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Author(s): Gilbert Rozman

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GILBERT ROZMAN

Edo's Importance in the Changing Tokugawa Society

By 1800 Edo ranked as one of roughly 70 cities in the world (five were in Japan) with more than 100,000 residents, as one of about 20 cities (three in Japan) in excess of 300,000 population, and as probably the only city easily to surpass 1,000,000 inhabitants. By 1970 Japan was one of a small number of countries that started the modernization process as latecomers yet rushed through a complex transition to become highly modernized societies. What is the connection between a country's premodern urban heritage and its pace of modernization? By raising some general questions about Edo in comparative perspective, I will examine in this paper aspects of this city's impact on the development of strategic factors favorable to subsequent modernization.

A single, large city represents many things to social scientists: a separate spatial entity with distinctive features, a component contributing various functions to a greater societal network of cities, a case designated for comparison with cities chosen from other societies and, in potential accord with each of these viewpoints, either a mirror on which broad lines of change are vividly reflected or a breeding ground for the dissemination of change to some wider area. The city of Edo commands attention from each of these perspectives. First, as the most populous city in Japan for slightly longer than the final two centuries of Tokugawa rule, Edo glitters in the spotlight thrown by Japanese historians on many features of their compact country's extraordinary urban past. Second only to Kyoto, which was unsurpassed for a more than 1,000 year tenure as one of the world's great cities, Edo intrigues Japanese scholars, who in recent years have continued to add to the unusually well-documented history of the city's various social strata and its successive phases of growth.¹

1. For information on Edo's *chōnin* see Nishiyama Matsunosuke, ed.,

Second, as the crown atop Japan's highly efficient pyramidal structure of 1,700 or more central places (administrative and marketing centers) during the second half of the Tokugawa period, Edo occupies a crucial position in analyses of networks of cities.² Japanese historians have partially documented the flow of goods between hundreds of small marketing centers, many of the more than 200 castle cities (*jōkamachi*), some tens of ports and post stations with regional significance, and the three principal cities. Inferior, perhaps, only to the detailed local histories compiled for English urban history, these materials assembled on large numbers of Japanese cities and their interrelationships represent one of our richest resources in the analysis of premodern urban networks.

Third, as the premier city in a country which later succeeded in rapid modernization, Edo would seemingly attract comparisons with the main cities in other countries alleged to have possessed unusually favorable preconditions for modernization. Unfortunately, little is yet known about the roots of modernization, especially among the countries which were latecomers to the process. Recognition remains long overdue of the utility of comparisons between cities, including such major centers as London and Paris in the early modernizing countries and St. Petersburg in Russia, another rapidly modernizing latecomer.

In the absence of direct comparison, articles by Thomas C. Smith and E. A. Wrigley in *Past and Present* indirectly pose the most compelling challenge to consider in new comparative ways Edo's significance for changes conducive to subsequent modernization in Japan. On the one hand, Smith's stimulating work, "Pre-modern Economic Growth: Japan and the West," cannot but leave doubts as to whether, in comparison to London or Paris, Edo made any major contribution at all to the premodern phase of economic growth, since Smith boldly contrasts Japanese rural-centered to European urban-centered devel-

Edo chōnin no kenkyū (Studies of the Edo chōnin), vols. 1-3 (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1972-74); and Minami Kazuo, *Edo no shakai kōzō* (The social structure of Edo) (Hanawa Shobō, 1969). On Edo's *hatamoto* see Kozo Yamamura, *A Study of Samurai Income and Entrepreneurship* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); and on other categories of *bushi* see the bibliography in Yamamura. For histories of Edo's growth see Naitō Akira, *Edo to Edojō* (Edo and Edo castle) (Kajima Kenkyūjō, 1966); Nomura Kentarō, *Edo* (Shibundō, 1966); Ikeda Yasaburō, *Hiroshige no Edo* (Kodansha, 1968); and Kawasaki Fusagorō, *Edo happyaku hachi chō* (The 808 wards of Edo) (Tōgensha, 1967).

2. Gilbert Rozman, *Urban Networks in Ch'ing China and Tokugawa Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

opment.³ On the other hand, Wrigley's article, "A Simple Model of London's Importance in Changing English Society and Economy 1650-1750," proposes a model for assessing London's considerable importance in English society with obvious (though unstated) applications for studying Edo's importance in Japanese society.⁴ Despite initial impressions, interpretations of the two views need not be entirely inconsistent. If carefully interpreted, Smith's contrast implies two stages of Japanese development, with urban-centered growth during the early Tokugawa period giving rise to later rural-centered growth. And Wrigley's interest really centers on London's long-run impact on rural England, not excluding a comparable two-stage process. Neither author draws comparisons between Edo and London; nonetheless, this is the obvious comparison which emerges from a juxtaposition of their conclusions.

Wrigley suggests that London's relationship with the rest of England can be conceived as that of "a potent engine working toward change."⁵ He begins with population data, noting that England's capital grew rapidly from roughly 200,000 in 1600 to 575,000 in 1700 (by which time it had become the largest city in Europe) to as many as 675,000 inhabitants in 1750. Students of Japan have long been aware that in absolute growth Edo easily outdistanced London during this period. In 1590, when London already ranked as a great city of Europe with 200,000 inhabitants, Edo was just being founded on the site of a small settlement distinguished only by a branch castle and an insignificant market.⁶ Within 130 years, as London's population increased by 400,000 or 450,000, Edo added more than one million residents.⁷ Indeed, for almost 100 years until London's growth gained momentum in the early nineteenth century, Edo probably

3. Thomas C. Smith, "Pre-modern Economic Growth: Japan and the West," *Past and Present* 43 (1973):127-60.

4. E. A. Wrigley, "A Simple Model of London's Importance in Changing English Society and Economy 1650-1750," *Past and Present* 37 (1967):44-70.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

6. A recent account of Edo's early history can be found in Mizue Renko, "Shoki Edo chōnin" (The chōnin of early Edo), in Nishiyama, ed., *Edo chōnin no kenkyū*, 1:43-124.

