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*Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2. (Spring, 1975), pp. 321-345.

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*Journal of Japanese Studies* is currently published by The Society for Japanese Studies.

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WAKITA HARUKO

## Towards a Wider Perspective on Medieval Commerce

Research on the commerce of medieval Japan has long failed to receive due attention by scholars specializing on this period. Instead their research has focused on such questions as: Was Medieval Japan a feudal society? Or, when did a feudal society emerge through the transformation of the ancient (*kodai*) society? Since a feudal society is based on agriculture, questions concerning specialization and commerce could not be readily accommodated within the framework of examination adopted by earlier scholars. Thus, the best they could do was to analyze the development of commerce as an agent which evolved gradually to undercut the autarkic agricultural villages which were the foundation of the feudal system.<sup>1</sup> But this narrow scope of research, however, is now being widened, if only slowly.

Thus the purposes of this article are to analyze (1) the growth of commerce in cities where the *shōen ryōshu* exerted various controls over artisans who had initially been brought together by the power of the Ritsuryō state,<sup>2</sup> and in villages where local artisans worked for and were controlled by the *zaichi ryōshu*, and (2) how the commercial developments observed both in the cities and villages interacted with one another. Our central concerns in the latter case will be the conflicts that developed among the *ryōshu* who tried to prolong their control over the artisans, the artisans who gradually freed themselves of this control, and the peasants who were affected by the development of rural commerce.

In the first section of this article, dealing with the early medieval

1. A history of research, referred to in the text, is found in Wakita Haruko, *Chūsei Nihon shōgyō hattatsu-shi no kenkyū* (Ochanomizu Shobō, 1969), pp. 3–22.

2. A chapter entitled “Kodai kokka ni okeru bungyō no mondai” in Ishimoda Shō, *Nihon kodai kokka-ron* (Iwanami Shoten, 1973) contains an examination of specialization achieved during the *kodai*.

period (from the late Heian to the mid-Kamakura periods), we shall examine (i) the more self-contained and privately controlled ryōshu-centered urban and rural economies which grew out of the disintegrating *kodai* society; (ii) the relationships between these ryōshu-centered economies and those artisans and peasants who were, to varying degrees, within the control of such economies; and (iii) the significance of the markets that developed around the shōen ryōshu in the cities and around the zaichi ryōshu in the villages and analytical questions concerning them.

The second section, covering the late Kamakura and the Nanbokuchō periods (which are also early medieval), analyzes the process of change in the economy. These changes are the increase in agricultural productivity, which gave the peasants a surplus, and the surplus which, in turn, promoted the growth of village commerce. And because of the growth of commerce, merchants and artisans, both in the cities and villages, grew free of ryōshu control and formed new *za*.

The last section examines how the market economies had changed by the late medieval period (Muromachi and Sengoku periods) owing to the development of commerce both in the cities and in the countryside, and what the new relationship was between commerce and the ryōshu.

In examining the questions raised above, efforts will be made to place earlier works in perspective and to evaluate them critically. It is my hope that through such efforts we can take a first modest step towards answering the questions we raise and towards a more useful analysis of the commercial development in Medieval Japan. One caveat is that both the questions raised here and the evaluation of various works necessarily reflect my own view of medieval commerce.

### I. *The Development of Ryōshu-centered Commerce*

*Commerce and the shōen ryōshu.* The shōen ryōshu, who were descended from the nobles of the Ritsuryō period, satisfied their needs through taxes in kind from their shōen and other scattered landholdings (*sanjo-teki shoryō*), from stipends accompanying their positions in the bureaucracy, and from goods supplied by artisans who owed taxes to them.<sup>3</sup> The shōen ryōshu also made extensive use of the economic services provided by cities to sell goods collected as

3. Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, p. 158.

taxes in kind and to buy goods otherwise not obtainable.<sup>4</sup> Analyses of the degree of and reasons for their involvement in the market economy have been made by Nagahara Keiji<sup>5</sup> and Sasaki Ginya,<sup>6</sup> both of whom emphasize their self-sufficiency (non-involvement in the market).<sup>7</sup>

Sasaki believes that the shōen ryōshu met their basic needs through taxes in kind collected from the artisans who in exchange received stipendary rice paddies (*kyūden* or *menden*). Since the goods stipulated to be paid as taxes in kind were not necessarily produced by the taxpayers, the mix of goods required by the shōen ryōshu had to be obtained through the market in each shōen or its environs.<sup>8</sup> Shōen ryōshu gradually, however, stopped requiring a certain mix of goods and the taxpayers were increasingly allowed to pay with goods they themselves produced.

Nagahara, who pointed out the significant increase in taxes collected in rice during the Heian period compared to the Ritsuryō period, regards the growth of the market functions of centrally located cities as a response to an increasing need to market tax rice. Despite this view, Nagahara maintains that the shōen ryōshu attempted to meet their needs, to the greatest extent possible, by producing needed goods within their own shōen. Thus, in order to be self-sufficient, the shōen ryōshu provided stipendary land from which they obtained taxes in rice and other goods. This led Nagahara to conclude that the shōen ryōshu living on such taxes were consumers of de facto rents and parasitic in nature. In effect he is saying that the city economy that was emerging in response to demand from the shōen ryōshu

4. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

5. Nagahara Keiji, *Nihon chūsei shakai kōzō no kenkyū* (Iwanami Shoten, 1973).

6. Sasaki Ginya, *Chūsei shōhin ryūtsū-shi no kenkyū* (Hōsei Daigaku Shuppankai, 1972).

7. According to Toda, the shōen ryōshu attempted to be self-sufficient, that is, to have an autarkic shōen. Toda Yoshimi, *Nihon ryōshu-sei seiritsu-shi no kenkyū* (Iwanami Shoten, 1967), p. 291. In analyzing the Kōfukuji in Yamato as a basically autarkic economy, I stressed the need to realize the fact that the artisans, who owed dues to the ryōshu in return for the stipendary paddies, produced goods for the market. Wakita Haruko, "Chūsei Yamato ni okeru shōhin keizai no hatten," *Shirin*, 47, 4 (July 1964).

8. Sasaki, *Chūsei shōhin ryūtsū-shi no kenkyū*, pp. 176–77. Sasaki viewed the markets of the late Heian period as developing to supplement the needs of the shōen ryōshu, i.e., to exchange taxes received in kind for desired bundles of goods. He called such a trade the shōen exchange system (*shōen kōekisei*).

and the agricultural economy under the control of the shōen ryōshu were two discrete economies.

Sasaki's and Nagahara's studies are significant because both focus our attention on the functions of cities and the specialization that resulted from the growth of commerce. However, their analyses, while useful, seem to draw conclusions that I find difficult to accept. This, perhaps, is due to the fact that both scholars examined the changing patterns of commerce primarily from the point of view of the ryōshu. Although I have already criticized their works elsewhere,<sup>9</sup> let me briefly reiterate my criticisms.

