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## **Blowing Up a Double Portrait in Black and White:**

### **The Concept of Asia in the Writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi and Okakura Tenshin**

Urs Matthias Zachmann

#### **Questioning the East/West Binary in Meiji Intellectual History**

A good story always needs two opponents or two principles in conflict. Japan's course in Asia during the Meiji era (1868–1912) is often seen as a conflict between Westernization-cum-imperialism (Japan devours Asia in concert with the Western powers) and a utopian Asianism (Japan unites Asia against the Western powers). Indeed, Japan's ascent to empire until 1905 was decisively shaped by the experience of Western imperial policy. Japan's drive to great-power status was (at least initially) informed by the desire to gain equality and protect its independence vis-à-vis the Western powers. The ruling elite of Japan sought to expedite the process through reforms that selectively emulated various Western models, including Western imperialist policy. As European international relations entered a phase

of colonial expansion and imperialist rivalries in the 1880s, it was taken for granted by virtually everyone in Japan that Japan should do likewise.<sup>1</sup> The text most often associated with the “aggressive” Western-oriented policy is “Datsua ron” (“On Leaving Asia Behind,” 1885) by Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901).<sup>2</sup> Fukuzawa’s short text has gained such notoriety that it stands to represent Westernization, as such, and even the policy of the whole Meiji period.<sup>3</sup> Its content is generally summed up by the phrase “leave Asia, join Europe” (*datsua nyūō*), although Fukuzawa himself never used the addition “join Europe.”<sup>4</sup> Asianism, however, is often presented as the counter-narrative to (imperialist) Westernization. It describes a certain “mood” among Asian-minded individuals or groups, characterized by a common solidarity for Asian countries, especially China and Korea.<sup>5</sup> The quote most often invoked in this context is “Asia is one,” which comes from the opening line of *The Ideals of the East with Special References to the Art of Japan* (1903) by Okakura Tenshin (1862–1913).<sup>6</sup>

The now familiar double portrait of Fukuzawa and Okakura as representatives of Westernization and Asianism,<sup>7</sup> respectively, thus helps to illustrate the “familiar dichotomy of East versus West, Westernization versus Asianism,” the “contrastive scheme of Asia and Europe” that is said to govern foreign policy in the Meiji period.<sup>8</sup>

This article questions the familiarity of the East/West dichotomy in general, and especially for Fukuzawa and Okakura. Was it really the binary scheme of Asia/Europe that governed Meiji foreign policy? Do Fukuzawa and Okakura really serve to illustrate these two poles? There are reasons to doubt the applicability of this scheme for Meiji intellectual history, mostly because it is too familiar. We are prone to forget that the subject that speaks through this scheme is European. Of this fact, Meiji intellectuals writing on politics were well aware, and they did not like its consequences for Japan. They were familiar with the Asia/Europe split, but embraced it only with significant modifications.

Today it is well known that, simultaneous with European expansion in Asia in the age of high imperialism, the concept of Asia also became subjugated to the defining power of Europe and was made the exact opposite of what Europe felt itself to be.<sup>9</sup> The imbalance of power between East and West exacerbated the opposition between Asia and Europe already inherent

in Enlightenment thinking. Asia became the embodiment of every negative quality conceivable, of irrationality, cruelty, wickedness, and — most of all — weakness.<sup>10</sup> The process of projecting an imbalance of power onto the image of the subordinate (as a result and means of domination) is the one we now call “Orientalism.”<sup>11</sup>

Japanese intellectuals in the Meiji era were painfully aware of Europe’s Orientalist view of Asia and of their view of Japan as part of Asia. An example of how this Orientalist image was reflected in the Japanese press can be seen in an article by Hinohara Shōzō (1853–1904) titled “Nihon wa Tōyō-koku taru bekarazu” (“Japan Must Not Be an Oriental Country”), published in November 1884.<sup>12</sup> Hinohara, a former disciple of Fukuzawa Yukichi, reported from London, at the height of the Sudan crisis and the attending rise of British jingoism, about European (British) views on Asia:

Generally speaking, Europeans qualify all countries in the East as “oriental” [*orientaru*] without making any distinctions, and they call its people “Orientals” [*Tōyōjin*]. In drawing a clear line between themselves and the others and establishing the boundaries, they never rely on the nomenclature of natural geography, but do so according to the characteristics of man-made society. . . . Therefore, what people today call “the Orient” is not the geographic Orient, but the Orient of international relations, and it is not an entity that is defined by natural geography, but it is called Eastern because all institutions of man-made society are of a special, unique kind and differ from Europe.<sup>13</sup>

Hinohara leaves no doubt that the “position of the Oriental” (*Tōyōjin taru no ichi*) is the position of the subjugated, as the case of India illustrated, or, more acutely to Japanese minds, as the Sino-French War (1884–85) did. Being “looked upon as Oriental” (*Tōyō-shi seraruru*) meant being the object of domination. Hinohara therefore rejected the concept of Asia: “Therefore, stubbornly calling oneself an Asian or an Oriental [*Tōyō-jin*], and throwing in one’s lot with the Asian countries . . . means sticking blindly to just a word called ‘Asia’ and in the future never leave the position of the Oriental. . . . Do we have to be content to belong to Asia just because the Europeans see China and also Japan as belonging to Asia?”<sup>14</sup>

Even those who did call themselves Asian, the so-called Asianists, were

aware that the formation of Asia derived its existence from Europe and therefore was a derivative, heterogeneous concept.<sup>15</sup> The Jiyūtō politician Sugita Teiichi stated in his treatise “Kōa-saku” (“A Policy for Reviving Asia,” 1884): “While the countries of Asia are inseparably bound to a common destiny, our thoughts are thousands of miles apart; we lack mutual empathy as members of a common race, and any spirit of mutual aid, despite the fact that we face the same difficulties. Under such circumstances, it is only by virtue of balance of power among our enemies, the European nations, that we Asians are able to maintain a semblance of life.”<sup>16</sup>

Even though Sugita still clings to a subject called “we Asians,” he is fully aware that it is merely a product of Western agency (“bound to a common destiny”) without common consciousness. It is the product of external pressure which, if the pressure was released, must eventually cease to exist.

One could argue that Japanese intellectuals rejected the European concept of Asia only for Japan (as it *included* Japan), but otherwise—for the rest of geographical Asia—left it unchallenged. If so, the East/West binary would place Japan necessarily on the Western side of the scheme. Yet, it is unlikely that this was a viable option for Meiji intellectuals. After all, Japan’s trajectory to empire was initially launched by conflict with the Western “concert of powers,” and it was driven by the impetus to equal or even excel the powers. Moreover, Meiji intellectuals of all political quarters fervently believed that strife and competition constituted, as it were, a “law of nature” in international relations.<sup>17</sup> Thus it is hard to conceive that Meiji intellectuals would envision Japan in easy community with the West.

If Japan’s trajectory to empire potentially challenged the European “concert of powers,” it is most likely that Japanese intellectuals, too, may have sought ways to subvert the East/West binary in Japan’s favor and find a new scheme that suited their outlook better: a scheme that would place Japan at the apex, regardless of the composition of its margins. In other words, the Western scheme *translated* itself in this way into the Japanese context. As we have seen from Hinohara’s quote above, Japanese intellectuals were keenly aware that it was the voice of “Europe as self” that spoke through the binary scheme of Europa and Asia, and that the scheme itself, more than anything else, represented the dominance of the speaker.<sup>18</sup> Thus, one might expect

that the strategies to transcend the East/West binary would place Japan in the position of the subject, rather than the West.

Having voiced these doubts regarding the familiar dichotomy of East versus West, Westernization versus Asianism, I will now propose to once more take a look at what Meiji intellectuals were aiming at when saying or writing “Asia.” As our familiar notion of Asia in the binary scheme is most closely associated with Fukuzawa Yukichi’s “Datsua ron” and Okakura Tenshin’s *The Ideals of the East*, I will use these texts to break with the habitual reading of Asia, to find a new perception of what Asia could have meant in their contexts.<sup>19</sup>

### The Concept of Asia in Fukuzawa Yukichi’s “Datsua ron”

Fukuzawa’s newspaper *Jiji shinpō* published “Datsua ron” as an editorial on Monday, March 16, 1885. It is composed of two paragraphs: the first paragraph expounds the inevitability of the spread of Western civilization; Fukuzawa likens it to an epidemic of measles. Japan is the only country in Asia that has accepted Western civilization rather than trying in vain to stop it. Since Western civilization does not tolerate antiquated political structures, Japan reformed its political body in order to maintain its independence (*doḱuritsu*):

Japan not only has shed its old manners and customs [*kyūtō o datsu shitaru*], in the middle of Asia it also has struck out into a new direction; the principle of which lies in these two words: leave Asia [*datsua*].