7. Estimates of Edo's total population can be found in many sources, including Naitō Akira, *Edo to Edojō*, pp. 124-42; and Nomura Kentarō, *Edo*, pp. 103-12. These estimates indicate growth from about 100,000 in 1610 to roughly 400,000 in the 1640's to as many as 800,000 in the 1680's and finally to over 1,000,000 persons by the 1720's. More recently Naitō Akira has estimated the city's peak population at 1.3 to 1.4 million, including 650,000 persons on *bushi* estates. See his book, *Edo no toshi to kenchiku* (The city and architecture of Edo) (Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1972), pp. 23-25.

ranked as the largest city in the world, rivaled only by one or two cities in far more populous China. Under these circumstances, are we not justified in asking whether Edo did not likewise operate as "a potent engine working toward change?" Should we not both observe the reflection in Edo of nationwide currents of change and examine the central role of this city in initiating changes which spread across Japan?

Wrigley's model links demographic conditions, marketing, and new forms of social mobility and consumption to the growth of London and the establishment of a foundation for the industrial revolution. It credits London with exerting a pervasive impact on the rest of England, largely through new patterns in the movement of people and goods centering on this city. Before examining whether new patterns of migration and marketing into Edo could have exerted a similar impact, we shall first want to establish that changes similar to those listed by Wrigley for English society prior to 1750 were also occurring in Tokugawa society. Then we shall briefly consider the prevailing image of Edo, showing how it differs from that of London. After looking in some detail at the evidence for recasting Edo's image, we should emerge in a position to draw preliminary conclusions about Edo's impact on Japan in comparison to the impact of other great cities on their premodern societies.

Included among Wrigley's checklist of ten changes which the growth of London may have promoted and which by their occurrence may have succeeded in engendering the magic "take-off" are: 1) the fostering of changes in agricultural methods which increase the productivity of those engaged in agriculture so that the cost of foodstuffs will fall and real wages rise; 2) the interplay between fertility, mortality, and nuptiality such that population does not expand too rapidly for some time after real income per head has begun to trend upwards; 3) the steady spread of environments in which the socialization process produces individuals with different orientations in their patterns of action; 4) the establishment of conditions in which upward social mobility need not necessarily lead to the recirculation of ability within traditional society; and 5) the spread of the practice of aping one's betters.⁸ While emphasizing that "it is not so much that London's

8. Also on Wrigley's checklist are: 6) the creation of a single national market; 7) the development of new sources of raw materials; 8) the provision of a wider range of commercial and credit facilities; 9) the creation of a better transportation network; and 10) the securing of a steady rise in real incomes. Of these changes, all stated here in a simplified form, Japan may only have lacked the pronounced development of new sources of raw materials such

growth was independently more important than the other major changes which modified English economy and society during the century, as that it is a most convenient point of entry into the study of the whole range of changes which took place . . . ;” Wrigley presents a model for exploring the impact of a great premodern city on its wider society.⁹

Reference to many of the same social changes that Wrigley identifies has surfaced during the past two decades in reappraisals of Tokugawa history, most recently in the sweeping challenge posed to the lore of past studies by Susan Hanley and Kozo Yamamura. Together these two social scientists have offered a string of fresh insights in applying the relatively precise tools of demographic and economic history to the study of the Tokugawa period, pointing specifically to similarities between Japan and England in slow population growth and rising per capita income.¹⁰ The impressive documentation by Japanese scholars and by Ronald Dore and Thomas C. Smith of dramatic rises in literacy, non-agricultural by-employments, and labor mobility within rural areas also leaves little doubt that Wrigley's checklist could be reproduced virtually intact for Tokugawa Japan.¹¹ The similar general pattern of social transformation is no longer problematic; only the basic explanations for change vary from one country to the other. Curiously, unlike the overwhelming emphasis placed on London in explanations of the dynamism of English society, Edo is still virtually ignored in interpretations of major social changes within Japan.

The image of Edo conveyed in writings on the Tokugawa period

as coal, increasingly mined in England before 1750. See Wrigley, “A Simple Model of London's Importance,” pp. 65–67.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

10. Among the numerous articles authored individually or jointly by Susan Hanley and Kozo Yamamura are: “Population Trends and Economic Growth in Pre-industrial Japan,” in D. V. Glass and Roger Revelle, eds., *Population and Social Change* (London: Edward Arnold, 1972), pp. 451–99; “Toward an Analysis of Demographic and Economic Change in Tokugawa Japan: A Village Study,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 31 (May 1972): 515–37; and “Toward a Reexamination of the Economic History of Tokugawa Japan, 1600–1867,” *The Journal of Economic History* 33 (September 1973): 509–41. The authors point specifically to similarities between England and Japan in the first of these articles on pp. 451 and 485 and in the second article on p. 536.

11. R. P. Dore, *Education in Tokugawa Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965); and Thomas C. Smith, “Farm Family By-employments in Preindustrial Japan,” *The Journal of Economic History* 29 (December 1969): 687–715.

is generally more that of a caboose than of a locomotive. Unlike London's towering primacy in the English context, Edo appears as a late addition coupled on at the rear of a progression of Japanese cities. During the Tokugawa period, innovation in the sphere of production and distribution is credited primarily to the Kinai area within the Kinki region, not to the Kanto region in which Edo was located. Osaka is commonly identified as the center of a prosperous national market, while Edo's economic importance is typically relegated to the sphere of consumption, a contribution often ignored or even regarded as parasitic.¹² In the mistaken impression that cities can be neatly classified according to a single primary function, Osaka is labeled an economic city and Edo a political city. From this perspective, Edo appears to have coasted along, fueled by the momentum gained through resources mobilized in Osaka and the various castle cities.