First, I believe that it is necessary to distinguish between the nature of the self-sufficiency (non-involvement in the market economy) of the ryōshu and the self-sufficiency of the peasants. It is important, for example, to establish the extent to which the ryōshu were able to dictate trading patterns and to determine the degree of specialization so that they could limit market transactions within the villages over which they claimed lordship. When this is established, it will become possible to answer the question which Nagahara raised: was self-sufficiency preferred by the ryōshu because of the underdeveloped state of city markets? Sasaki implies that the ryōshu's motivation in adopting appropriate measures to maintain their self-sufficiency was to strengthen their political control over the peasants. But how were the aims of the ryōshu realized? If the ryōshu did in fact promote only a limited trade within or around a shōen in order to limit the increased orientation of the peasants to markets, then did not this policy in effect weaken the power of the shōen ryōshu because it resulted in strengthening the power of the shōen administrators (*shōkan*) who controlled these shōen markets? More fundamentally, one wonders why the ryōshu found it necessary to limit their own involvement in the market. Perhaps Nagahara is correct in believing that such attempts to limit their market orientation constitute only a transitory phenomenon due mostly to the yet undeveloped market functions which could be provided in urban centers.

Second, I find it difficult to accept Sasaki's view that the ryōshu exercised enough power to determine the mix of taxes in kind. At first one may be inclined to accept Sasaki's argument that the intra-shōen trade gradually made the shōen economically self-sufficient. True,

9. Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, pp. 128-34. Wakita's review of Sasaki's *Shōhin ryūsū-shi* is found in *Nihon-shi Kenkyū*, 129 (January 1972); and Sasaki's review of Wakita's *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi* is in *Rekishigaku Kenkyū*, 353 (October 1969). The later includes Sasaki's rejoinder to Wakita's view of his view.

intra-shōen trading existed in the shōen held by the Tōdaiji and the Daigoji. Such cases were, however, limited to the *zōyakumen*-type shōen in the Kinai.<sup>10</sup> In most of the shōen created out of land commended by the zaichi ryōshu, the shōen ryōshu as passive commendees merely received the taxes in kind which had been paid previously to the provincial administration.<sup>11</sup> When we realize that the provincial governors had already been reduced to accepting any mix of products as payments, it is most unlikely that the shōen ryōshu were in any position to dictate the product mix of the taxes in kind. Given the position of the ryōshu, their power would have been only sufficient to name a single good they wished to receive as taxes in kind and not a mix of numerous products. If the zaichi ryōshu had been able to restrict the peasants' trading activities, the rural market would have been small. Thus their ability to restrict rural trade would have depended on their ability to obtain a specific mix of goods in the city market.

Third, it would be difficult for a shōen ryōshu to obtain a desired mix of products by assigning to his shōen various tax obligations payable in a variety of products. Most of the shōen were created out of commended land and thus the shōen ryōshu were passive recipients who were not able to select their land on the basis of its productive capabilities. Even the Imperial household and the Sekkanke with their large number of shōen would have found it difficult to specify tax obligations so as to obtain a desired mix of goods because the proprietary ownership of their shōen was multi-layered (*honjo*, *ryōke*, etc.) and ownership tended to change frequently.<sup>12</sup> I do not believe that either the Imperial household or the Sekkanke attempted to obtain any specific mix of goods. And the taxes in kind received by the lower- or middle-ranked nobles who had one or at most a few shōen were insufficient for making them independent of the market.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, if the shōen ryōshu were not self-sufficient, how did they meet their needs? In my earlier study which examined the Sekkanke during the late Heian period, I showed that these high-ranking nobles received taxes mostly in rice from distant shōen which had been created out of commended land and from the *fuko*, while corvée and varied mixes of goods were obtained from the *zōyakumen*-type shōen

10. Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, pp. 139–47.

11. Nagahara Keiji, *Nihon hōken-sei seiritsu katei no kenkyū* (Iwanami Shoten, 1961), pp. 49–50.

12. Yoshie Akio, "Sekkan karyō no sōzoku kenkyū josetsu," *Shigaku Zasshi*, 76, 4 (April 1967); Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, pp. 156–67.

13. Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, p. 139.

and scattered holdings (*sanjo*) in the Kinai region.<sup>14</sup> The amount of the varied mixes of products obviously could not have exceeded the fixed amount once paid to the government. The taxes in kind were used to meet the expenses of the *mikuramachi* (the office in the powerful nobles' households which administered the warehouses, kitchens, servants' quarters, and artisans). However, these taxes in kind proved insufficient, even when supplemented by other taxes in kind paid by the nobles' artisans, and increasingly goods had to be obtained through the market. Since the goods purchased in the market by the nobles' household administrators (*keishi*) were also needed by the nobles, the nobles must have become more and more dependent on the market.

It is evident, therefore, that the shōen ryōshu depended both on taxes in kind and on the market to satisfy their needs. How, then, is one to judge whether or not the shōen ryōshu as a whole were basically self-sufficient or more or less dependent on the market? I believe that the answer lies in the tax obligations the artisans owed to shōen ryōshu. The artisans chose to "belong" to shōen ryōshu in order to rid themselves of the burden of the taxes imposed by the central government. At times the artisans received stipendary land in exchange for their products, and as a rule they had their own workshops<sup>15</sup> and tools and were their own managers. This meant that they produced goods for the market as well as to discharge their tax obligations.<sup>16</sup> Thus economic activities in the cities expanded because the artisans produced goods for the market; and the shōen ryōshu came to use the city markets as a place to sell the goods they collected as taxes in kind and to buy what they needed. Therefore, in viewing the economic life of the shōen ryōshu, one must recognize the important supplementary role performed by the city market.

*Commerce and the zaichi ryōshu.* The major specialized economic activities, at one time under the control of the Ritsuryō government, came to be controlled, albeit fragmentarily, by the shōen ryōshu. Thus in order for the zaichi ryōshu to expand their economic base, they had to try to bring markets and the local production of specialized goods under their influence. Despite the prevailing view that during

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 139–70.

15. According to an entry dated June 17, 1184, in *Gyokuyō*, a scroll painter had his own workshop and tools of his trade. For further discussions on the artisans, see Endo Moto's, *Nihon shokunin-shi no kenkyū* (Yūzankaku, 1961); and Asaka Toshiki, *Nihon kodai shukōgyō-shi no kenkyū* (Hōsei Daigaku Shuppan-kyoku, 1971).

16. Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, pp. 191–208.

the early medieval period the zaichi ryōshu's economic base was the peasant and did not include the local production of specialized goods and commerce, Kudō Keiichi argues that the zaichi ryōshu showed an increasing interest in exerting their power over the market, though this was secondary to their interest in promoting agriculture.<sup>17</sup> Sasaki Ginya, who agrees with Kudō, examined the case of Kobayakawa and argues that the zaichi ryōshu's interest in commerce grew over time and that by the fifteenth century they were vigorously trying to control the market.<sup>18</sup> Sasaki, however, should be criticized for relying almost entirely on decrees relating to markets<sup>19</sup> issued by Kobayakawa. The issuance of more decrees as the market developed led him to conclude that this accounted for the zaichi ryōshu's guarded interest in the market.<sup>20</sup> A more judicious view is that their interest in the market (a necessary interest in order to strengthen political power) grew gradually over time, and no sharp change appeared in the attitude of the zaichi ryōshu toward the market. Perhaps more important, their ability to control the market weakened during the late medieval period as commerce developed.

