiliation is far stronger in the city than in the countryside, and is insignificant in the villages at the local and prefectural level.

7. Minor party allegiances are of insignificant importance in both rural and urban areas at all levels.

8. Independent candidates are normally conservative in their political allegiance in both rural and urban areas.

9. "Independent" political allegiances are most common in local level elections, and thence decline in numbers through prefectural to national elections. This tendency is far more pronounced in the countryside than in the city.

10. Some tendency is discernible in urban areas toward a leveling off of differences in voting behavior at the various levels of election.

D. Patterns of Political Support at the Local Level:

<u>Okayama</u>	<u>Ōsaka</u>
1. Self-contained within village	Important national and regional aspects
2. Organized by <u>buraku</u>	Organized by wards along political party and interest group lines
3. Organized or overt campaigns are rare	Organized, public, and intensive campaigns essential
4. System displays tendency to minimize the difference between the number of seats and the number of candidates.	Sharp competition for seats normal
5. Explicit programmatic content usually small	Significant and explicit programmatic content usual

At the National Level

1. Based ultimately on buraku Same as above in general
2. Characterized by informal and personalized system of communications and political allegiance stretching from locally prominent individuals at buraku level to national figures in Diet
3. System is controlled at all levels by conservative political leaders

E. Political Attitudes

1. Rural political attitudes are normally characterized by a lack of any sense of a popular right to participate in the public decision-making process, an absence of effective will to avail themselves of existing political alternatives, and a general sentiment of resignation vis-a-vis the political process. Such attitudes are, however, changing in slow and piecemeal fashion and in the general direction of existing urban patterns.

2. Urban political attitudes are normally characterized by greater independence, a more positive and demanding posture, and the general view that the processes of government are both accessible to and manipulatable by the people.

In highly summary and generalized terms these are the principal conclusions reached in this paper. They are intended primarily as a suggestive, not a definitive, listing of some of the significant categories of political differences found to exist between two specific rural and urban areas in contemporary Japan. It is not claimed that they are typical of all Japan, but it is thought probable that they are reasonably representative of rural-urban patterns throughout most of the country. The fact that Japan is by any standards well "advanced" along the scale of traditional to modern development undoubtedly detracts from the possibilities of readily adapting the patterns noted here to the experience of other less developed areas in southern or southeastern Asia. However, the Japanese experience when viewed from the developmental standpoint does provide some grounds for assuming the existence of a tendency for rural or traditional forms of political practice to accommodate themselves gradually and in piecemeal fashion to urban and more modern forms. This is most apparent at the moment in such areas as popular political attitudes, and patterns of voting behavior and political allegiance, especially at the national level. It is probably gestating in other areas as well. If so, it might be most instructive to examine the Japanese experience in both greater breadth and depth to determine what larger patterns exist, and at the same time to attempt similar analyses of patterns of urban-rural and traditional-modern differences in other Asian societies for purposes of overall comparison and synthesis.