Mounting evidence that in critical respects Tokugawa society resembled English society some 100 years earlier, of course, does not establish that Edo's primacy should be equated with that of London. In at least one obvious way Edo's position in Japan differed considerably from London's position in England. After all, London contained seven per cent of England's population in 1650 and about 10–11 per cent from the late seventeenth century through the first half of the eighteenth century, while Edo maintained a comparatively meager three per cent of Japan's population during the second half of the Tokugawa period. Yet, this difference should be attributed, above all, to the small scale of England and Wales with a total of just 5.5 million persons in the late seventeenth century. London remained the only city in England until after 1700 with as many as 30,000 inhabitants, while Edo was one of 20 to 25 Japanese cities in excess of this minimum, which together encompassed some 8–9 per cent of the national population. While we might conclude from these figures that it would be useful to compare a number of Japanese cities together to London (and for some purposes it undoubtedly would be), there are many respects in which Edo merits comparison as a direct counterpart to London. As the national administrative center, as one of two fairly equal centers of a national market, and as the point into which flowed Japan's numerous circulating elite,

12. See, for example, George Sansom, *A History of Japan 1615–1867* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963). Among the many writings in Japanese which convey a negative impression of Edo's economic importance versus that of Osaka is Matajima Masamoto, *Edo jidai* (Iwanami Shoten, 1966), pp. 106–18.

Edo's influence was carried down through the various levels of the urban hierarchy. At the very least, we should examine the possibility that Edo also provides a "convenient point of entry into the study of the whole range of changes which took place."¹³

In the absence of studies focusing on Edo's primacy in generating social change, we are confronted with incomplete interpretations of the mechanisms of social change during the first half of the Tokugawa period and, more seriously, with one-sided impressions of the nature of social change during the second half of this period. By now there is general agreement that the seventeenth century was characterized by unprecedented rapid urbanization. What is less clear is how this urban growth transpired. What made possible a sudden four- or five-fold jump in the urban population of Japan and a more than doubling of the urban percentage? Comparisons with other premodern societies suggest that three basic factors were involved: 1) the prior existence by the late sixteenth century of a solid foundation of commercial exchange; 2) the deliberate restructuring of administrative practices and settlement patterns to maximize urban concentrations; and 3) the promotion of new growth mechanisms which stimulated the continued mobilization of increasing amounts of resources into cities. By design, Edo became the center in the restructuring process and at the same time an heir to the commercial legacy of the past. A case will be made below that, in a less deliberate manner, Edo also became the main source for the new mechanisms of resource accumulation which pervaded all of Japan.

During the seventeenth century Edo's special significance for overall urban growth in Japan stemmed above all from new patterns of elite migration associated with the *sankin kōtai* system of alternate residence and from the continually rising demand for goods and revenues to meet the responsibilities commensurate with each elite position within the city's finely stratified population. Unlike the sixteenth century efforts at urban consolidation promoted by local lords,¹⁴ impulses emanating from the top of the urban hierarchy now produced waves of urban growth in successively lower level cities. Daimyo transformed their castle cities to support new mobilization of local resources to meet expenses in Edo. Centralization in Edo spurred increased accumulation and production also in Osaka and Kyoto and in smaller cities, reaching eventually to the local commercial nexes subordinate

13. Wrigley, "A Simple Model of London's Importance," p. 65.

14. On sixteenth century cities see Nakabe Yoshiko, *Kinsei toshi no seiritsu to kōzō* (Establishment and plan of Tokugawa cities) (Shinseisha, 1967), part 1.

to castle cities. Lending support to this emphasis in the study of Japan during the first half of the Tokugawa period are the data assembled in my book on Ch'ing and Tokugawa cities showing that as much as one-fourth of all urban growth between 1590 and 1720 was accounted for by the growth of Edo.¹⁵

While rural Japan shared in the dynamism with respect to population growth, to commercial specialization, and to social differentiation in the seventeenth century, it was overshadowed by the unparalleled transformation within the urban sector. With Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto leading the way, new patterns of consumption and new modes of social organization developed in Japanese cities. If any period of premodern history anywhere can properly be labeled urban-centered, it is this period from about 1600 to the 1720's in Japan.

The justification for Edo's centrality becomes less obvious after the first quarter of the eighteenth century, when Japan's overall urban growth stopped, while, as various studies have shown, the rural sector increasingly exhibited unusual dynamism in the proliferation of commercial orientations. Indeed, Japanese cities have long taken a back-seat to villages in studies of the second half of the Tokugawa period; and this trend has culminated recently in Thomas Smith's hypothesis that this phase of Japan's premodern economic growth was rural-centered. Yet, given the continuing high percentage of Japanese in cities (about 16 or 17 per cent if the population in all marketing centers with more than 3,000 residents and one-half the population in smaller centers with intermediate markets are included, not so far below the 20 or 21 per cent recorded in England for the 1680's and, perhaps, slightly higher than the percentage in France before 1789),¹⁶ the striking rural changes ought not to be seen in isolation from closely connected urban phenomena. Increasing village real incomes, literacy rates, and commercial orientation corresponded to similar changes in cities. Where the proximity to large cities was greatest and the urban presence was most pervasive, as near Edo, rural dynamism reached its peak, evidenced by dramatic declines in population, the sudden proliferation of small-scale industries, and the gradual disappearance and replacement of periodic markets by village stores and by daily commerce in major cities. These changes penetrated most thoroughly in areas in close contact with the consequences of the earlier urban-

15. Gilbert Rozman, *Urban Networks in Ch'ing China and Tokugawa Japan*, pp. 285-88.

16. See chapter 5, "Urban Networks of Stage G Societies," in Gilbert Rozman, *Urban Networks in Russia, 1750-1800, and Premodern Periodization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).

centered phase of societal development and with the continued reorganization of life in the cities.

Acknowledgment of a perceptible shift in the balance of social dynamism to the rural sector is not inconsistent with emphasis on Edo's continued importance in eliciting change. English and French urban data on the eve of early modernization likewise reveal little increase in the percentage of the population in cities. Moreover, London between 1670 and 1750 and Paris during the century before the French Revolution seem to have maintained a fairly constant percentage of their national populations, as did Edo in the second half of the Tokugawa period. Even with a population probably rising quite slowly after 1720, Edo could easily have continued to be in a position in no way inferior to that of these other cities to act as the principal source of changes which spread across rural areas.