How did the zaichi ryōshu exert power both over the production of specialized goods and the market? Toda Yoshimi's study has shown us that ryōshu who had accumulated wealth through opening up paddy land (*elden ryōshu*) had originally expanded their economic power by acting as tax collectors for the provincial government.<sup>21</sup> These *elden ryōshu* were the forerunners of the zaichi ryōshu, who also acted as tax agents and expanded their economic base in a similar way.<sup>22</sup>

When peasants were unable to meet their tax obligations, the zaichi ryōshu advanced whatever the peasants needed to meet them. This in turn obligated the peasants to provide labor and goods to the zaichi ryōshu. The zaichi ryōshu did not necessarily receive the exact mix of goods needed to meet their own tax obligations, but they could buy the goods elsewhere or have them produced at work-

17. Kudō Keiichi, "Kamakura jidai no ryōshu-sei," *Nihon-shi Kenkyū*, 53 (March 1961):43.

18. Sasaki, *Chūsei shōhīn ryūtsū-shi no kenkyū*, pp. 126-30.

19. A copy of a market regulation issued in the market of Nuta-no-shō in Aki on April 25, 1353. This is the entry No. 25 in *Kobayakawa-ke monjo 1*, *Dai-Nihon komonjo* (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan-kai, 1927).

20. Articles 1 and 2 prohibited the Kobayakawa from having social contacts with merchants, and Article 3 specified the juridical authority of Kobayakawa over the markets.

21. Toda Yoshimi, *Ryōshu-sei seiritsu-shi*, pp. 14-43.

22. Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, p. 80.

shops which they maintained. This, in essence, was the way their control over the production of specialized goods and over the market began and the reason for the delay in the peasants' involvement in the market.<sup>23</sup>

According to Asaka Toshiki, during the ninth and tenth centuries the local rich (i.e., *zaichi ryōshu*) often maintained large establishments for producing a variety of specialized goods, but their involvement in this production decreased significantly during the eleventh and twelfth centuries.<sup>24</sup> They used both *corvée* and hired labor; their most important products were often the special goods of the region. The kind of rich man discussed here was not like the rich man of Kii, Kannabi no Tanematsu, found in *Utsubo Monogatari*<sup>25</sup> who was self-sufficient in all goods<sup>26</sup> (in a fashion similar to what Weber classified as an *oikos* economy) but rather the wealthy man of Mano found in the *Sarashina Nikki*.<sup>27</sup>

During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the *zaichi ryōshu* exerted a significant amount of control over the markets in order to obtain the specialized goods needed to make tax payments. They "urged the peasants to be diligent in the fields in the spring, and to produce goods needed for taxes in the summer. Peasants always had more than they could do."<sup>28</sup> It is well known that the *zaichi ryōshu* gave stipendary paddies to artisans in order to assure their services,<sup>29</sup>

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 80–83.

24. Asaka, *Shukōgyō-shi*, pp. 370–73.

25. The "Fukiage" section in *Utsubo monogatari* described an ideal residence of the nobles, which included a large kitchen and workshops for dyeing, weaving, and metal working.

26. At first Ishimoda Shō argued in his *Kodai makki seiji-shi josetsu*, Vol. 2 (Miraisha, 1956) that the example of Kannabi no Tanematsu represented the autarkic economy of the local powers (*gōzoku*). However, he later changed his view, saying that the *gōzoku* began to make use of markets during the Heian period while still attempting to be as self-sufficient as possible. See his "Nihon kodai ni okeru bungyō no mondai" in *Kodai-shi kōza*, Vol. 9, *Kodai no shōgyō to kōgyō* (Gakuseisha, 1963).

27. We read in the section entitled "*kadode*" in *Sarashina nikki* that: Once upon a time, in the province of Shimotsusa lived a person known as the wealthy man of Mano. He is said to have had tens and thousands of *hiki* of cloth woven and bleached. In a boat we crossed a deep river in which he had his cloth bleached and on the bank of which his house once stood."

28. "Kaga no kuni Enuma-gun shoshirage" in *Heian ibun*, No. 2106.

29. Asaka Toshiki, *Shukōgyō-shi*, pp. 275–303; Yokoi Kiyoshi, "Shōen taisai-ka no bungyō keitai to shukōgyō," *Nihonshi Kenkyū*, 62 (September, 1962) and Wakita Haruko, "Chūsei shukōgyō-za no kōzō," *Rekishigaku kenkyū*, 272 (January, 1962).

and this same procedure was used by both the provincial governors and the shōen ryōshu. This provided an economic base for artisans before the market had developed enough to give them economic independence. Gradually the artisans who once labored in the workshops of the central and provincial governments began to manage their own workshops.<sup>30</sup> According to Sasaki, this development was initiated “from above” by the shōen-ryōshu, the provincial governors, and the zaichi ryōshu in order to minimize their dependence on the market.<sup>31</sup>

Many of the stipendary paddies (*kyūmenden*) given to the artisans by the zaichi-ryōshu were small in scale, and often the recipients were the producers of daily necessities such as smiths, carpenters, potters, and leather workers (*kaji*, *banjō*, *kawako-tsukuri* and *doki-tsukuri*).<sup>32</sup> These artisans were treated preferentially by the ryōshu as they gave the ryōshu-economy some degree of self-sufficiency. However, it is quite possible that the artisans who managed their own workshops limited themselves to producing only those goods required for taxes in kind. Neither can we be certain that these taxes in kind were all consumed by the ryōshu. Rather, it seems natural to assume both that there existed a regional market for the products of the small-scale artisans and that the zaichi ryōshu attempted to exert control over this market.

Furthermore, these materials were not only used by the governor but also were marketed, as is evident in the case of the governor of Iyo who provided the producers of high quality cloth with stipendary paddies in exchange for receiving cloth as a tax in kind.<sup>33</sup> Thus, the method of control—giving stipendary paddies in exchange for artisans' products—was not for the purpose of attaining self-sufficiency on the part of the ryōshu, but for the purpose of obtaining the products of the artisans either for their own use or for trading.

*Kyoto as the Hub of Commerce.* During the Ritsuryō period the part-time artisans who still cultivated paddies were used in the workshops of the national and provincial governments to produce specialized goods.<sup>34</sup> Because of a steady inflow of new skills from the

30. Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, pp. 219–32.

31. Sasaki, *Chūsei shōhin ryūtsū-shi*, pp. 153–58.

32. Matsuoka Hisato, “Chūsei kōki naikai suiun no seikaku,” in *Naikai sangyō to suiun no rekishi-teki kenkyū* (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1966); and Wakita's review of Sasaki's *Shōhin ryūtsū-shi*, cited in footnote 59 above, pp. 74–75.

33. Asaka, *Shukōgyō-shi*, pp. 344–45.

34. Ishimoda's 1963 article cited in footnote 77, p. 337.

continent, these artisans were able to produce goods of exceptional quality.<sup>35</sup> However, as the power of the Ritsuryō government declined, these highly skilled artisans began to be employed by the shōen ryōshu of noble origins. In addition to producing goods to fulfill their tax obligations, they now began to produce goods for the market as well.<sup>36</sup>

In Kyoto, where most of the shōen ryōshu lived, there were also two other kinds of artisans. One kind formed villages of families who shared the same skill.<sup>37</sup> The other lived in the lowlands (*sanjo*); most of these artisans belonged to the shōen ryōshu, that is, they owed taxes in kind to the shōen ryōshu.<sup>38</sup> These three kinds of artisans worked in Kyoto and met the needs of commerce, which was growing due to demand from the shōen ryōshu.

