



The Castle Town and Japan's Modern Urbanization

John Whitney Hall

The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1. (Nov., 1955), pp. 37-56.

Stable URL:

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0363-6917%28195511%2915%3A1%3C37%3ATCTAJM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1>

The Far Eastern Quarterly is currently published by Association for Asian Studies.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/journals/afas.html>.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The Castle Town and Japan's Modern Urbanization*

JOHN WHITNEY HALL

JAPAN'S role in Far Eastern history has been unique in many respects. Traditionally an integral part of the Chinese zone of civilization, Japan has nonetheless demonstrated a marked ability to remain independent of continental influence. In recent years Japan's remarkable record of adjustment to the conditions imposed upon her by the spread of Western civilization to the Orient has raised the provocative question of why Japan, of all Far Eastern societies, should be the first to climb into the ranks of the modern industrial powers. Is it possible, as one scholar has suggested, that Japan "has been the country which has diverged the most consistently and markedly from Far Eastern norms, and these points of difference have been by and large, points of basic resemblance to the West"?¹

To seek an answer to this fascinating problem in culture comparison is beyond the scope of this short article. Yet with this question in mind it may be profitable to pursue an approach to Japanese history through one of its key institutions. Perhaps by confining our attention to a single facet of historical development it will be possible to gain some useful insights into the process of cultural evolution in Japan, particularly into the historical factors which were so influential in the years of transition which followed the "opening" of the country to the West in 1854. For such purposes the city presents itself as a convenient object of study.

The city has been a distinct and important segment of society in both East and West. Characteristically it has constituted, in the words of Mumford, a "point of maximum concentration for the power and culture of a community."² Most often the city has served as a source of progressive leadership, the center from which forces of innovation and change have spread into the community as a whole. The city as a cultural institution is both universally prevalent and historically significant. In the case of Japan it affords an especially rewarding object of study not only for the measure it provides of Japan's internal social and economic development but for the light it sheds on Japan's relative position between the cultural extremes of East and West.

Japanese cities prior to the impact of industrialized civilization upon them were essentially "oriental" in their composition and their social and economic func-

Dr. Hall is Associate Professor of History at the University of Michigan, and the author of *Tanuma Okitsugu, Forerunner of Modern Japan* (1955).

* Material contained in the article is in part the result of research supported by the Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies of the University of Michigan.

¹ Edwin O. Reischauer, *The United States and Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), 184.

² Lewis Mumford, *The Culture of Cities* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1938), 3.

tions.³ As in China such cities were larger by far than their European counterparts. But they seldom attained their size on the basis of trade alone. As in the case of most Eastern cities, a prime reason for their existence was that of civil administration and military defense. Yet while the morphology of Japanese cities and their role in national life reflected their oriental environment, it is also apparent that in their evolution they followed a pattern much more similar to that of the West than of China. In contrast to China where, since Han times, the function and structure of cities remained comparatively unchanged dynasty after dynasty, Japan presents a picture of continuing urban modification and expansion. Thus in Japan the major cities which succeeded in making the transition to modern times were, with few exceptions, completely undeveloped at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Furthermore, most of these did not reach maturity until the early eighteenth century and even then did not settle into a static, unchanging mode of existence. The city in Japan may be viewed as a constantly growing and evolving organism which, while it may never have constituted the dramatic challenge to the traditional land-based political and economic order as in Europe, was capable of rapid modification under the impetus of Western influence.

Before pursuing these observations further, however, it would be well to point out some of the limitations which must attend a study of this kind. Even within a society as comparatively homogeneous as that of Japan, cities have seldom been identical either in type or structure. Cities and towns have arisen from many diverse causes. Their historical evolution has followed several distinct paths according to the complex interweaving of changes in political, economic or religious conditions within the country. Geographic regionalism, especially in the contrasting features of the highly advanced central core of Japan and the generally retarded fringe areas, has provided a constant factor of diversity.⁴ Thus any attempt to trace the course of urban development as a single uniform process must run the risk of oversimplification. On the other hand, during many periods of Japanese history, one or another type of town has tended to predominate, and hence has stood out as the representative urban institution of its era. This is especially true of the period which immediately preceded the appearance of the modern industrialized city in Japan. During roughly three centuries, from the 1570's to the 1870's, the castle town, or *jōkamachi*, assumed an importance out of all proportion to other types of urban communities. The story of the rise of the castle town and its eventual modification under the forces of internal decay and Western influence may be taken as the central theme of Japan's modern urbanization.

The story of the castle town has its origins in the early Middle Ages in Japan,

³ For an interpretation of the historical Chinese city see Rhoads Murphey, "The City as a Center of Change: Western Europe and China," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 44.4 (Dec. 1954), 349-362.

⁴ On regional factors influencing the distribution and types of Japanese cities see R. B. Hall, "The Cities of Japan: Notes on Distribution and Inherited Forms," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 24.4 (Dec. 1934), 175-200.

in the era of transition from the classical age of aristocratic rule to the feudalism of the rising military class.⁵ In medieval Japan, the Sinified monolithic government adopted from China during the seventh century and the old style administrative towns which housed the court bureaucracy fell into decay. After the twelfth century both Nara and Kyoto lost their significance as centers of political authority and fell apart into a number of loosely clustered towns: Nara as a locus of temples; Kyoto as a place of residence for court families.⁶ The provincial capitals, the *kokufu*, for the most part, reverted to the villages from which they had sprung. Lacking the massive walls of the Roman outposts in Europe, even the remains of their public buildings quickly disappeared from sight. This decline of the central government left few large concentrations of political or ecclesiastical power, since early feudal society in Japan was decentralized and its constituents were individually weak.

Beginning with the twelfth century, Japan entered a new phase of urban development along lines which followed the rise of new religious or military centers and the new economic requirements of a decentralized feudal society. Growth was slow. Kamakura appeared momentarily as a flourishing administrative seat but faded with the fall of the Hōjō. Not until the late fourteenth century did new towns of any consequence make their appearance. Fed by an expanding manorial economy, Nara and Kyoto began to recover some stature as commercial centers. Muromachi flourished as the location of the Ashikaga shogunate. Beyond these, local feudal headquarters such as Kagoshima, Yamaguchi, and Bingo Funai, religious centers such as Ishiyama, Sakamoto, and Ujiyamada, and commercial towns such as Hakata, Muro, Hyōgo, and Sakai attested to the expansion of the power of feudal and religious institutions and to the growth of domestic and foreign trade.

Scholars who have attempted to identify this phase of urban growth in Japan with comparable stages in the rise of European cities are uniformly agreed that the fourteenth-century Japanese towns remained far more dependent for their support on the agencies of political or ecclesiastical authority than did the newly emergent towns of Europe.⁷ Whether this was the result of some basic "charac-

⁵ In applying the term feudalism to the institutions of Kamakura, Ashikaga, and Tokugawa Japan I follow K. Asakawa, "Some Aspects of Japanese Feudal Institutions," *TASJ*, 46.1 (1918), 76-102.