The significance of the turnabout in the fortunes of Osaka and Kyoto by the middle of the eighteenth century was to make more direct Edo's impact over much of Japan. As the combined population of these two neighboring cities within the Kinki area declined from roughly 900,000 to the range of 600,000 to 700,000, Edo's predominance over other Japanese cities strengthened and its sources of supply widened to encompass expanded rural production of non-agricultural goods. The continued economic implications of a city that was extremely populous and sheltered expensive tastes now reached rural Japan in full force.

If Edo's influence paralleled that of London, then the mechanisms by which it penetrated into rural areas might presumably have been the same as those identified for London. Did Edo exert a powerful impact over much of Japan through the mechanisms of migration and marketing? How did the character of these mechanisms vary from the first half to the second half of the Tokugawa period? Answers in greater detail to these questions are essential for reassessing Edo's image.

I offer some preliminary approximations on migration into Edo in the hope of stimulating more careful and complete studies. First, since the population of Edo rose by about one million in 130 years from 1590 to 1720, it will on the average have been increasing annually by nearly 8,000. It seems likely that this growth was spaced quite evenly during the 130 years, which means that the percentage increase continually declined. Second, similar to London and other large cities, the crude death rate in Edo was probably substantially higher than the crude birth rate over the period as a whole. In the absence of direct information, we may assume for the moment that

the gap between the two rates was roughly as in London and held throughout the period. Accordingly, if the difference between the two rates had fluctuated around 10 per 1,000 per annum, then at the time when the population of Edo was one million, the shortfall of births each year is assumed to have been 10,000. To make good this shortfall and to permit an annual increase of the total population of 8,000, the net immigration into Edo must have fluctuated around 18,000 per annum. As Edo's population rose between 1590 and 1720, the net immigration figure must also have been generally rising, with the city at first requiring fewer persons to replace its losses through the excess of deaths over births. Based on these assumptions, we should envision a net immigration of about 10,000 persons during the first half of the seventeenth century, 15,000 persons in the second half of that century, and about 18,000 persons by the early eighteenth century. After the relative stabilization of Edo's population at 1.0 to 1.2 million, a net immigration figure of about 10,000 would again have been sufficient.

Two types of migration into Edo can be distinguished. Most widely noted has been the elite inter-city mobility of daimyo, rejoining members of their families left in Edo and accompanied by large entourages of their samurai retainers often travelling with their families.¹⁷ This closely regulated annual migration under the *sankin kōtai* system involved increasing numbers of persons during the seventeenth century, but its growth must have virtually stopped by the early eighteenth century. Excluding the stationary *hatamoto* and *gokenin*, who together with their families comprised perhaps ten per cent of Edo's population, this assembled elite continuously replenished from *jōkamachi* throughout Japan constituted roughly 25 to 30 per cent of the city's population.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this regular circulation of Japan's elite population between local *jōkamachi* and Edo. In my opinion, this system of alternate residence ranks as the single greatest accomplishment of Japanese leaders precisely because it built on the already considerable scale of urban and commercial development to accelerate the mobilization of resources at both national and local levels. Its multiplying effects, beginning with the demand for supporting personnel in Edo, had ramifications that reached from city to village throughout all parts of the country carried by the migrating messengers of change.

The estimates of Edo's population classified as *bushi*, which are

17. See Toshio G. Tsukahira, *Feudal Control in Tokugawa Japan: The Sankin Kōtai System* (Cambridge: Harvard East Asian Monographs, 1966).

in excess of 500,000, include a category of persons whose number is difficult to determine. These were the servants or hired help of the *bushi*. An immediate consequence of both strict prohibitions on slavery and the rapidly rising *bushi* population, some permanently and some temporarily in Edo, had been the replacement of hereditary servants with hired wage labor during the seventeenth century.¹⁸ These were hired help serving in the most menial positions and meeting quotas set by the *bakufu* for a minimal complement of personnel appropriate to each samurai office depending on rank, holdings, and official responsibilities. Normally called *hōkōnin*, these employees generally lived in the *bushi* estate complexes and served fixed terms of service. Despite the fact that the *hōkōnin* of the *bushi* were not counted as part of the *chōnin* population, they were virtually indistinguishable by origin from other migrants until they registered at one of Edo's employment bureaus for new arrivals.¹⁹ At a minimum, some five to ten per cent of Edo's population should be classified as hired subordinates of the *bushi*.

The second type of migration, which in all essential respects should also include the *hōkōnin* entering *bushi* service, differed from the first in bringing to the city persons mostly rural in origin, younger on the average, more predominantly male (although the migration of samurai also involved an unspecified surplus of males over females), and with rare exception poorer. Unlike samurai migrants, these would-be *chōnin* arrived in Edo without guaranteed incomes, jobs, or places of residence, although not necessarily without contacts from their native areas which could ease the transition. Renting lodgings and finding work as servants, peddlars, or other hired laborers, these migrants probably experienced high rates of mortality despite their youth.

After the period of rapid growth had come to an end by the 1720's, Edo's enumerated *chōnin* population (including persons living in the separately administered jurisdiction over the city's temple and shrine areas) hovered between 500,000 and 600,000. An additional 20,000 or so seasonal migrants regularly spent the winter in the city, returning to home areas for the agricultural season. Available data suggest that after an early peak in 1721 the total number of *chōnin* remained near the bottom of this population range through the 1740's and, after a period of gradual growth, a new peak was

18. Sori Yoshio, "Edo no dekaseginin" (The migrant laborers of Edo), in Nishiyama, ed., *Edo chōnin no kenkyū*, 3:263-308.