Kyoto thus became the largest entrepôt for the collection of taxes paid in specialized goods produced by the most highly skilled artisans of the time. By the twelfth century the difference in the quality of goods produced in Kyoto and in the countryside was significant,<sup>39</sup> with an undisputed superiority going to the military and luxury products produced in Kyoto. As the seat of political power, Kyoto was also the largest consumer and depended on the surrounding fishing and agricultural villages for its necessities. As suggested by Nagahara and Sasaki, it was at least theoretically possible for the shōen ryōshu to acquire all of their needs by means of levying taxes in various mixes of products, and some shōen met their needs through the shōen artisans (*sanjo*), but as a rule the requirements of the shōen ryōshu and of the city had to be met by levying on the merchants in the city new taxes to be paid in specialized goods. By the time of the Genpei wars, even the Imperial court was finding that the taxes in kind paid by artisans, merchants, and peasants who owed taxes directly to the Imperial household were inadequate to meet its

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 324–25.

36. Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, pp. 204–06.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 210–14. The smiths of Nishi-Hichijō, the charcoal makers of Ōhara, and the woodcutters of Yase are examples.

38. Wakita Haruko, "Nihon chūsei toshi no kōzō," *Nihonshi Kenkyū*, 139 and 140 (March 1974). These were groups who lived in the designated lowland sections of the Heian-kyo and who engaged in hunting, fishing, agriculture, and in the production of some specialized goods. The members of these groups engaged in all of these activities and did not specialize in only one specific pursuit.

39. The Sekkan, Fujiwara Tadazane, obtained woodcrafts directly from the shōen which specialized in them in addition to having them made by craftsmen in Kyoto. See "Shitsumandokoro" in *Zoku gunshoruijū*.

needs.<sup>40</sup> It therefore became necessary to levy taxes on the merchants in the cities.

Along with the city merchants who had originally come from villages in the Kinai, commercial activities were undertaken by artisans and peasants of the shōen in the Kinai. Many shōen in this region were created by nobles and temples who first obtained rights to corvée from cultivators and the rights over their land (*zōyakumen-type shōen*) or who created shōen whose economic base was the activity of artisans (*sanjo shōen*). The power of the ryōshu over the economic activity in these shōen tended to be weaker than in shōen created by other methods. This meant that the taxes in these shōen were probably lighter than those levied by the central government and were most likely fixed in amount. This in turn suggests that the peasants in these shōen near Kyoto were probably able to accumulate a certain amount of surplus, which found a natural outlet in this city.<sup>41</sup> Thus Kyoto emerged as the hub of commerce in the Kinai region.

Another significant commercial relationship was the long-distance trading connecting Kyoto to more remote regions. Nagahara suggests that the autarkic agricultural economy under the zaichi ryōshu and the market-oriented economy of the capital functioned independently of each other.<sup>42</sup> I find this view difficult to accept. The zaichi ryōshu of the early period were evidently not self-sufficient but were eager to exert their control both over the market and over the producers of specialized goods. To obtain goods to meet the taxes owed to the shōen ryōshu and to acquire goods to be marketed, the zaichi ryōshu required peasants to produce these goods under their management.<sup>43</sup> But since these efforts seem to have been unsuccessful, during the eleventh and twelfth centuries the zaichi ryōshu began to try to control the flow of goods by controlling the workings of the market.<sup>44</sup>

It is most likely that long-distance trading took place between the zaichi ryōshu out in the provinces and the shōen ryōshu who lived in Kyoto or Nara. This means that the marketing of specialized goods in Kyoto and the Kinai region and the production of these goods in the outer regions formed a symbiotic market economy. The production of specialized goods, including goods paid as taxes in kind,

40. Akamatsu Toshihide, *Kodai chūsei shakai keizai-shi kenkyū* (Heirakuji Shoten, 1972), p. 425.

41. Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, pp. 139–46.

42. Nagahara, *Chūsei shakai kōzō*, p. 93.

43. Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, p. 74.

44. Asaka, *Shukōgyō-shi*, pp. 374–75.

therefore contributed to encouraging commercial development in the regional economies. Despite the views advanced by Sasaki and Asaka,<sup>45</sup> I do not believe that this trade was controlled strictly for the benefit of the shōen ryōshu who wished to be self-sufficient. While specialized goods were produced for taxes, seemingly under the direction of the ryōshu, one might be tempted to say that the ryōshu controlled production and marketing, but in reality he was merely a part of the market mechanism.

These emerging markets should be clearly distinguished from the shipments of specialized goods made to the Ritsuryō government within an economy which was basically autarkic.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, during the Ritsuryō period, the differences in the quality of the specialized goods paid to meet tax obligations seemed to be a matter of secondary importance. As these goods came to be traded and regions specializing in specific goods became known,<sup>47</sup> the prices began to vary according to the quality of the goods;<sup>48</sup> and the *rokusai-ichi* (markets held six times a month) in the provinces—referred to collectively as the *kuni-no-ichi* (provincial markets)—became the major marketing centers within each province.<sup>49</sup> In short, during the early medieval period Kyoto became the hub of commerce uniting the markets of Kyoto and the Kinai region with the emerging long-distance commercial activities of the zaichi ryōshu.

## II. *The Za in Cities and Villages*

*The Development of Commerce in Agricultural Villages.* From the latter part of the Kamakura period on, commerce began to penetrate into villages all over Japan. An important yardstick of this development was the payment of shōen dues in cash (or *daisenno*), which was the subject of a major study by Sasaki.<sup>50</sup> There were two kinds of *daisenno*: one was the cash payment made by the zaichi ryōshu and the shōen-administrators who obtained cash by trading in local

45. *Ibid.*, p. 376; and Sasaki, *Shōhin ryūtsū-shi*, p. 157.

46. Sakaebara Towao, "Ritsuryō-seika ni okeru ryūtsū keizai no rekishi-teki tokushitsu," *Nihonshi Kenkyū*, 131 (January 1973):4.

47. Well-known local specialities are listed in *Shin-saru gōki* and *Tsutsumi Chūnagon monogatari*.

48. Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, p. 42.

49. Sasaki, *Shōhin ryūtsū-shi*, pp. 24–26.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 265. While I am in agreement with most of his arguments, I cannot agree with his view that one of the reasons why a cash tax was adopted was the still limited size of the rice market in Kyoto. See Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, p. 322.

markets to meet their tax obligations to the shōen ryōshu. The other was the cash payments made by the peasants to meet their tax dues. Our concern here is with the latter type.