⁶ Several recent studies have been made of the transformation of the classical cities of Nara and Kyoto into medieval towns. See Nagashima Fukutarō, "Toshi jichi no genkai—Nara no baai" (The limits of urban self-government—the example of Nara), *Shakai keizai shigaku*, 17.3 (1951), 27-51; Matsuyama Hiroshi, "Hōken toshi seiritsu ni tsuki no kōsatsu" (On the establishment of feudal towns), *Rekishigaku kenkyū*, 180 (Feb. 1955), 12-22; Murayama Nobuichi, "Nikon toshi seikatsu no genryū" (The source of urban life in Japan) (Tokyo: Seki Shoin, 1953) 69f.

⁷ For some general studies of the medieval Japanese town in addition to Murayama, see Endō Motoo, *Nihon chūsei toshi ron (Medieval cities of Japan)* (Tokyo: Hakuyōsha, 1940); Harada Tomohiko, *Chūsei ni okeru toshi no kenkyū (A study of cities in the middle ages)* (Tokyo: Dai Nihon Yūbenkai Kōdansha, 1942); Toyoda Takeshi, "Toshi oyobi za no hattatsu" (The growth of cities and guilds), *Shin Nihonshi kōza*, 4 (1948).

teristic" of Japanese society⁸ or merely a product of the tardy development of commercial economy is hard to determine. But for whatever reason it is apparent that the medieval town and the commercial and service community in Japan looked for security not in the building of walls, but in the patronage and protection of the aristocracy or the politically powerful temples, shrines, and military houses. More clearly a result of economic backwardness was the relative lack of differentiation of the town from the surrounding agrarian community. In fourteenth-century Japan traders and artisans continued to maintain strong ties with the land, functioning both as landlords and as members of trade or craft guilds. Self-government was slow to develop and in most areas was inspired by a more vigorous movement towards village self-rule.⁹

During the fifteenth century, however, with the breakup of the Ashikaga hegemony and the consequent wars of succession and feudal rivalry, a growing spirit of freedom became evident in both countryside and town. The troubled times of Japan's civil wars provided the lower classes with both the occasion for independence and the opportunities for self-advancement. While the feudal wars brought destruction and turmoil, they served also to encourage social mobility and widespread economic growth. The causes of such growth are not easily enumerated, but the accompanying signs were clearly visible in technological improvements affecting agriculture and mining, the increase in foreign and domestic trade, the spread in the use of currency and in the agencies devoted to the handling of credit and exchange, and in the gradual absorption of the fragmented manorial economies into the larger blocks of feudal or ecclesiastical holdings.¹⁰

By the sixteenth century such factors of economic growth and feudal competition had accounted for the emergence of the town into new prominence. New bonds of dependence were forged between castle and trading town as the shogun or the great *shugo* lords attempted to buttress their economic positions against the lesser feudal barons of the countryside. Notable was the attempt of the Ashikaga shogunate to maintain its superiority over its vassals through its use of the merchants of Sakai. In the ensuing years Sakai, Hirano, Hakata, and a few other port cities of central Japan won a degree of freedom from feudal control. Sakai in particular, the "Venice of Japan" to the Jesuits of the late sixteenth century,¹¹ took on the form made familiar by free cities of Europe: a port governed by its chief burghers, protected by walls and moats, and by its own militia.

⁸ Horie Yasuzō states in his "The Life Structure of the Japanese People in Its Historical Aspects," *Kyoto University Economic Review*, 21.1 (April 1951), 20-21, ". . . in the case of Japan the feudal system was a manifestation of the traditional family-like structure of life. . . . Thereby it prevented the healthy maturing of urban society and caused the development of urban society to be deformed."

⁹ This is brought out clearly in Harada Tomohiko, "Chūsei toshi no jichi teki kyōdō soshiki ni tsuite." (On the self-governing communal organization of the medieval town), *Rekishigaku kenkyū*, 156 (Mar. 1952), 1-13. See also Harada, *Chūsei ni okeru toshi*, 253-255; Nagashima, 47-51; Murayama, 124-132.

¹⁰ Many of these developments have been summarized by Delmer Brown, *Money Economy in Medieval Japan* (New Haven: Far Eastern Monographic Series, No. 1, 1951).

¹¹ Note the descriptions of Sakai in 1561-1562 by the Jesuit Vilela. Quoted in James Murdoch and Isoh Yamagata, *A History of Japan* (London: Kegan Paul, 1925), 2:147.

The appearance of such cities as Sakai has occasioned considerable speculation among Japanese and Western historians regarding the direction which Japan's social and economic institutions were taking in the mid-1500's. Early writers such as Takekoshi were extravagant in their views, claiming to see in the rise of trading cities the beginning of the end of feudalism in Japan.¹² But more considered studies have demonstrated the weakness of these independent urban communities.¹³ Sakai was, after all, the achievement of a relatively unique region of Japan which, especially in its economy, had advanced far beyond the rest of the country. It is obvious that Japan as a whole lacked the basic requirements which could support a more widespread growth of free cities as Europe had done. Furthermore, the conditions which had favored such a growth in central Japan were to diminish in subsequent years. In sixteenth-century Japan religious organizations, which in Europe helped counterbalance feudal authority, were on the decline. Foreign trade, that source of vital energy for a free commercial class, was at best a precarious activity for the Japanese, placed so far from Chinese and Southeast Asian ports. Even in its most prosperous years much of the foreign trade carried on by Japanese adventurers was made possible only through the use of capital supplied by feudal or religious institutions.¹⁴ The ease with which the feudal authorities were able to control and then to monopolize foreign trade before the middle of the next century was a clear indication of the failure of such trade to become the support of urban freedom in Japan.

The "freedom" of such cities as Sakai was indeed illusory, based, as it was, less upon any prolonged struggle against feudal authority or on any overwhelming economic resources than upon the accidents of feudal rivalry and the weakness of the Ashikaga shogunate. Once the crumbling shogunate was replaced by new military coalitions, once Nobunaga and Hideyoshi turned towards the "free" cities, they fell, and Sakai among them.¹⁵ Perhaps the surest commentary on the "free cities" of the sixteenth century Japan was their subsequent history. Not one was to continue its dominant role through the succeeding Tokugawa period into the modern age.

In Japan of the sixteenth century the truly significant institutional development was not the free city nor the rising merchant community, but rather the maturation of a new type of feudal ruler, the daimyo. The rise of the modern daimyo produced one of the major turning points in the history of Japanese political and social institutions. During the late years of the civil war period the daimyo had been increasing constantly in size and effective strength. Then after

¹² Takekoshi Yosoburo, *The Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilization of Japan* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1930), 1:362.

¹³ Harada, *Chūsei ni okeru toshi*, 259-264.

¹⁴ Nishida Naojirō, *Nihon bunkashi josetsu* (*An introduction to the cultural history of Japan*) (Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1932), 480.