19. For information on the life of migrants to Edo see Minami Kazuo, *Edo no shakai kōzō*.

reached at the top of this range by the 1850's.²⁰ Conceivably, unregistered persons could have pushed the total *chōnin* population figures well over 600,000 and the city total over the widely accepted 1.0–1.1 million range to as high as 1.2 million.

While the size of the *chōnin* population appears to have fluctuated within a narrow range during the second half of the Tokugawa period, its changing composition provides pertinent information on migration patterns. Enumerations of residents not born in the city show a sharp drop from roughly one-third of the total *chōnin* population to barely one-quarter during the 25 years after 1843.²¹ Prior to 1843, only a slight decrease in this percentage had occurred since the 1720's, although given the rapid growth of the seventeenth century one might expect that over the entire Tokugawa span figures of one-half or more of all residents born outside the city would represent the starting point for this transition. No doubt, figures for the percentage of Edo's able-bodied inhabitants born outside the city always exceeded these averages for all age groups.

As the proportion of *chōnin* residents born inside the city increased, the ratio of males to females approached unity. During the 1720's there were almost twice as many males as females in the *chōnin* population; however, by 1844 this figure had fallen sharply until males numbered roughly 52 per cent of the total. Indeed, the relatively complete data of 1844, 1849, and 1853 indicate that the total male *chōnin* population was falling and then rising slightly, while the female population showed consistent increases of more than 6,500 over each five year interval.²² Edo's pull on rural residents attracted an increasing proportion of females during the second half of the Tokugawa period. By 1853 males outnumbered females among the enumerated *chōnin* by barely 15,000. Despite this reduction in the sex ratio, which ordinarily would be expected to have been accompanied by an increase in household size, the average size of the more than 140,000 *chōnin* households declined somewhat.²³ Small families and relatively low birth rates for a premodern population predomi-

20. Sori, "Edo no deka-seginin," pp. 296–98.

21. Takeuchi Makoto, "Kansei-Kaseiki Edo ni okeru shokaikyū no dōkō" (Tendencies of the various classes in Edo during the Kansei to Bunka and Bunsei periods), in Nishiyama, ed., *Edo chōnin no kenkyū*, 1:387–90.

22. Yoshihara Ken'ichirō, "Bakumatsuki Edo chōnin no sonzai keitai" (The state of existence of Edo chōnin in the late Tokugawa period), in Nishiyama, ed., *Edo chōnin no kenkyū*, 1:533–34.

23. Yoshihara, "Bakumatsuki Edo chōnin no sonzai keitai," 533–34.

nated throughout most of Japan,²⁴ and must have been especially noteworthy in Edo, where in the mid-nineteenth century the average *chō* household numbered just 3.9 members.²⁵

Just as it is possible to distinguish between categories of *bushi* more or less stationary in Edo, a rough distinction can be made between houseowners and lodgers among the *chōnin*. Data for 1828 indicate that almost all *chō* areas ranged between 55 and 85 per cent of the population renting their accommodations.²⁶ Scattered throughout the densely settled *chō* sections of the city, the poor occupied back rooms and tiny quarters. While families that owned their own residences were likely to have long been present in the city, the roughly two-thirds of all *chōnin* living as lodgers moved most frequently within the city and included a disproportionate number of recent arrivals from the countryside.

Migrants originating from certain localities had access to special channels of entry into Edo's competitive job market. For many born in the vicinity of Kyoto or in nearby Ise and Omi provinces, entry into Edo came as employees of branch stores whose main offices were located in their home territories. The flow of apprentices consisted of young men or boys paid only in daily necessities, who after a fixed period of service may either have returned to their home areas or have been permitted to advance in the Edo shop as wage laborers.²⁷ The main stores regulated the flow of personnel as well as the supply of retail goods to Edo, in some cases setting up several branch outlets, each with as many as ten or more employees.

Taking into consideration this all-male labor force in branch stores, the large numbers of males employed in construction during the seventeenth century, the predominance of males on *bushi* estates, and the general ambience favoring men in the city, Nishiyama Matsunosuke labels Edo a male city.²⁸ Entertainment largely catered to male tastes, including a system of reservations at houses of prostitution which provided the counterpart of modern corporation-owned

24. Susan B. Hanley, "Fertility, Mortality and Life Expectancy in Pre-modern Japan," *Population Studies* 28:1 (1974).

25. Yoshihara, "Bakumatsuki Edo chōnin no sonzai keitai," pp. 533-34.

26. Takeuchi, "Kansei-Kaseiki Edo ni okeru shokaikyū no dōkō," pp. 391-92. See also Ikegami Akihiko, "Kōki Edo kasō chōnin no seikatsu" (The life of lower class *chōnin* in Edo during the late Tokugawa period), in Nishiyama, ed., *Edo chōnin no kenkyū*, 1:167-71.

27. Hayashi Reiko, "Edo dana no seikatsu" (Life in the shops of Edo), in Nishiyama, ed., *Edo chōnin no kenkyū*, 2:95-138.

28. See the introduction of Nishiyama, ed., *Edo chōnin no kenkyū*, 1:5-13.

season tickets parcelled among employees who take turns visiting the facilities. It remains to be explored whether this male-oriented climate was affected by the gradual shift in the balance of population maintenance away from in-migration toward natural increase.