Sasaki argues that taxes were still paid mostly in kind during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and views the cash payments which began to appear as an indication of the peasants' involvement in the market economy and as the first signs of cash rent. Sasaki's view was based on his findings that the *daisennō* was demanded and adopted by the peasants in the shōen of Tōji during this period.<sup>51</sup> Oyama Kyōhei criticizes this accepted view—that only the rich myōshu class within the shōen were involved in commerce—and argues that cash came into use in these regions where one's livelihood could be earned in economic activities other than the cultivation of rice, that is, in the production of specialized goods. Thus, he advanced the view that the producers of specialized goods began to demand *daisennō* during the latter part of the Kamakura period.<sup>52</sup>

Although these findings are important, one must note that not all peasants in regions where commerce was developed demanded the *daisennō*. The rate of conversion between cash and taxes in kind was probably crucial in determining its desirability. There were cases in which the ryōshu demanded cash payment to the grave detriment of the peasants. And one Kinai shōen continued to collect dues in kind despite the commercial development seen in the region.<sup>53</sup>

Because of the limitations imposed by the historical evidence, studies on the *daisennō* tend to be confined to practices within shōen. It is thus important to recall that the degree of control exerted by the shōen ryōshu and the amount of taxes collected differed according to whether the shōen was a *zōyakumen*-type in the Kinai or one created out of commended land. It seems reasonable to assume that the villages under zaichi ryōshu tended to be the most self-sufficient and the least commercially oriented. It is also likely that, while the tax (paid usually in rice but also payable in silk or other goods) paid to the shōen and the zaichi ryōshu was fixed, the other taxes in kind were levied by the zaichi ryōshu to the limit of his ability to extract them from the peasants.<sup>54</sup> Such differences between shōen resulted in varied responses to the nationwide tide of commerce which rose in the late medieval period, the same period when regional differences

51. *Ibid.*, p. 283.

52. Ōyama Kyōhei, "Chūsei sonraku ni okeru kangai to senka no ryūsū," *Hyōgo Shigaku*, 27 (September 1961):11.

53. Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, p. 317.

54. Wakita, "Chūsei no toshi to nōson," pp. 199–202.

in the degree of economic development became pronounced. The regional differences in the development of commerce were highly correlated with the frequency of the peasant revolts (*do-ikki*) which occurred during the late medieval period.

Class stratification due to the growth of commerce resulted in poverty for the peasants, which was reflected in an outbreak of revolts in which the peasants demanded the enactment of decrees canceling their debts (*tokuseirei*). These revolts occurred most frequently in the *shōen* villages in the Kinai and its surrounding provinces—"the *ikki* occurred mostly in the villages that belonged to the powerful nobles, temples, and shrines."<sup>55</sup> In one case peasants revolted on the outskirts of Kyoto and demanded that all seven toll gates to Kyoto be abolished because they impeded their trade with the city.<sup>56</sup> The destruction by the peasants in these revolts of the warehouses of pawnbrokers and moneylenders is a clear indication that they had become debtors.<sup>57</sup> Peasant revolts did not occur in the villages controlled by the *zaichi ryōshu* who had become vassals of the *ryōgoku daimyō*. The military strength of the *zaichi ryōshu* might explain this in part, but the failure of the peasants to accumulate a surplus because heavy taxation slowed the growth of the development of commerce might be the principal reason for the absence of these revolts.

*The Development of the Za.* The changing status of the artisans can be seen in the decline of the stipendary paddies. For example the stipendary paddies which had been allotted to the artisans during the twelfth century by the provincial government of Wakasa were subdivided and reallocated to others in 1265; by 1302 only the names of the paddies remained to remind the cultivators of the history of their fields.<sup>58</sup> Since the stipendary paddies were provided to assure that the *ryōshu*'s needs for specialized goods would be met, their disappearance meant that a new source—the markets—had been found to meet their needs. This new development also suggested, if indirectly, that the growth of commerce now enabled artisans to produce their goods without the assistance of the stipendary paddies.

One should not assume that the existence or non-existence of the

55. An entry dated February 5, Eikyō 2 in *Mansai jugō nikki* found in *Zoku gunsho ruijū*.

56. The entries dated September 16 and October 23, Bunmei 12 in *Daijō-in jishi zōji-ki*.

57. Wakita Haruko, "Tokusei ikki no haikai," in Kobata kyōju taikan kinen jigyō-kai ed., *Kobata kyōju taikan kinen: Kokushi ronshū* (November 1970), pp. 511–25.

58. Asaka, *Shukōgyō shi*, pp. 296–300.

stipendary paddies per se indicates the degree of specialization achieved in various regions.<sup>59</sup> In Yamato, where commerce had reached down to the villages because of their proximity to Kyoto and Nara, such powerful shōen ryōshu as the Kōfukuji continued to provide stipendary paddies to artisans well into the Ōnin-Bunmei period (1467–87). In the shōen of the Kōfukuji, which was able to retain its political strength, the artisans paid cash for the privilege of being designated shōen artisans, which conferred on them stipendary paddies and the right to supply their specialized goods to the shōen. Their economic base, however, was the production of specialized goods. Thus, when the shōen system entered its final declining stage and the shōen were no longer able to provide rice (the supposed benefit for having a stipendary paddy), these artisans were seen resigning the very privileges they had acquired in earlier years.<sup>60</sup>

More eloquent than the decline of the stipendary paddies in signaling the new heights reached in the production of specialized goods was the emergence of the za in the cities.<sup>61</sup> During the early medieval period the urban artisans in Kyoto and Nara were dependent on and owed corvée or taxes in kind to the shōen ryōshu in exchange for stipendary paddies and exemption from central government taxes. These artisans could produce goods for the market and provide services to others so long as their obligations to the shōen ryōshu were met. They organized za, but these were still “service za,” which existed principally for the benefit of the shōen ryōshu.

From the mid-Kamakura period, there began to emerge in Kyoto za which consisted only of members with rights to engage in one specific trade. By the Nanboku-chō period the largest were able to enjoy monopoly rights and they were no longer “service za”; their members specialized in the trading as well as in the production of goods for the market and no longer owed dues to the shōen ryōshu. Instead their only obligation was to give a fixed amount of “business tax” to the ryōshu. Most likely the persons who formed these za migrated to Kyoto and Nara from nearby villages during the medieval period.<sup>62</sup> By this time the “service za” of the earlier period had also

59. Sasaki argued that the disappearance of the stipendary paddies contributed to the emergence of this specialization. Sasaki, *Shōhīn ryūtsū-shi*, pp. 166–67. For criticism of Sasaki’s view on this point, see Matsuoka’s work cited in footnote 82 and my review of Sasaki’s book cited in footnote 59.

60. Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, Appendix pp. 436–64.

61. *Ibid.*, Chapter 3.

62. *Ibid.*, pp. 261–64. This is with reference to the Oyamazaki oil-za.

begun to be transformed into *za* for the purpose of monopolizing their trade.

The monopolistic activities of these *za* inevitably came into conflict with the interests of the independent small sellers and the part-time sellers from the villages. There was also a conflict between the cities and the villages, but the cities had the upper hand.