¹⁵ The story of the fall of Sakai is told by Takekoshi, 1:363-364. For a penetrating analysis of some of the weaknesses of the Sakai merchants see Sakata Yoshio, *Chōnin*, (*Merchants*) (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1939), 156-158. A detailed study of the fall of Nara under Hideyoshi's feudal control is contained in Nagashima Fukutarō, "Toyotomi Hideyoshi no toshi seisaku ippan," (*An example of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's policy towards towns*), *Shigaku zasshi*, 59.4 (Aug. 1950), 58-64.

the mid-sixteenth century, as the daimyo joined ranks in far-reaching military alliances, and eventually in an overall national unity, all opposition to feudal authority fell before them. The cities as well as the Buddhist church submitted. Japan was, in the words of her own historians, thoroughly "refeudalized".¹⁶

But the word "refeudalization" is hardly adequate to describe the radical changes which swept Japan during the late sixteenth century. These years were distinguished not by some conservative retrogression within Japanese society but by a dynamic burst of activity which had few parallels in the history of Japanese institutions. The new feudal lords and the domains, or *han*, which they held represented the harnessing of social and material energies on a new unprecedented scale.¹⁷ Forged out of the great civil wars of the fifteenth century, the daimyo domains were the product of a process of military and political consolidation which brought increasingly large areas under the unified control of individual feudal rulers. They were supported by new advances in agricultural technology and by extensions in the area under cultivation which released into the hands of the feudal lords new potentials of wealth and military power. They won their way by the perfection of new developments in the art of warfare: the mastery of the use of muskets and cannon, the improvement of the means of fortification and the shift to the use of large mass armies.¹⁸ Finally, they were both the result and cause of far-reaching changes which affected the social organization of the peasantry and of the feudal ruling class. Characteristic of the daimyo was their ability to devise new means of social control which enabled them to draw increasingly on the manpower resources of the countryside and on the loyal services of their military vassals.

It has been suggested that the larger of the daimyo domains resembled petty principalities.¹⁹ Needless to say, however, not all Japan was consolidated into domains of sufficient size to warrant such a description. Many parts of the country remained politically fragmented, either because of adverse geographical conditions or because they occupied buffer zones lying between large rival concentrations of feudal power. By 1560 over two hundred daimyo had made their appearance, and the major plains of Japan had been reduced to stable

¹⁶ The standard exposition of this thesis is found in Nakamura Kichiji, *Nihon hōkensei saihenseishi* (A history of the refeudalization of Japan) (Tokyo: Mikasa Shobō, 1939).

¹⁷ Japanese scholars have recently devoted considerable attention to the subject of the emergence of the *kinsei daimyō* "modern daimyo." For an analysis of the feudal lords who preceded the daimyo see Nagahara Keiji and Sugiyama Hiroshi, "Shugo ryōkokusei no tenkai," (The development of the *shugo* domain), *Shakai keizai shigaku*, 17.2 (1951). On the modern daimyo themselves, the outstanding author is Itō Tasaburō. Of his many writings see "Kinsei daimyō kenkyū josetsu" (An introduction to the study of the modern daimyo), *Shigaku zasshi*, 55.9 (Sept. 1944), 1-46; 55.11 (Nov. 1944), 46-106. His *Nihon hōkenseido shi* (A history of Japanese feudalism) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1951), is useful as a brief survey. The establishment of the Bizen domain of central Japan is being made the theme of joint study by members of the University of Michigan Center for Japanese Studies.

¹⁸ Delmer M. Brown "The Impact of Firearms on Japanese Warfare, 1543-98," *FEQ*, 8 (May 1948), 236-253.

¹⁹ Edwin O. Reischauer, *Japan Past and Present* (2nd ed., New York: Knopf, 1952), 77.

blocks of control by the more powerful of these feudal lords. Although much fighting remained to be done, the contours of daimyo control had been established and the basis was laid for the movement towards "national unification."

The story of Japan's political unification in the last years of the sixteenth century is well known. Beginning with the formation of regional alliances among daimyo, it progressed under the leadership of the "three unifiers," Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu. By 1603 a national hegemony had been effected by the ascendancy of a new shogunal power able to reduce the competing daimyo to vassalage. The resultant political structure, referred to as the *baku-han* system by Japanese historians,²⁰ was a curious blend of centralization and local feudal autonomy. In it direct shogunal authority extended from the powerful Kantō base of the Tokugawa house to include much of central Japan and most of the buffer zones, while the daimyo proper, though acknowledging their obligations of vassalage and subservience to the basic laws of the land, retained a generous amount of independence in local affairs.

The completion of this daimyo-based centralized feudalism had a profound effect upon the subsequent character of Japanese society, particularly upon its urban development. For the next three centuries all the cities of Japan were brought firmly under feudal control. Former religious centers or commercial and post station towns shared the common experience of incorporation into shogunal or daimyo territories. Those which survived as important cities saw the erection of huge castles in their confines or found themselves placed under the direct authority of feudal magistrates. Thus Kyoto, Sakai, and Nagasaki became nonmilitary cities within the shogun's territories. But the most numerous urban units of the time were the castle towns which made up the military and administrative headquarters of the shogun and daimyo.²¹ Among these the vast majority were completely new cities occupying locations which, up to the time of their selection, supported little more than farming or fishing villages.²² The erection

²⁰ For some recent analytical studies of the *baku-han* system see particularly: Itō Tasa-burō, "Baku-han taisei" (The *baku-han* structure), *Shin Nihonshi kōza*, 11 (1947); and Imai Rintarō, "Baku-hansei no seiritsu" (The establishment of the *baku-han* system), *Nihon rekishi kōza*, 4 (1952), 103-121.

²¹ Japanese interest in the castle town is indicated by the fact that the 1954 symposium of the Jimbunchiri Gakkai of Kyoto dealt with this subject. A mimeographed bibliography prepared for this symposium entitled *Jōkamachi kankei bunken mokuroku* (A bibliography of materials on the castle town) has been extremely helpful in the preparation of this article. Among the general works consulted on the subject the following have been found most useful: Ono Hitoshi, *Kinsei jōkamachi no kenkyū* (A study of the modern castle town) (Tokyo: Shibundō, 1928); Ono Terutsugu [Hitoshi], "Kinsei toshi no hattatsu" (The growth of the modern town), *Iwanami kōza, Nihon rekishi*, 11.4 (1934); Harada Tomohiko, "Toshi no hattatsu" (The growth of cities) in Tsuchiya Takao, *Hōken shakai no kōzō bunseki* (An analysis of the structure of feudal society) (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1950), 95-124; Toyoda Takeshi, *Nihon no hōken toshi* (Feudal cities of Japan) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1952).

²² Many of the so-called "new castles" were built on sites previously occupied by minor fortifications of one kind or another. But the fortresses built after 1575 were seldom dependent upon these earlier structures. In terms of size and conception they were literally new creations. The most familiar example is Edo which was converted from a small fortified outpost into the greatest fortress in Japan from 1590 to 1606.

of the castle towns of the late feudal period out of the undeveloped countryside required a tremendous outlay of resources on the part of the daimyo. The achievement was made all the more remarkable by the dramatic suddenness with which these operations were carried out. Most of the first-ranking castles and castle towns such as Himeji, Osaka, Kanazawa, Wakayama, Tokushima, Kōchi, Takamatsu, Hiroshima, Edo, Wakamatsu, Okayama, Kōfu, Fushimi, Takasaki, Sendai, Fukuoka, Fukui, Kumamoto, Tottori, Matsuyama, Hikone, Fukushima, Yonezawa, Shizuoka, and Nagoya were founded during the brief span of years between 1580 and 1610.²³ It would be hard to find a parallel period of urban construction in world history.