At a time of declining village populations in the hinterlands of big cities, Edo's continued slight population growth suggests that the city maintained, and relative to other big cities increased, its appeal to peasant migrants. The dynamics of migration changed markedly from the first half of the Tokugawa period, reflected in a growing mobile labor force finding employment outside of Edo and other large cities. Policies to restrict entry into Edo and at times to return recent arrivals may have contributed to, but were not the principal cause of, this gradual realignment of labor mobility. Population movement in eastern Japan was once oriented almost exclusively toward Edo, but by the mid-nineteenth century intra-regional mobility increased; as the volume of migration to the largest cities declined and the number of migrants from village to village and to small cities increased. In this respect, repeated in the histories of tens of other Tokugawa cities, urban-centered patterns of movement bred new rural-centered patterns as well. The details of this transformation in migration patterns remain to be discovered. Furthermore, the problem of explaining migration to Edo in terms of the characteristics of the places of origin, as has been done for the major nineteenth century Russian cities by Barbara Anderson, looms as an important task for future study.²⁹

While a much smaller proportion of Japanese had direct experience with life in Edo than did Englishmen with life in London, Edo's demonstration effect took on added significance because of the elite nature of its migrants. The daimyo and their retainers represented a circulating elite with impressive control over resource allocation in every local area of Japan except for areas directly administered from Edo in which resources were mobilized without need for such an elite through the more common procedure of dispatching officials to represent central interests. While *chōnin* and other non-samurai throughout Japan did not themselves exhibit a regular pattern of migration to Edo, their efforts to control resources became closely intertwined with this recurrent circulation of the elite. To a large extent, the populations of the castle cities engaged in accumulating goods and revenues

29. Barbara A. Anderson, "Internal Migration in a Modernizing Society: The Case of Late Nineteenth Century European Russia," (a doctoral dissertation submitted to the Department of Sociology of Princeton University, 1973).

for use in Edo. In this respect, the regular movement to and from Edo of individuals with exceptional control over local resources swelled the city's impact throughout Japan. Given the inevitable limitations on centralization in premodern societies as large as Japan, a circulating elite proved to be a strikingly effective device. Elsewhere I have argued that this was a similarity between Japan and Russia, which helps explain their subsequent speed of modernization.³⁰

While the number of individuals moving in and out of Edo each year totaled some tens of thousands, a much larger number, certainly reaching into the millions, participated in the production, transportation, and exchange of goods bound for Edo. Indirectly nearly everyone in Japan contributed in some way to the sizable *han* revenues and the lively national commerce which supported new habits of consumption in Edo. In turn, behavior and attitudes reflected the decreasing self-sufficiency and growing outside orientation. Changing family patterns resulting from popular aspirations for a higher living standard most likely closely corresponded to the commercialization of rural life. Marketing, probably more than migration, broadened the horizons of ordinary villagers.

With respect to marketing, Edo's preeminence in the transformation of Tokugawa society is not nearly as indisputable as was London's domination over English society. Unlike London, Edo was not the first city in Japan associated with the development of a national marketing system, nor was it the city during most of the Tokugawa period best known for extensive commercial and credit facilities. Instead, Osaka and, at least during the seventeenth century, Kyoto have long captured attention for economic supremacy, most notably through a huge grain market, diverse specialty products from practically every locale, and numerous handicraft industries. The heartland of commercialized agriculture within the densely settled Kinki area pumped goods directly into these neighboring cities. Does this mean that Edo's contribution to social change centered on migration, while Osaka and Kyoto dominated in marketing? Separate examination of the stages of marketing in the Tokugawa period is needed to show Edo's position relative to these cities.

During at least the first half of the seventeenth century Edo's impact on the production and accumulation of goods throughout all but a few areas of Japan was mediated largely through Osaka, nearby

30. Cyril E. Black, Marius B. Jansen, Herbert S. Levine, Marion J. Levy, Jr., Henry Rosovsky, Gilbert Rozman, Henry D. Smith, II., S. Frederick Starr, *The Modernization of Japan and Russia* (New York: The Free Press, forthcoming).

Sakai, and Kyoto.³¹ As late as 1630, Edo's *chōnin* still totaled only about one-half the number in either Kyoto or Osaka. Because of the undeveloped nature of the surrounding Kanto region, Edo relied heavily on goods from afar and on requisitions in kind for daily necessities supplied from nearby. Meanwhile, much of the rapidly growing national exchange to support costs incurred in Edo occurred through the direct intervention of daimyo with the close support of small numbers of privileged merchants.

During the next century Edo established itself as a center of national marketing equal to or surpassing the Kinai complex of cities, but its growth did not come at the expense of other cities. Rather, Osaka, Kyoto, and many large castle cities flourished at their peak in the first half of the eighteenth century. New shipping routes made all areas of the country more accessible to the main cities, particularly reinforcing ties between Edo and coastal areas along the Japan Sea in the Tohoku and Chubu (Hokuriku) regions. Productivity rose sharply in the areas closest to Edo. Private commerce increased rapidly, accompanied by an expansion of marketing centers without administrative functions and by a growing competition among merchants successfully encroaching on the old privileges once monopolized by a few.

Even in this stage of general urban prosperity, Edo's dependence on Osaka was far less than once was thought. As William B. Hauser observes, with the exception of certain goods which required a sophisticated processing technology, Edo received little from Osaka.³² The majority of goods imported into Osaka were consumed locally and not reexported. Edo's market for grain and other agricultural and forestry products from eastern Japan rivaled the separate market for these goods in the West.

During the final century of Tokugawa rule marketing increasingly bypassed the biggest cities. This is the stage of *jimawari* commerce,

31. On Edo's commerce see the writings of Hayashi Reiko, including *Edo tonya nakama no kenkyū: bakuhan taiseika no toshi shōgyō shihon* (Studies of the Edo tonya nakama: urban commercial capital under the Tokugawa shogunate) (Ochanomizu Shobō, 1967).

32. William B. Hauser, *Economic Institutional Change in Tokugawa Japan: Osaka and the Kinai Cotton Trade* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 14, 30. For a more detailed treatment of the relations between Edo and Osaka see the writings of Oishi Shinzaburō, including "Kyōhō kaikakuki ni okeru Edo keizai ni taisuru Osaka no chii: Kyōhō kaikakuki ni okeru shijō kōzō ni tsuite" (The position of Osaka in the Edo economy during the Kyōhō reform period: concerning the market structure during the Kyōhō reform period), *Nihon rekishi* 191 (April 1964):2-31.

signifying the specialization of production within eastern Japan directly for the Edo market. Villages within the Kanto region became actively engaged in commercial production, including to a rapidly increasing extent textile processing. Various goods such as cotton and soy sauce previously imported from the Kinai cities now came primarily from local producers. Unlike the decline of Osaka and Kyoto in the face of this rural dispersion of processing activities, Edo continued to prosper into the 1850's.³³ Rural competition, the extension of *han* monopolies, and the breakdown in exclusive merchant organizations all disrupted the commercial centrality of other cities, while improving the supply of goods and revenues to Edo. This is not to suggest that Edo was left unaffected internally by these various changes. A redistribution of real income from *bushi* to merchant, a move from forced migration within the city to freer urban relocation and sprawl, and a continued disruption of old commercial organizations in favor of freer associations all accompanied the emergence of Edo's new marketing patterns.