I believe the "guild" came into being in Japan with the establishment of the exclusive right to produce and/or sell certain goods.<sup>63</sup> With the recognition of the status of the guild members, a new class of persons called *chōnin* (the residents in towns; *chō* or *machi* compared to villages) came into being. A case in point was the Gionsha's (a shrine) cotton-batting *za*; its members were called *chōnin* at the point when these former *jinin* (literally, shrine persons) ceased to owe *corvée* to the shrine.<sup>64</sup>

In the Nanboku-chō period commerce began to develop more rapidly because of the increasing part-time participation of the Kinai peasants in commerce. They began to organize *inaka-za* (country *za*) which obtained monopolistic privileges by paying a "business tax" to the *ryōshu*. In the Omi villages east of Lake Biwa, some *za* organized to capitalize on their location, which was ideally suited for them to act as intermediaries of goods flowing into nearby urban centers.<sup>65</sup> The famed Omi merchants of the Tokugawa period traced their origins to these *za*. In Yamato, the *za* producing specialized goods and the *za* selling them were organized separately. Many *za* were also organized in villages among part-time peasants for producing and marketing their products.<sup>66</sup> This pattern of the development of the

63. In his *Toshi oyobi za no hattatsu* (Chūō Kōronsha, 1948), p. 33, Toyota Takeshi argued that the *za* were simply professional groups which evolved out of service groups (*hōshi dantai*) as commerce developed. While he seems to recognize the guild-like characteristics of the *za*, he emphasized the fact that these groups were not independent and autonomous because of their "dependent relationships" with the *ryōshu*. Apparently, Toyota believes that only the *kabunakama* of the Edo period were *bona fide* guilds. Toyota Takeshi, *Nihon no hōken toshi* (Iwanami Shoten, 1954), p. 49. However, since the *kabunakama* paid business taxes (*eigyō-zei*), one could argue that the *za* of the late medieval period were freer from "dependent relationships." In part, Toyota's view stems from his failure to distinguish the *za* in cities from those in villages. For a discussion of the process by which the *za* gradually became autonomous entities, see Wakita's "Chūsei toshi no kōzō."

64. An entry dated November 14, Kōei 2, *Yasaka jinja kiroku-jō* (Yasaka Jinja Shamusho, 1942).

65. Wakita, "Chūsei shōgyō no tenkai," *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, Appendix 2, pp. 523-93.

66. *Ibid.*, Appendix 1, pp. 496-506.

*inaka-za* in Yamato, which emerged as the result of increased specialization in villages and of the growth of commerce, also reflected the stimulation of the demand by nearby major urban centers for the goods produced in these villages.

### III. *Commerce During the Late Medieval Period*

Let us now consider the control exerted by the *za* merchants in central cities and the production of regional specialty goods. Because of the vastly superior skill levels maintained in Kyoto from the Ritsuryō period on, and because the *shōen ryōshu* lived there, the capital grew into a large city. Throughout the Nanboku-chō and the Muromachi periods, Kyoto continued to develop as the unquestioned center of consumption and production, and the establishment of the Muromachi bakufu in Kyoto only hastened the tempo of growth. Rice was the most important item of consumption, but various agricultural and marine products too were brought into the city<sup>67</sup> by *za* merchants who functioned as jobbers for merchants from the outskirts of the city as well as for sellers in more distant regions.<sup>68</sup>

As is evident from the increasing use of cash to meet tax obligations, the tax rice and the rice which peasants had to sell on their own were converted into cash in local markets and in *entrepôts* which developed along coasts and lake fronts. The rice was then brought to the city and to the Kinai region by the *za* merchants who had acquired exclusive privileges.<sup>69</sup> Though the development of the rice market is an important topic for further examination,<sup>70</sup> let us now turn to the growth of the output of specialized goods.

The most important characteristic of this growth was the fact that the Kinai region, with Kyoto as its center, specialized in producing the best quality products while other regions produced raw materials and semi-finished products.<sup>71</sup> For example, the prices of silk in Kyoto during the Muromachi period were 14 to 15 *kammon* for imported weaves and 4.5 to 6 *kammon* for silk produced in Kyoto in contrast to only 3 *kammon* for the best Kaga province had to offer and 2.3 *kammon* for the best Mino silk. With the exception of Kaga

67. Sasaki, *Shōhin ryūtsū-shi*, pp. 103–08.

68. Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, pp. 333–40, and pp. 395–405.

69. See footnotes 50 and 67.

70. Momose Kesao, "Muromachi jidai ni okeru beika-hyō," *Shigaku Zasshi*, 66, 1 (January 1957) is the only work dealing with this topic.

71. Sasaki, *Shōhin ryūtsū-shi*, pp. 109–17; Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, pp. 343–55; and Wakita, "Toshi to nōson," pp. 202–09.

and Mino, other regions had stopped producing silk by the eleventh century and instead became producers of the inputs for silk weaving and semi-finished products as well as of cotton and cotton yarn. Thread<sup>72</sup> was produced in the San'in region (Tajima, Tamba, and Tango) and the Hokuriku region (Kaga, Echizen, and Etchū), while cotton was grown in the Kantō region (Etchū and Mino).<sup>73</sup> Because Kyoto remained dominant in the growth of medieval commerce, the regions outside the Kinai gradually became the suppliers of the more widely demanded goods (rather than luxury goods)<sup>74</sup> and later became the producers of semi-finished goods and raw materials.

The za members in Kyoto and the Kinai region enjoyed a privileged status in the trading of these specialized goods. One can correctly assume that most of the goods were sold through exclusive routes. The bakufu, in effect, was allowing the merchants who engaged in this trade to make monopolistic profits, and the shugo daimyo who owed allegiance to the bakufu also protected the monopoly rights of these same merchants.<sup>75</sup> This means that the bakufu was able to exert some control over commerce at this time; its intention was to strengthen the dominance of Kyoto and the Kinai region within the commercial network that existed. The bakufu went as far as to allow the za merchants to act as collectors at the toll gates on the main routes into Kyoto and the Kinai.<sup>76</sup>

How did the regions outside Kinai react to a commercial structure which accorded Kyoto such a privileged and predominant role? Although these regions became the suppliers of raw material to Kyoto, they also continued to produce goods to meet the needs of their own regions.<sup>77</sup> Regrettably, little is known of the regional markets. Sasaki studied the regional distribution of artisans who produced various types of metal tools for agriculture and found that there was a significant difference between the early and the late medieval periods.<sup>78</sup>

72. During this period, the highest quality silk was woven from imported Chinese silk yarn, and the profits from importing the yarn were very large.

73. "Shogeisai-dai motsuzuke" in *Zoku gunsho ruijū*.

74. During the eleventh century, cloth woven in Hitachi was referred to as Hitachi-aya suggesting that the cloth was a luxury good (*Shin-saru gōki*). However, this cloth was later referred to as Hitachi-*tsumugi* suggesting that it was then woven for a wider market (*Teikin ōrai*).

75. Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, pp. 343–55.

76. *Ibid.*, pp. 337–39.

77. Asaka believed that it was possible for the regions producing raw material and the regions supplying goods to Kyoto to become importers of raw materials or goods. Asaka, *Shukōgyō-shi*, p. 377.