The castle town naturally derived its location and structural arrangement from the requirements laid down by the daimyo and the central shogunal authority, for the same forces which had given rise to the new combinations of feudal power gave shape to the castle towns. Thus as wider and wider domains were consolidated, the daimyo moved their headquarters from the narrow confines of mountain defenses to larger moat-and-tower fortresses placed at the strategic and economic centers of their holdings. In most instances the daimyo selected locations from which their castles could dominate the wide plains which formed the economic bases of their power and from which they could control the lines of communication stretching into the countryside. Here the daimyo was able to assemble and support his growing corps of officers and foot soldiers. In almost every instance the final establishment of the daimyo's castle town headquarters was preceded by the erection of less spacious establishments which were abandoned as the daimyo increased in power and stature. Oda Nobunaga's progress from Gifu to Azuchi and his subsequent attempt to acquire Osaka as his headquarters is merely the best known of such moves.²⁴

The new *jōkamachi* symbolized first of all the new concentrations of military power achieved by the daimyo. In the domains, defenses formerly scattered in depth were now pulled back to single central citadels where the massed resources of the daimyo could be held in readiness and where protective walls could be thrown up at sufficient distance from the vital nerve centers of military operations to protect them from musket and cannon. The shogunal edict of 1615 which ordered the destruction of all but one castle in each province was merely the culmination of a lengthy process of consolidation in which the functions of many

²³ This list includes the major castles built or rebuilt in new style between these years. The order is chronological according to the dates on which construction was begun. Data is taken from Ōrui Noboru^a and Toba Masao^a, *Nihon jōkakushi (History of Japanese castles)* (Tokyo: Yūzankaku, 1936), 528-533; and Toyoda, *Nihon no hōken toshi*, 89-90.

²⁴ Imai Toshiki^a, *Toshi hattatsushi kenkyū (Studies in the history of urban development)* (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppambu, 1951), 206. In establishing the castle town of Sendai in 1591, the Date daimyo abandoned a former site at Yonezawa which was too far removed from the center of domain communication and too circumscribed in space. Yonezawa had a population of about 6,000. Sendai attained a population of over 60,000 within a generation after the erection of the new castle. Sendai Shishi Hensan Inkai^a, *Sendai no rekishi (The history of Sendai)* (Sendai: Sendai Shiyakusho, 1949), 23-28.

smaller installations were combined into a limited number of oversize establishments.²⁵ In the province of Bizen, to take a typical example of an area which eventually came under the control of a single daimyo, there were at times during the fifteenth century between twenty and thirty castles. Yet by the time of the 1615 order only four remained. Of these, the lesser three were destroyed, leaving Okayama, which commanded the entire Bizen plain, as the headquarters of the daimyo of Bizen.²⁶ The citadels which resulted from this process were huge by any standards of their day. It is probably no exaggeration to say that the greatest of the Japanese fortresses, Edo and Osaka, had no peers in terms of size and impregnability.²⁷ For Japan, no clearer indication was needed of the ascendancy of feudal military might than these castles which at regular intervals towered over the Japanese countryside.

Intimately associated with the construction of the new consolidated fortresses of the late sixteenth century were a number of major changes in the structure of feudal society. In the first place the elimination of the numerous smaller castles had resulted in the decline and eventual elimination of numerous petty baronies scattered throughout the shogunal and daimyo territories. Within the new domains the daimyo became increasingly absolute as they consciously diminished the independence of their vassals. For this reason, and as a result of new military and tactical requirements, it became the policy of the daimyo to draw their vassals and retainers, both high and low, more and more into residence within the confines of the central citadel. The pattern made familiar by the enforced residence of daimyo in the environs of the shogun's castle at Edo had already become established practice at the daimyo level.²⁸ The citadel thus of necessity became a town.

This physical displacement of the feudal class from countryside to castled towns held even more fundamental social implications. As the petty lords and feudal gentry left the land and congregated at the center of daimyo authority, a new line of distinction was drawn between the cultivators, those remaining on the land, and the feudal aristocracy, those members of the daimyo's retinue gathered at his castle headquarters. The process was not sudden, but continuous over several decades. It was most dramatically brought out by Hideyoshi's nationwide land resurvey begun in 1582, and the "sword hunt" of 1588. Thereafter the privilege of wearing two swords had become the badge of social distinction which gave to its possessor life and death power over the subject classes. By the end of the sixteenth century the castle and its attached feudal military elite had become a distinct unit and the chief reason for the existence of large

²⁵ Takayanagi Mitsutoshi, "Genna ikkoku ichijō rei" (The Genna law restricting one castle to a province), *Shigaku zasshi*, 33.11 (1922), 863-888.

²⁶ Okayama Shiyakusho, *Okayama shishi (History of Okayama)* (Okayama: Gōdō Shim-bunsha, 1937), 3:2042.

²⁷ For detailed descriptions of these and other Japanese castles see Ōrui and Toba; and Furukawa Shigeharu, *Nihon jōkakukō (A study of Japanese castles)* (Tokyo: Kojinsha, 1936).

²⁸ The Sendai domain maintained a system of alternate residence between castle town and fief for the major fief-holding vassals. Sendai Shishi Hensan Iinkai, 28-29.

concentrations of people in the years to follow. The *jōkamachi*, at first fundamentally garrison towns, had become the home of an entire class, the *bushi* or samurai.

The castle towns thus individually and collectively became the physical embodiment of the Tokugawa feudal elite. Edo, the shogun's capital, symbolized the hierarchal unity of the daimyo under the Tokugawa house, as the several daimyo built residences in the shadow of the castle and proceeded on a regular basis to pay yearly homage to the supreme feudal authority. The daimyo's castle towns were but miniatures of this pattern. The morphology of the castle town was in essence a cross-section of the pattern of Japanese feudal society. The castle town was built by and for the daimyo and his vassals.²⁹ The castles, which occupied the center of these cities, were built to protect the aristocracy. No outer wall enclosed the whole community as in Europe, although outer moats were not infrequent. Around the central keep lay the residences of the daimyo's vassals, generally in two zones. The higher officials were placed in a group closely strung around the keep within the security of the main rampart and inner moat. A second belt, farther removed, lay unprotected except perhaps by the outer single moat and sometimes an earthen barricade. Here were the quarters of the lesser vassals. Between the two groups of vassals resided the daimyo's privileged merchants and artisans, while at the edge of the outer belt lay a ring of temples and shrines whose substantial buildings provided a sort of outer cordon of defense points controlling the major roads and points of access to the city. In such a community the lines of feudal hierarchy were clearly drawn and strictly maintained.