By the mid-nineteenth century Edo's *chōnin* population may have outnumbered that of Osaka and Kyoto combined. Edo's dominance had reached its peak, yet even much earlier there is reason to think that Edo's impact on marketing loomed large. To clarify this point, it is necessary to reconsider in a general way the nature of marketing in premodern societies.

Just as employment opportunities shape migration patterns, so too does consumption shape marketing patterns. In premodern societies the value of urban craft production, serving primarily local customers, comprises a tiny fraction of the national product. Much more value is contributed by commerce, particularly involving rural products. Thus the impact of a city is less a function of its notable handicraft industries or its exports of processed goods to other cities than a function of its consumption demands. Already in the seventeenth century Edo established itself as the single dominant center of consumption in Japan. This dominance was never relinquished, although its character changed with the declining relative prosperity of *bushi* as opposed to *chōnin*. As peasant real income rose, patterns of consumption spread from Edo to rural areas.

Edo's enormous consumption needs directly reshaped production patterns in the Kanto region and in parts of the Tohoku and other

33. Evidence on this point is presented in Hauser, *Economic Institutional Change in Tokugawa Japan* pp. 33-58. See also Toyoda Takeshi and Kodama Kōta, eds., *Ryūtsūshi* (History of marketing), vol. 13 in *Taikei Nihonshi sōsho* (Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1969).

regions and indirectly filtered through other cities to all areas of the country. To the extent that more revenues and profits became available for expenses in Edo, more pressure was exerted on other areas to supply the city's needs. Through the conversion of production methods and the reorganization of commercial operations, villages increased income and reduced self-sufficiency. The means existed in Japan to make urban needs felt in rural areas.

With three per cent of Japan's total population, how did Edo stimulate changes among the rest of the population that may have become the cornerstone of later modernization? How did Edo contribute to the diffusion of literacy, technical skills, and new attitudes toward family and work which count as possible preconditions for modernization? The two principal mechanisms of migration and marketing, I have argued above, responded to changes within the city, specifically to new patterns of employment and consumption. Indeed, emphasis should be given to the latter, since employment opportunities mainly met consumption needs. Migration tapped the human resources of the country for the city's needs and imprinted the city's new modes of living on individuals returning to their home areas. Marketing tapped the material resources of the country for the city's needs and reoriented the city's suppliers within their home areas. These mechanisms, activated in Edo, operated with exceptional force in Japan. Mutual emulation of higher standards of living inside Edo continually contributed to new patterns of employment and consumption, which sparked a chain reaction throughout the nation.

Edo's basic capacities for activating these mechanisms for generating change had much in common with those of other large cities throughout the world. In general, the existence of large cities induced change through a limited number of ways: through coercive means of securing resources, through individual pursuit of commercial gains, through making possible costly modes of living, and through an open market for hired labor. Most essential is the concentration of individuals within the city with both the means and the incentives to mobilize resources from the rest of the country.

A large premodern city thus draws resources from some wider area and in the process transforms itself and the countryside and cities around it. Urban- and rural-centered development intersect; initially the urban sector displays greater dynamism but eventually the much larger rural population becomes the major bearer of change. For these reasons, in premodern societies changes internal to a single city are difficult to divorce from changes over wider areas. Unless the city is heavily dependent on foreign trade (which probably only could

happen in small-scale societies with populations well below that of England),³⁴ its capacity to generate jobs and to increase consumption rests on an intricate support system nestled in a network of marketing and administrative centers.

Through an urban networks approach, we can think of Edo's impact reaching out in a number of steps: most directly to the 2–3 per cent of Japan's population in Osaka and Kyoto, who shared in the widest access to resources, then to another 2–3 per cent of the population in cities with at least 30,000 inhabitants scattered across the country, and step by step down to the smallest marketing centers. Simultaneously the process of diffusion reached out directly from the most populous cities to the surrounding countryside. In particular, Edo functioned as an administrative center for Osaka, Kyoto, and some other major cities, as a marketing center for the entire urban network, but especially its eastern half, as a center of elite migration from most cities with 10,000 or more residents as well as from many cities in lower population ranges, and as a center for peasant migrants from the Kanto region and other areas in eastern Japan. In these ways, Edo's impact spread across Japan.

There is no need here to repeat the details of a seven-level hierarchy of central places which I have discussed elsewhere.³⁵ It will suffice to note developments during the second half of the Tokugawa period at both ends of the hierarchy. At the bottom, level 7 settlements, defined as standard marketing centers with fewer than 3,000 residents, begin to lose their central place functions. The number of periodic markets in advanced regions no longer increases and, indeed, begins to decline. This phenomenon also appeared in England and then in France during the first decades of the eighteenth century and in Russia by the early nineteenth century, interestingly in each country at a time of little or no increase in the percentage of the national urban population. Some of the commercial functions typical of this type of settlement become dispersed in ordinary villages and at the same time other activities are increasingly concentrated in settlements at the higher levels of 6 and 5, that is, intermediate marketing centers with fewer than 3,000 residents and cities with 3,000 to 10,000 residents respectively. The continued growth of *zaikata* central places in the second half of the Tokugawa period supports this impression of

34. My view on the unimportance of foreign trade contrasts with the view expressed by Smith, "Pre-modern Economic Growth," pp. 147–49.

35. Gilbert Rozman, *Urban Networks in Russia, 1750–1800, and Pre-modern Periodization*, chapter 1.

redistribution of functions among central places serving primarily local areas.