78. Sasaki, *Shōhin ryūtsū-shi*, pp. 130–32.

During the early medieval period, agricultural tools were supplied by artisans who received stipendary paddies and lived on *shōen* or on government land and by the *za* in Kyoto which obtained their wares from artisans in Kawachi and Izumi, who were known for superior products. In contrast, during the late medieval period, new regional centers producing these agricultural tools emerged, threatening the existence of independent artisans and competing with the producers in the Kinai region. The *sengoku daimyo* were able to encourage the production of regional products for military reasons because specialized goods were regionally produced during the Muromachi period. Thus we find two facets to the commercial activities of the Muromachi period: the dominance of the Kinai region and the growth of regional markets, which continued to coexist as commerce grew.<sup>79</sup>

*The Market Sphere of the Capital and of Domains (ryōgoku).* In the Kinai region where commerce had developed and where more and more peasants became engaged in by-employments producing and selling goods for the market, the *inaka-za* began to grow rapidly in number during the first decades of the fourteenth century. The development of this commercial activity soon created what one may call a domainal market sphere. For example, during the fourteenth century, the pottery *za* of Yamato distributed their Hōryūji and Kōfukuji-style pottery within the regions surrounding these temples. By the fifteenth century, however, this *za* marketed throughout Yamato<sup>80</sup> what was known as “the new Kōfukuji-style pottery.” By the fifteenth century the power of the Kōfukuji had declined and the *dogō* emerged to rule various parts of Yamato. Despite this, the *za* continued to retain its monopolistic rights throughout Yamato by paying fees (*kujisen*) to the newly emerging political powers.<sup>81</sup> In the Kinai region at least, many *za* appear to have had their own spheres of influence established in terms of domains, but this did not mean that commercial activities of the *za* were segmented by domain

79. For the degree of control exerted by Akuta, a smith in Harima, over village markets, see Toyota, *Chūsei shōgyō*, pp. 86–87.

80. Inagaki Shinya, “Akado-ki shirodo-ki: Chūsei kawarake no hennen,” *Yamato Bunka Kenkyū*, 8, 2 (February, 1963); Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, pp. 511–12.

81. Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, pp. 407–08. For a discussion of the appearance of the *zatō* (the *za* elders) who administered the affairs of the *za*, the emergence of status distinctions among the *za* members, the process by which the position of the *zatō* came to be rights that could be traded for cash, and on the eventual issuance by the *za* of codes of conduct to regulate the action of the *za* members, see *ibid.*, pp. 385–94.

boundaries. The *za* of the Omi merchants, who specialized in entrepôt trade, traded widely and their markets included Ise Bay, Mino, Wakasa, and Kyoto. The *za* organized in the Yamato villages for the purpose of producing goods to be sold in Kyoto had to accept the dictates of the city *za* which were maintained for wholesaling functions.

The power of the wholesalers over the *inaka-za* was well established by the Muromachi period. For example, during the Ōei period (1394–1428) a bamboo-blind (*sudare*) *za* in Otsuki-shō in Yamato was restricted to dealing with two wholesalers of the Nara *za* in Kyoto. By the time of the Ōnin War, wholesale *za*, which acted as conduits between Kyoto-Nara and Yamato, were exerting monopsonistic control over the producers in Yamato through the method of advancing credit to the producers.<sup>82</sup>

The monopsonistic power of these wholesalers had extended by the fifteenth century to all of the Kinai region. A sedge-hat *za* of Fukae village in Settsu (within the present city limits of Osaka) was a typical case: the *za* was the only wholesaler and it had monopsony power over all the sedge hats produced by the Fukae peasants. It was also the monopolist of these hats in Sakai, Nara, Tennōji, and Kyoto as well as in the rural areas of the five Kinai provinces. This of course meant that the whole Kinai region constituted a unified market over which such monopolistic and monopsonistic powers could be exerted.<sup>83</sup> This development in the Kinai reflected the degree of economic development which the region had achieved because Kyoto and Nara were the heart of the shōen system.

The rural *za*, which emerged to meet only the needs of villages, gained greater freedom from the control of the city wholesalers. In time these *za* came to specialize either in the production or sale of goods and became the nuclei of many new, regional, urban centers. In Omi, for example, we find many references in the records to these newly emerging markets during the Ōnin-Bunmei period (1467–87).<sup>84</sup> It is known that in the town of Yagi in Yamato a market was held daily in the months following the harvest of 1487. This undoubtedly was one of the earliest examples of a town within a rural area, but these *zaigo-machi* were to increase in number over time.<sup>85</sup> Of course, even in these new towns the *za* gained monopolistic power as production and sales became specialized.

82. *Ibid.*, pp. 514–15.

83. *Ibid.*, pp. 409–11.

84. *Ibid.*, pp. 562, Table 18.

85. *Ibid.*, pp. 509–11.

An important characteristic of the commerce of the Kinai region during the Muromachi-Sengoku periods was the coexistence of the metropolitan market sphere dominated by wholesalers and the markets with these new towns as their nuclei. I define the metropolitan market sphere as the market sphere of the Kinai, dominated by Kyoto and Nara, and served by the people in the region. Another important facet of the Kinai commerce was that commercial (wholesale) capital exerted its power across the political boundaries drawn by the ryōshu. The development of the self-governing cities must be viewed within this perspective.

How did the sengoku daimyo react to the growth of commerce? As we have seen in the case of Kobayakawa in Section I, the zaichi ryōshu as a rule attempted to exert control over specialized production and commerce in order to maintain and solidify their political and economic base. Despite their efforts, however, commerce in villages continued to develop throughout the late medieval period, overcoming economic and political restrictions imposed by the zaichi ryōshu. Faced with this fact, the zaichi ryōshu had to recognize the changing economic reality and reacted in the best way they could by making impositions on the merchants, such as taxing village markets. There also were Kobayakawa and other zaichi ryōshu in the west who actively engaged in commerce as well as in trade with Korea.<sup>86</sup> The task of the *ryōgoku daimyō* was to limit the power of these zaichi ryōshu who were engaging in regional and even in foreign trade and to control and use the power of these zaichi ryōshu for the daimyo's own political and economic benefit. Let us now examine a few examples of the roles played and actions taken by daimyo.

The markets which developed in Omi serve as useful examples of the way commerce changed in the markets under the jurisdiction of the zaichi ryōshu. In Omi, the zaichi ryōshu were still in command of these markets and they taxed merchants who traded there. However, as the sengoku daimyo rose in power and began to exert control over commerce, and especially as merchants began to trade across the regional boundaries of the zaichi ryōshu, disputes arising out of conflicts among groups of merchants trying to maintain monopoly rights had to be settled by Rokkaku, the sengoku daimyō who controlled Omi. Since the decisions made by Rokkaku were first conveyed to the zaichi ryōshu who enforced them, the control over commerce

86. Sasaki Ginya, "Kaigai bōeki to kokunai keizai," in *Kōza Nihon-shi 3* (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan-kai, 1970); and Tamura Hiroyuki, *Nitchō bōeki no kenkyū* (Sanwa Shobō, 1967).

by the sengoku daimyō was not yet complete. Also, the commercial activities of some merchant groups who exercised monopolistic and monopsonistic powers through their *za* extended beyond the political sphere of Rokkaku. These *za* could not be completely controlled by a sengoku daimyō who had not yet succeeded in bringing all the *zaichi ryōshu* under his control. Thus when Rokkaku made the new castle town Ishidera a *rakuichi*, a city with no *za*, he was bringing to bear all the power at his command.<sup>87</sup>

In contrast, Imagawa in Suruga was able to exercise significantly more control over commerce within his domain, using *za* or *za*-like organizations.<sup>88</sup> All but a few authorized merchants were prohibited from trading in leather goods—a military necessity and an export product. The number of authorized carpenters, who received paddies worth 48 *kammon*, was limited to 16, which indicates the degree of control Imagawa exerted over artisans. A select group of smiths was exempted from taxes because they represented all other smiths and functioned as agents for the daimyo in carrying out his policies affecting the entire trade. A *za* merchant named Tomono was made the collector of taxes levied on merchants and for this service he himself was exempted from taxes. One Matsuki, who was also exempted from taxes, functioned as an agent of Imagawa in the daimyo's trade outside the domain, especially in Kyoto.