One of the most distinctive features of the castle town was the large number of samurai resident in it. On the average they accounted for approximately fifty per cent of the town's entire population. But the figure was frequently greater; for instance, in Sendai it was near seventy per cent and in Kagoshima it was over eighty per cent.³⁰ What this meant in total numbers of samurai and family members will be evident from a few examples. In Okayama, a city of slightly over 38,000 inhabitants in 1707, 10,000 were of the samurai class, another 8,000 were hangers-on of one kind or another. The census of 1872 for the city of Sendai listed 29,000 inhabitants of a total of 50,000 in the samurai class. In Tottori, a city of approximately 35,000 in 1810, 25,000 were of this category.³¹

The *jōkamachi* were built first and foremost as garrison towns and military headquarters of their domains. But they rapidly became points of concentration

²⁹ On the morphology of *jōkamachi* the following specialized studies have been found most useful: Obata Akira^z, "Kyū jōkamachi keikan" (A view of former castle towns), *Chiri ronsō*, 7 (1935), 31-76; and Nago Masanori^v, "Okazaki jōkamachi no rekishichiri teki kenkyū" (A study of the castle town of Okazaki from the point of view of historical geography), *Rekishigaku kenkyū*, 8.7 (July, 1938), 71-103.

³⁰ Harada, *Toshi no hattatsu*, 107; Sekiyama Naotarō^z, *Kinsei Nihon jinkō no kenkyū* (A study of Japanese demography for the early modern period) (Tokyo: Ryūginsha, 1948), 235; Toyoda, *Nihon no hōken toshi*, 147-154.

³¹ Toyoda, *Nihon no hōken toshi*, 148-154; Sendai Shishi Hensan Inkai, 156-157; Kanai Madoka^{aa}, "Hitotsu no han no sōjinkō" (On the total population of one *han* [Okayama]), *Nippon rekishi*, 67.12 (Dec. 1953), 38-39.

for many other functions important to the feudal rulers of the day. Thus as civil war gave way to a new political unity, the daimyo's headquarters became increasingly concerned with matters of local administration. It has been pointed out that one of the outstanding features of Tokugawa feudal administration was its "public character," in which a regular bureaucracy managed the affairs of taxation, judicature and maintenance of law and order.³² This public bureaucracy was eventually achieved by the conversion of an essentially military hierarchy of officers and men, which constituted the daimyo's corps of vassals and retainers, into an administrative officialdom.³³ The great castles of Japan came to house the central and local administrative headquarters of the nation. From them political authority radiated outward into the countryside.

The castle towns also quickly assumed importance as points of economic accumulation and consumption. The degree of economic concentration achieved in the *jōkamachi* is perhaps best understood in terms of the tremendous outlay of manpower and material required to construct the fortress and its accompanying residences and temples. The castle town symbolized from the first the ability of the daimyo to draw from his domain vast productive resources and to recruit the services of numerous commercial and industrial agents. Once having accomplished the initial task of castle construction, moreover, the need for economic concentration did not disappear. The daimyo and their vassals, having taken up permanent residence in the new towns, became dependent upon their commercial agents who could supply the sinews of warfare and the necessities of daily living, agents able to bridge the gap between town and countryside. The feudal aristocracy of the Tokugawa era, living in cities at a level of subsistence and consumption far above that of the meager self-sufficiency of the village, was made increasingly dependent upon the services of a merchant class.

Thus the same movement which brought the samurai to the castle headquarters of the daimyo also brought merchants out of the older port or religious cities and scattered trading towns. The result was a radical rearrangement of commercial activity in Japan. Daimyo, eager to attract to their castles the services of merchants and artisans, offered liberal conditions to those who would join them. The old guild system of medieval Japan was broken down as merchants took advantage of "free" markets provided in the castle towns. Thus as the daimyo rose to power the older centers of trade declined and new communities, surrounding the new castles, began to flourish.³⁴

This process, whereby the merchant community of the sixteenth century became increasingly attached to centers of feudal authority, has generally been described as coercive. It would be hard to deny the coercive aspects of the measures taken by the great centralizers such as Nobunaga and Hideyoshi as they clamped

³² K. Asakawa, *The Documents of Iriki* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), 46.

³³ On the shogunal bureaucracy see John W. Hall, *Tanuma Okitsugu, Forerunner of Modern Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), 21-33. On the administration of the Bizen (Okayama) domain see Okayama Shiyakusho, 3:2135-2312.

³⁴ Toyoda Takeshi, "Shokuhō seiken no seiritsu" (The establishment of the political power of Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi), *Shisō*, 310 (1950), 237-247.

restrictions upon the merchants of Sakai or Hakata. But for most of Japan coercion was not the key factor. In the less economically advanced areas the daimyo provided local merchants and artisans with new and attractive opportunities. Under the stimulus of the insatiable demands for military supplies and food stores made by the warring feudal lords there came into being a new and more aggressive service class, many of whose members were actually drawn from the warrior class.³⁵ By allying itself with the rising feudal aristocracy, this new class of merchants was able to break the restraints of the medieval guild system and meet the daimyo's needs for an expanding economy. In the early years of their ascendancy the daimyo counted their commercial agents among their most valuable resources. It was even customary for a daimyo to take his merchant adherents with him when he moved the location of his headquarters.³⁶ Thus as the castle towns took shape, they became the economic centers of their domains. In them were concentrated the service groups which in turn acted as exploitive agents for the daimyo and *bushi*. In the *jōkamachi* the other half of the population consisted of merchants, artisans, and service personnel. These were the *chōnin* of Tokugawa times.

In both the shogunal territories and daimyo domains, castle town merchants had the advantage of patronage and protection. Within the domain, the daimyo drew a sharp line between castle town merchants and the residents of the countryside. Commerce was strictly limited to the central city and, under special circumstances, to the few towns which had functioned as urban centers before the emergence of the daimyo.³⁷ The villages were confined to agricultural and handicraft production. Within the domain the castle town merchants performed two prime tasks: the wholesale accumulation of produce from the hinterland, and the linkage of the domain economy to the national market. The first function gave rise to monopoly associations under daimyo patronage. The second brought into existence the class of rice merchants and domain financiers who maintained the produce warehouses at Osaka or other exchange centers. The desire of every daimyo to make his domain self-sufficient and prosperous was a constant stimulus to the castle town merchants.

As with the *bushi*, disposition within the castle town revealed graphically the relative status of the *chōnin* within the community.³⁸ In such towns the early commercial settlers, those first to enter the daimyo's service, constituted a privileged group. Among them the daimyo's chartered merchants, the *goyō shōnin*, enjoyed a degree of tax exemption and social advantages which belied the low status eventually assigned to the merchants as a class. For the sake of convenience and protection these groups were located in the belt between the two main zones of samurai residences. Late arrivals were obliged to take up

³⁵ Matsuyama, 20.

³⁶ Yamori Kazuhiko^{ob}, "Jōkamachi no jinkō kōsei" (On the demographic structure of a castle town), *Shirin*, 37.2 (Apr. 1954), 180-181.

³⁷ Ono Hitoshi, 232-280.