At the top of the urban hierarchy in these countries, level 1 cities, national administrative centers with more than 300,000 residents, generally increased their central functions at the expense of cities at levels 2, 3, and 4 (with populations in excess of 300,000; 30,000 and 10,000 respectively). In this regard, the decline of Osaka, Kyoto, and some *jōkamachi*, as well as the falling percentage of the total urban population within some of these countries in cities other than the national center which exceeded 10,000 in population, indicates a new centripetal force. Obviously, regional variations must be examined carefully before firm conclusions should be drawn. It does, however, appear likely that Edo's rising preeminence reflects a common pattern of concentration of resources in a single city where the scale of the society permitted.

Through comparisons of five countries I have tentatively concluded that the two stages of Tokugawa society closely parallel similar divisions in the late premodern histories of England, France, and Russia, but not China. After a century or more of rapid growth in the percentage of the national population in cities, the urban percentage leveled off in each case. In comparison to the other countries, Japan supported the highest average population per central place (17,000 for each of its more than 1,700 *jōkamachi* and marketing settlements), the highest average urban population per central place (3,000 based on a total of 5.3 million urban residents), and the largest city. Its extremely efficient urban network signifies that a small number of lower level central places supported relatively large numbers of populous cities. The absence of much further urban growth in Japan as a whole and in Edo in particular during the second half of the Tokugawa period reflects the fact that Japan, as England, already boasted an extremely efficient premodern urban network. The dynamism of local areas at this time in both countries reveals a restructuring, perhaps, essential for subsequent urbanization on a new foundation.

The kind of changes taking place in Edo during the second half of the Tokugawa period reveals that the city was expanding its sources of support. Whereas during the first half of the period Japan achieved extraordinary centralization of population at the various high levels in the urban pyramid, now the direct channeling of resources through low levels and villages advanced. In the process the number and wealth of *chōnin* increased in the urban total and urban sprawl reflected more diverse contacts with the outside. Changes in the sources of supplies, in the distribution of wealth, in urban land use,

and in other urban characteristics should be further examined to determine Edo's new-found position in Tokugawa society.

Among the largest cities in these five countries, only London topped Edo's percentage of the national population. No city rivaled Edo's massive elite migration and, with the possible exceptions of England and France, no country could have approached Japan's high percentage of production redistributed to cities. Japan's efficient urban network speedily conveyed to village residents changes in consumption, in styles of living, and in aspirations. Japan not only resembled England in the sorts of changes identified by Wrigley, but Edo also resembled London in its capacity for generating such changes. Similar to London, the city "must have acted as a powerful solvent of the customs, prejudices and modes of actions. . . . There were many more lodgers than in the countryside, as well as servants [and] apprentices. . . . Outside the household, moreover, a far higher proportion of day-to-day contacts was inevitably casual. . . . The shop, a most important new influence upon consumer behavior, was a normal feature . . ." In these and other ways Edo generated improved standards of performance and new tastes for living better.³⁶

While not every characteristic of London was repeated in Edo (for instance, the merchants of Edo were excluded from the ruling elite), Wrigley's conclusion for London would likely hold about as well for Edo during the second half of the Tokugawa period. It "was so constituted sociologically, demographically and economically that it could well reinforce and accelerate incipient change." Of the ten cities in the world with populations in excess of 500,000 in 1800, London and Edo were probably uniquely in a position to influence their countries.

Looking backward from the experiences of modernization in numerous societies, explanations of success in this process must take into consideration the premodern base from which change took place. No less important than the goal of throwing light on the global origins of this momentous period of rapid change is the need to uncover the preconditions of successful latecomers. Anything which distinguished Japan from other latecomers during the century or more preceding its initial modernization may help to throw light on the conditions which made possible rapid development once the initial outside forces of change were introduced.

Premodern societies varied in their urban development as they varied in the extent to which the mechanisms of migration and marketing interrupted the preexisting routines of peasant existence. Large

36. Wrigley, "A Simple Model of London's Importance," pp. 50-51.

cities with concentrated wealth and plentiful employment opportunities had the potential to dislodge these old routines. In countries already endowed with complete premodern urban networks the special impetus of a single, great city could be realized through two phases of successive changes. The first phase, operating primarily in cities, was characterized by a substantial increase in the percentage of the population in cities, by a restructuring of the urban network increasing its efficiency in various ways, and by a growing circulation of those with the greatest control over resources between local centers and a national administrative center. Not many societies experienced this first phase of advanced premodern growth; probably none entered it before the late sixteenth or early seventeenth centuries. Edo along with London and St. Petersburg emerged as one of the world's great cities as this phase of development progressed.

The second phase was one of a diffusion of skills and orientations from cities to villages. Striking changes in rural areas and in settlements at the bottom levels of the central place hierarchy went along with continued, though less dramatic, changes in cities. The rural phase may not have occurred before the late seventeenth century. It seems to have occurred only in societies relatively urbanized for the world at that time and in which one great city bore special importance as an incubator of change. In each of these phases Edo trailed London by roughly half a century. However, by the late eighteenth century London's premodern growth had given way to the first example of modernization, in which the pace of change accelerated drastically. This is not the place to consider why early nineteenth century Japan did not follow England's precedent with self-initiated modernization. What should be emphasized is that Japan did continue its second phase, most likely securing a firmer foundation for modernization as a latecomer.

In conclusion, I would note that despite Edo's position as probably the world's largest eighteenth century city, it has scarcely been noticed by urban specialists outside of Japan. Moreover, among specialists in Japan, Edo has not been credited with the significance in generating economic growth which it rightfully deserves. Comparisons with cities in other societies show that, indeed, Edo possessed the basic characteristics that elsewhere are identified as the sources of major social change. New forms of mobility and consumption originating in Edo did spread through Japan. Further comparisons are essential to show more precisely how Edo's impact on Japan facilitated the emergence of preconditions for modernization.