While the use of the *za* or *za*-like organizations showed that the power of the daimyo to control commerce was still weak, the use of the regional *za* enabled the daimyo to eliminate the dominance of the privileged city merchants in the daimyo domains. The case of Uesugi in Echigo is a useful example to show how one sengoku daimyo developed an effective commercial policy. In this domain, a few merchants were made “official merchants” (*goyō-shōnin*) and it was they who eliminated the influence of the Kyoto merchants and enforced Uesugi's policies affecting all merchants and commerce within his domain.<sup>89</sup>

We are able to trace the development of markets actively promoted by a daimyo by examining the case of Go-Hōjō who ruled Sagami and Musashi. Thanks to Toyota, we know that markets—*sansai-ichi* and *rokusai-ichi*—were held throughout this domain within a few *ri* of each other during the latter half of the sixteenth century. For example, the markets in the Chichibu region grew around the market of Ōmiyagō and were held in Niegawa, Yoshida, Ōnohara,

87. *Ibid.*, pp. 550–80.

88. *Ibid.*, pp. 380–82; Sasaki, *Shōhin ryūtsū-shi*, pp. 371–80.

89. Wakita, *Chūsei shōgyō hattatsu-shi*, pp. 371–80.

and Kamiogano. The market in Ōmiyagō was held on days ending with 1 and 6, and in the four satellite markets on days ending in 2 and 7, 3 and 8, 4 and 9, and 5 and 10, respectively. Toyota emphasizes the fact that these markets were held for the benefit of the peasants.<sup>90</sup>

In contrast, Nakamaru Kazutaka advances the view that these free markets (i.e., *rakuichi*) were held for the benefit of daimyo who wanted to provide the peasants with opportunities to obtain cash—the medium in which daimyo preferred to receive taxes. Therefore Nakamaru maintains that these markets ceased to be held when tax obligations were no longer paid in cash.<sup>91</sup> Fujiki Hisashi questions Nakamaru's view and argues that these markets (*rokusai-ichi*) in rural areas were held because the daimyo needed them in order to sell the tax rice they collected. He supports his argument in part by pointing out that Go-Hōjō began to collect taxes in rice rather than in cash during the Eiroku-Genki periods (1558–73), while these markets came into being during the Tenshō period (1573–92). Furthermore, he points out that Go-Hōjō, in collecting some of the taxes in barley, set a rate of 3.5 *to* of barley per 100 *mon* in cash, while an extant record shows that a ryōshu in Yoshida was ordering the sale of barley at the price of 100 *mon* per 2.5 *to*.<sup>92</sup>

If we assume that the unit of measure used in the market and in paying taxes was the same and that sales were in fact made at the rates specified, then the difference in the rates provided a large gain for the ryōshu. But who bought the barley? It is difficult to believe that the peasants were compliant enough to buy at the higher price of 2.5 *to* for 100 *mon* the very barley which they had handed over at the rate of 3.5 *to* for 100 *mon*. This is especially true when we note that the same historical record informs us that the 2.5-*to*-for-100 *mon* rate was an official price which the peasants were not to undersell; that is, the peasants were seen as competing sellers and not as buyers. In short, it was most unlikely that the peasants were buying the barley.

If this is true, then the barley must have been sold only in the castle towns within the domain, and the *rokusai-ichi* in villages were held for other than the purpose of selling goods collected as taxes in kind. We are thus back to the reason for the growth of markets advanced by Toyota—the development of commerce within the village

90. Toyota, *Chūsei shōgyō*, p. 318.

91. Nakamaru Kazuhiro, "Gohōjō no hatten to shōgyō," *Rekishigaku Kenkyū*, 229 (April 1959):38.

92. Fujiki Hisashi, "Daimyō ryōgoku no keizai kōzō," *Nihon keizaishi taikei* 2: *Chūsei*, pp. 253–64.

economy. The medieval ryōshu frequently helped maintain and regulate markets once the peasants' need for markets became evident. Fujiki is partially correct in saying that the ryōshu attempted to create a unified market system out of the peasant markets within their domains. Such a unified market system was created even if it meant that the daimyo had to rely on the officially appointed merchants and artisans as was done when Odawara, a daimyo castle town, failed to become the natural center of the market network within the domain. Fujiki would do well to remember that the basic force behind the growth of the rural markets was the growth of the agricultural economy.

Though with differences in timing, commerce eventually spread to all parts of Japan. Commerce developed in varied forms depending on the degree and nature of the control exerted by each ryōshu. In regions outside the Kinai, the daimyo developed policies towards commerce in order to restrict the control over commerce that the zaichi ryōshu had exerted. In the Kinai region where the power of the daimyo was relatively weak, there developed a metropolitan market sphere which extended over many markets in areas politically controlled by many zaichi ryōshu and daimyo. Having no individual political power, a select group of wholesalers organized in za eventually controlled the market. In time, they became the *goyōshōnin* who enjoyed the support of the political powers and could be called "the first of the powerful merchants" (*shoki gōshō*).<sup>93</sup>

Finally, let us briefly comment on the *rakuichi-rakuza* (free market without za) policy. According to Toyota, this policy "enabled the merchants and artisans to free themselves of their earlier subjugation and allowed them to form new commercial relationships under the control of the ryōshu." That is, Toyota believes the policy had both the effect of liberating the merchants and artisans from subjugation and of bringing them under the yet stronger ryōshu control.<sup>94</sup> Presumably, by "liberating themselves from subjugation," Toyota meant that merchants and artisans in the za were liberated from the shōen ryōshu. But, if this was so, "subjugation" in most cases amounted to no more than paying a small fee for the privilege of maintaining the za. The abolition of the za was much more costly to

93. Wakita Osamu, "Kinsei-teki zenkoku shijō no keisei," *Kinsei hōken shakai no keizai kōzō*, Chapter 1 (Ochanomizu Shobō, 1963); Yamaguchi Tōru, "Obama Tsuruga ni okeru kinsei shoki gōshō no sonzai keitai," *Rekishigaku Kenkyū*, 248 (December, 1960).

94. Toyota Takeshi, "Rakuichi rakuza no seisaku," *Chūsei Nihon shōgyō-shi no kenkyū*, pp. 406-30.

these merchants and artisans because, as Toyota has shown, this policy broke the monopolistic power of the za. Also, because the za had acted to prevent the rise of intra-class conflicts, their abolition ushered in a period in which intra-class distinctions appeared among the former members of the za and in which the former equilibrium among the za was destroyed. One consequence of this development was the emergence of the giant wholesalers who proceeded to dominate commerce. As is well known, Nobunaga and Hideyoshi were able to control commerce by bringing these wholesalers under their authority; they now had the power to both permit the existence of za and at the same time control them to meet their needs.<sup>95</sup>

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95. Wakita Osamu has criticized the conventional view that Nobunaga began the *rakuichi rakuza* policy in Kyoto. See his "Nobunaga seiken no za seisaku," *Ryūkoku Shidan*, Nos. 56-57 (December, 1966).