³⁸ Yamori, 181; Toyoda, *Nihon no hōken toshi*, 188-204; Sendai Shishi Hensan Iinkai, 35-38; Nagao, 75.

positions on the outskirts, along the main roads leading to and from the town. It is sometimes maintained by Japanese historians that the Tokugawa period merchants lived under a system of local self-government. But the self-government they enjoyed consisted of little more than the privilege of managing certain private areas of their activity under their own headmen. In fact it is hardly possible to distinguish any fundamental difference between the procedures utilized by the Tokugawa rulers in their administration of the village and of the town.

From their castles most daimyo divided their realms into two distinct parts, the villages (*mura*) and the city blocks (*machi*). The same sort of control mechanism was used to govern both parts. Within the city, each block was supplied with guards and gates which converted it into a separate administrative unit. Each block like its counterpart, a village, was responsible for its own good conduct under its own representatives, whose titles of office often corresponded to those used in the villages. Individual citizens were made subordinate to the laws of the daimyo and shogun under the system of joint responsibility, the *gon'ngumi*. The merchant community as a whole was managed by its own headman or headmen who performed their duties under the scrutiny of the shogunal or domain magistrates. In Tokugawa Japan all cities were administered ultimately by the city magistrate (*machi bugyō*) placed there by either shogun or daimyo.

It was inevitable, perhaps, that as the feudal authorities perfected their administrative machinery, the *chōnin* were brought under an increasingly heavy burden of legal responsibilities and social restrictions. Relegated increasingly to a low status as the Tokugawa adopted the concepts of Confucian social theory, the *chōnin* found almost every aspect of urban life and commercial activity placed under the scrutiny and regulation of the administrative class. Thus the merchant community passed from an early period of relative freedom to one of increasing regimentation. The protected location in the shelter of the castle turned into a prison. And even foreign trade, which might have offered an escape from feudal oppression, became a shogunal monopoly. Yet it must be remembered that there was always a limit to such oppression. In the final analysis, daimyo and shogunal policy towards the merchants was tempered by the degree to which the feudal class had become dependent upon their services. After the mid-seventeenth-century merchants were permitted to organize themselves into new guilds and protective associations. In this way, the Tokugawa merchants, though deprived of foreign markets, continued to prosper as the middlemen between castle town and countryside.³⁹

A final aspect of the centralization achieved by the daimyo in their castle towns was attained at the expense of local religious institutions. The story of Nobunaga's dramatic conquest of the Buddhist church in Japan is well known. Less familiar is the history of the clash of ecclesiastical and feudal interests at the level of the local domain. Yet for the daimyo, the conquest over hostile religious bodies in his locality was also a prerequisite for secure possession of the

³⁹ John W. Hall "The Tokugawa Bakufu and the Merchant Class," *Occasional Papers, Center For Japanese Studies*, 1 (1951), 26-33.

domain. In each locality, as formerly independent religious centers were brought under daimyo control, we find the local headquarters of Buddhist and Shinto sects being moved to the castle town.⁴⁰ There the priests came under the direct patronage and surveillance of the daimyo and his magistrate of religious bodies. Even the location of religious buildings was frequently a matter of decision based on the strategic needs of the daimyo. In its growth the castle town became the focal point of the domain's religious institutions.

But of even greater importance in focusing religious sentiment upon the castle town was the adoption of the tenets of Confucianism, under which the shogun and daimyo became the divinely ordained rulers of the people.⁴¹ By weakening the hold of Buddhism over the minds of their subjects and by emphasizing the spiritual foundations of loyalty to the feudal authorities, the new rulers of Japan were able to achieve a new degree of popular support and solidarity within their domains. The feudal lords of the Tokugawa period, supported by their Confucian advisors and all the pageantry of aristocratic life, were able to exalt themselves in the eyes of their subjects. The cities in which they maintained their castled residences became in essence local capitals for the populace of the domain.

These, in profile, were the castle towns which sprang up with such vitality during the late sixteenth century to become the major cities of the Tokugawa period. Created by the newly ascendant feudal leaders in the course of their militant march to local and national unification, the *jōkamachi* were a unique institutional product of the new political and social organization consummated under the *baku-han* system. In terms of their total numbers, the *jōkamachi* were not necessarily more numerous than other types of towns and cities of the Tokugawa period.⁴² The commercial communities which continued to serve the major monasteries or which grew up around the ports and post-stations of the internal transportation network were far more prevalent. But most such communities were small and still largely rural in their orientation. In the final analysis all such towns were held under administrative and economic controls which emanated from the nearby castle town.

The supremacy of the *jōkamachi* in Tokugawa times is best demonstrated by a review of the size and number of those which attained a population of over 10,000. Admittedly, population data for the Tokugawa period are of uncertain accuracy. For one thing census figures, though assiduously kept, seldom listed the samurai population. Thus an exact population list is hardly attainable. Besides the incomplete statistics which do exist, however, students of Tokugawa population figures have suggested a rough rule of thumb to aid in gaining a general picture of the size of *jōkamachi*. Under this formula the inhabitants of castle towns would generally number somewhat more than ten per cent of the

⁴⁰ Sendai Shishi Hensan Iinkai, 25.

⁴¹ A classical statement of this concept is found in Kumazawa Banzan's *Daigaku wakumon*: "The lord of a province is appointed by Heaven to be the father and mother of that province." Quoted in Galen M. Fisher, "Kumazawa Banzan, His Life and Ideals," *TASJ*, 2nd Ser., 14 (1938), 267.

⁴² Maps of the Tokugawa period record between 148 and 164 active castles. R. B. Hall, 184. Orui and Toba list 186 castles at the end of the Tokugawa period (pp. 694-705).

total population of the domain, which in turn was roughly equivalent to the assessed size in *koku* of the domain.⁴³ Thus it would take a *han* of 100,000 *koku* assessment, of which there were just under fifty, to support a town of 10,000 inhabitants. A conservative estimate would place between thirty and forty castle towns, each the center of an extensive agricultural region, in the 10,000-or-more class.⁴⁴ And this should be compared with the ten or so cities of non-castle origin which had population of the same size.⁴⁵

The above population figures do not, of course, apply to the early years of the Tokugawa period when the castles were still in construction and the city inhabitants not fully assembled. But under the peaceful conditions which followed the cessation of civil warfare, Japan's economy expanded rapidly, and with it her feudal cities. By 1700 most cities had reached their maximum growth. The pattern of Tokugawa urban development had fully matured. Edo was approaching the one-million mark. Osaka and Kyoto stood at around 300,000. Kanazawa and Nagoya had populations of nearly 100,000. Perhaps ten per cent of Japan's population lived in cities of over 10,000 inhabitants. The city had become a major factor in Japanese life, in the government and economy, and in the formation of popular cultural and intellectual attitudes. In this respect the continued dominance of the castle town among the cities of Tokugawa Japan was to become increasingly significant. In the years after 1700 the pattern of urbanization created by the feudal aristocracy was to place a deepening imprint upon the evolution of Japanese urban society.

First of all we must acknowledge the continuing effects of the strong centralized feudal authority symbolized by the castles. The *jōkamachi* were, as we have noted, primarily garrison towns, the loci of shogunal and daimyo military power. They were secondarily administrative centers, seats of feudal political authority. The high percentage of aristocracy—of military and official personnel—resident in the castle towns was a constant indication of the degree to which government served the interests of the elite and impinged upon the lives of its subjects. Yet, while in many ways the ascendancy of feudal authority must be looked upon as a stifling and restrictive influence, this is not the whole story. The city-centered local administrations established by the daimyo represented important advances in the technique of local administration. Life in Tokugawa Japan became infinitely more regularized and subject to written law than under earlier feudal regimes, and this in turn was a step in the direction of more modern public administration.⁴⁶

This standardization of governmental procedures and policies had yet another

⁴³ Sekiyama, 100-106; Toyoda, *Nihon no hōken toshi*, 146-152.

⁴⁴ With the promulgation of the new law of local administration in 1888, 39 legal cities (*shi*) were created. Of these 33 were former *jōkamachi*.

⁴⁵ Sekiyama, 232-233. In the above calculations the cities of Kyoto and Fushimi have been listed as administrative towns.

⁴⁶ For a study of local administration based on materials in the archives of the former Bizen (Okayama) daimyo see John W. Hall, "Tokugawa Local Government and Its Contributions to the Modern Japanese State," Paper read at the annual meeting of the Far Eastern Association, 1953.

important effect upon Japanese society. The establishment of domain capitals became a powerful force in bringing about a uniform cultural and economic development throughout Japan. It was characteristic of the *jōkamachi* that their size depended not upon their proximity to the more developed core region of Japan but upon the size of the domain. Kagoshima, Kanazawa, and Akita, cities on the fringe, were in the same relation to the size of their domains as Nagoya or Hiroshima. No doubt a certain provincialism was inevitable in a feudal society such as that of Tokugawa Japan. But we find that throughout the nation the castle cities took on a remarkable uniform guise as the necessities of alternate attendance of the daimyo and their retainues at Edo circulated the ideas and practices of the center to the periphery, and as the enforced trade through Osaka and Edo knit the merchants of the realm more closely together.⁴⁷

But the elements of systemization and uniformity were not the only significant products of the urbanization which occurred under feudal stimulus. The factor of urban growth itself was to have far-reaching influence upon the various levels of Japanese society. Eventually it was to call into question the very ability of the feudal authorities to maintain their existence. The city, its life and its institutions, was in reality basically antagonistic to the type of land-centered military regime envisaged by the Tokugawa authorities. The urban environment, from its inception, was destined to have a contradictory effect upon the feudal class. With respect to the daimyo this became evident as they succumbed to the amenities of a life of ease in their castle towns and in the great metropolis of Edo. Certainly it was hard to recognize in the daimyo who gave up their domains to the Meiji government in 1869 the descendants of the hardy warlords of the late sixteenth century. As for the *bushi*, the establishment of castle towns served to complete their final separation from the land. In the cities the gentry warriors of the earlier days became increasingly removed from the actualities of the countryside both in their way of life and in their legal relationship to the land. By the eighteenth century, except for a few locations, the *bushi* had been stripped of any direct jurisdiction over their fiefs by the expanding power of the daimyo.⁴⁸ Though as a class they nostalgically clung to the concept that they were a landed aristocracy, they had been converted, in reality, to little more than salaried officials of the daimyo. As their bureaucratic functions multiplied, their security became increasingly identified, not with the land, but with governmental service. Separated from the duties of actual land management, they became a thoroughly urbanized group living increasingly in sedentary style.

The assembling of the daimyo's vassals in the castle towns reflected yet another condition which was to have a depressive effect upon the morale of the *bushi* class. As peace and prosperity permeated the Japanese islands, as the settled life of the cities took the place of the more rugged life of the country, the military

⁴⁷ Even in 19th century Europe few cities other than national capitals rose to over 100,000 population. The evenness of Japan's urban growth was thus remarkable. Imai Toshiki, 208.

⁴⁸ Kanai Madoka " 'Dokai kōshūki' ni okeru baku-han taisei no ichi hyōgen" (A view of the *baku-han* system as seen in the "Dokai kōshūki"), *Shinano*, 3.6 (June 1951), 37-47.

services of the *bushi* became increasingly superfluous. Large numbers of urbanized *bushi* were obliged to maintain themselves in mock military readiness. The shogunal and domain bureaucracies were overstaffed manyfold as peacetime occupations were provided for a class whose numbers had been determined by the necessities of civil warfare on a grand scale. The result for many was a life of hypocrisy and indolence. For the country as a whole it brought into being the curse of "*yakuninerie*," as one observer so colorfully described Japan's particular brand of over-bureaucratization.⁴⁹

The economic hardships faced by the populous feudal class of Japan as it was obliged to maintain itself on fixed land incomes in the face of the mounting costs of urban life have been amply dealt with in Western literature.⁵⁰ We need observe here only that these difficulties and the counter-efforts made by the authorities, whether in the nature of establishing new domain-sponsored commercial monopolies or of providing household handicraft opportunities for the distressed samurai, had the net effect of driving the *bushi* towards a more commercialized existence and of undermining the traditional way of life of the feudal aristocracy.

The story of the spread of money economy and the remarkable growth in commercial and craft activities which occurred during the Tokugawa period is also well known and requires no elaboration here. Few aspects of Tokugawa society were to remain unaffected by the rise in wealth and numbers of the *chōnin* communities in the feudal cities. Yet the fact that throughout these years the strength of feudal authority remained high forced upon the Japanese merchant a political passivity not generally seen in the West. Certainly it is undeniable that the urban commercial segment in Japan failed to become, at least by European standards, a significant antifeudal force. If anything, the leading merchants became, as time went on, more strongly allied with the feudal order, more dependent upon feudal privilege, and hence less inclined to oppose the dominant political order.⁵¹

But if the Tokugawa merchant did not awaken to his possibilities of revolutionary leadership, the indirect effects of his enterprising commercial activities were great. In each locality the castle city with its core of merchants constituted a powerful stimulus to the economic development of the countryside, encouraging the spread of commercial agriculture and handicraft production. As commercial production interfered with land economy or was substituted for it, as trade became an alternative to agriculture, the feudal economic order was weakened. By the end of the Tokugawa period signs of fundamental change were beginning to appear in the structure of the Japanese urban economy. Within the administrative cities the machinery of feudal control began to weaken. Within the do-

⁴⁹ William Elliot Griffis, *The Mikado's Empire* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1906), 2:526, rejoicing at the changes which followed the abolition of the Fukui *han* wrote: "The local officials of Fukui are to be reduced from *five hundred to seventy*. The incubus of *yakuninerie* is being thrown off. Japan's greatest curse for ages has been an excess of officials and lazy rice-eaters who do not work."

⁵⁰ Takizawa Matsuyo, *The Penetration of Money Economy in Japan and Its Effects Upon Social and Political Institutions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1927).

⁵¹ J. W. Hall, "The Tokugawa Bakufu," 28-32.

mains new towns of primarily economic importance began to compete with the privileged merchants of the castle towns.⁵²

Nor can we overlook the importance of the many cultural and intellectual innovations which accompanied the establishment of the *chōnin* communities of the Tokugawa period. The bourgeois culture, particularly of the three great cities of Edo, Osaka and Kyoto,⁵³ became increasingly self-contained and sophisticated. In the art and literature of the *chōnin* and in the development of practical sciences and "Western learning," it was possible to discern the first stages of intellectual revolt against the feudal order and the Confucian system of thought. Such developments, moreover, were to carry an impact beyond the confines of the *chōnin* class. The *jōkamachi*, by bringing the *bushi* and *chōnin* into close proximity, eventually provided the basis for a fusion of interest between merchant and samurai. It was in this zone of fusion that the origins of the modern Japanese bourgeoisie were to be found.

Perhaps the fundamental reason why the feudal cities of Japan did not play a more clear-cut role of political leadership is to be found in their structure. Combining, as they did, military, administrative, economic, and religious functions, they did not represent a single unified social group or aspiration. Yet by the end of the Tokugawa period such a unity of aspiration was being forged under the pressure of political crisis and economic distress. The city had become a point of maximum concentration for those many tensions which were eventually to break the bonds of feudalism in Japan. By the mid-nineteenth century, the feudal city had reached an obvious impasse, a limit in its ability to develop under the conditions imposed upon it by the Tokugawa regime. Bound by the rigid political, social, and economic doctrines of the daimyo system, limited by the technology of transportation, manufacture, and finance, the Japanese castle city was in unhealthy decline. The daimyo were in debt, the samurai ill-fed, the city poor in rebellious spirit. The ties between city and countryside were dangerously strained. Decay was everywhere visible.⁵⁴ Yet it was in the depths of such decay that Japan's new leadership was stirring. In the zone of fusion of interest and outlook between the merchant and samurai resentment against the Tokugawa regime was mounting.

The revolution of the Meiji era brought in its wake political and economic changes of greatest consequence. The conditions which supported urban populations changed almost overnight. With the abolition of the shogunal and daimyo systems and the establishment of universal conscription, the large concentrations of *bushi* in remote areas ceased to be a necessity. With the abolition of the *han* and the opening of the entire nation to free economic development, with the creation of new ports of foreign trade, Japan's economic centers shifted rapidly.

⁵² Ono Hitoshi, 281-298, describes the growing competition which rural towns presented to the central castle towns towards the end of the Tokugawa period.

⁵³ For a recent and novel approach to this subject see Ishida Ichirō^{ac}, "Kinsei bunka no tenkai" (The development of early modern culture), *Shin Nihonshi taikēi*, Vol. 4: *Kinsei shakai* (Tokyo: Asakura Shoten, 1952), 308-415, esp. 410-415.

⁵⁴ Griffis (p. 430) describes his first impression of Fukui in 1871 as follows: "I was amazed at the utter poverty of the people, the contemptible houses, and the tumble-down look of the city. . ."

In this era of sudden change the Tokugawa city and the institutions it had fostered played a noteworthy role.

Fundamental to the remarkable flexibility demonstrated by Japanese society in the transition period was the fact that in the castle towns the feudal ruling class had been largely removed from the land. Thus it was assured that there could be no politically powerful landed class remaining after the abolition of the daimyo. The *bushi* did not constitute an entrenched land-based gentry as in China, able to back up their interests in the face of modern change.⁵⁵ Without an economic base, the resentment they felt toward the reforms which deprived them of their feudal privileges was soon dissipated. Instead, they were forced to ride with the times, to join the new government or to seek security in the new economic opportunities which were offered them. They became the backbone of Japan's modern civil, military, and police bureaucracy, of her industrial management and labor force, and of her modern urban intelligentsia. In other words, they were a leaven for change rather than an obstacle.

Released from the inertia of social conservatism which a landed gentry might have provided, Japan after the Restoration moved swiftly in the direction of modern reform. In this process the castle city of Tokugawa times represented both an element of continuity with the past and a point of departure for far-reaching changes. In the first instance the *jōkamachi*, seats of feudal power, remained in modern Japan the local centers of national authority. Edo, the capital of the Tokugawa shogun, renamed Tokyo, was to remain the capital of new Japan. Today thirty-four of the forty-six prefectural capitals were *jōkamachi* in Tokugawa times, and in most instances the modern prefectures have taken the names of their capital cities rather than the old domain or provincial names.⁵⁶ Throughout Japan prefectural capitals still constitute the major cultural and educational centers of their locales. Here are concentrated the schools, hospitals, newspapers and radio stations. Before the War many of them also acted as divisional military headquarters. Thus the castles which dominated the cities of Tokugawa Japan continued to stand as symbols of strong centralized bureaucratic power in the modern Japanese state.

But the great cities of Tokugawa Japan were also to lead in the process of adjustment to the new economic requirements of the modern state. From the economic point of view not all of the major *jōkamachi* were able to shape their own destinies. After the Restoration certain areas, notably along the line running through the center of Japan from Tokyo to Fukuoka, developed almost to the exclusion of the rest of the country. As Japan's modern transportation system took shape, areas rose or fell in economic importance as they were serviced or bypassed by railroads or shipping lines. Thus those castle towns on the Japan Sea or in the extreme north tended to make a slower adjustment to

⁵⁵ I do not ignore the fact that in some *han* the *bushi* still retained their landholdings or that in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods a considerable number of *bushi* were "returned" to the land.

⁵⁶ Tōkyō Shisei Chōsakai^{ad}, *Nihon toshi nenkan* (Japan municipal yearbook) (Tokyo, 1952); Orui and Toba, 694-705.

modern conditions.⁵⁷ When given the chance, however, the *jōkamachi* demonstrated that they were in possession of the requirements necessary for modern commercial and industrial expansion. Situated at the major communication nodes, located on large rivers or close to the sea, in possession of land capable of cheap reclamation for industrial use, and linked to a large hinterland already closely tied to the city, the chief castle towns of the Tokugawa period made the transition to modern times to stand among the major urban centers of the new era. Today, more than one hundred years after the opening of Japan to the West, half of the sixty cities of over 100,000 population are former *jōkamachi*.⁵⁸

a 永島福太郎	l 伊東多三郎	v 岡山市役所
b 松山宏	m 今井林太郎	w 古川重春
c 村山修一	n 小野均	x 小葉田亮
d 遠藤元男	o 小野晃嗣	y 長尾正憲
e 原田伴彦	p 土屋喬雄	z 關山直太郎
f 豊田武	q 大類伸	aa 金井圓
g 西田直二郎	r 鳥羽正雄	ab 矢守一彦
h 坂田吉雄	s 今井登志喜	ac 石田一良
i 中村吉治	t 仙臺市史編纂委員會	ad 東京市政調査會
j 永原慶二	u 高柳光壽	ae 伊藤郷平
k 杉山博		

⁵⁷ Itō Gōhei^{ae}, "Toshi no tatechi narabini hattatsu to chiri teki seiyakusei" (On the geographic conditions which influenced the founding and development of cities), *Toshi mondai*, 32.3 (Mar. 1941), 1-16.

⁵⁸ *Nihon toshi nenkan*; Orui and Toba, 694-705.