Although our country Japan is located on the eastern edge of Asia, the spirit of our people has already shed off the stubborn conservatism of Asia [*Ajia no ḱorō o datsu shite*] and moved to Western civilization.<sup>20</sup>

The second paragraph castigates China and Korea for not having done likewise. Both countries still cling devotedly to “Asian tradition and customs.” Their society is therefore stagnant, their political system despotic, and their people lawless, irrational, servile, shameless, and cruel. Because of their aversion to progress, China and Korea eventually will lose their independence. Japan must ostentatiously dissociate itself from these two “false

friends,” lest — because of geographical proximity — Japan is mistaken “in the eyes of a civilized Westerner” (*Seiyō bunmeijin no me o mote*) as being like its neighbors. This undeserved reputation would indirectly inflict great damage on the foreign relations of Japan: “Therefore . . . we have to leave that group [*sono go o datsu shite*] and move on with the civilized countries of the West; we must not treat China and Korea in a special way just because they are neighboring countries, but deal with them in just the same way the Westerners do.”<sup>21</sup>

The *Jiji shinpō* reported on page 2 of the same issue on the Kapsin Incident (December 4–7, 1884) and the Sino-French War (August 1884–June 1885), as it had done almost daily since the respective beginnings of the incidents.<sup>22</sup> Fukuzawa had been deeply involved in supporting the hapless Enlightenment Faction (Gaehwapa).<sup>23</sup> The Sino-French War over Vietnam marked the beginning of a major expansion of Western imperialism in Asia.

In trying to define what “Asia” means in the context of the “Datsua ron,” we first have to note that Fukuzawa, like his disciple Hinohara, clearly distinguishes a geographical and a cultural concept of Asia. Without this distinction, Fukuzawa’s assessment of the present state of Japan being “located on the Eastern edge of Asia” but pursuing a policy of “leaving Asia” would be nonsensical. The geographical concept follows European taxonomy.<sup>24</sup>

“Asia” as cultural concept signifies the “old manners and customs” (*kyūtō*) that Japan has shed (*datsu shitaru*) but which China and Korea still retain. Fukuzawa saw Korea in its present state, governed by the Sinophile Conservative Faction (*Sugupa*), as a mere satellite of China.<sup>25</sup> Thus “Asia” signifies Chinese civilization, especially Confucianism, and its cosmological implication, the Sino-centric world order.<sup>26</sup> However, traditional interpretations of the “Datsua ron” frequently overlook that Fukuzawa presents Japan’s dissociation from Chinese civilization as an accomplished fact. Japan already *has* left Asia by adopting Western civilization.<sup>27</sup> Thus, if Fukuzawa calls for another *datsua* in the future, it is not about Westernization. It is about an even more decisive step of the strategy that aims at contesting Europe’s assimilative powers to “represent” Asia and thereby reestablish Japan’s position as an independent subject.<sup>28</sup>

The point of departure for this understanding is Fukuzawa’s demand that Japan, now that it had “shed off the stubborn conservatism of Asia,” should

also dissociate itself from its neighbors China and Korea. The proposition seems plain enough. However, if we read the text closely, we find that the real object of dissociation is not the political China and Korea, but rather their “Oriental” representation through Europe and, in a way, Europe itself.

It is obvious by how they are described in the “Datsua ron” that China and Korea are seen “through the eyes of a civilized Westerner” (*Seiyō bunmeijin no me o mote*). The description of their political systems, for example, echoes Hegel’s famous description of the “static nature” of Chinese history and of unenlightened Chinese despotism: “At the same time it is an empire of duration; it cannot change from within. . . . Their history, too, is for the most part without history, as it is simply the repetition of the same majestic downfall. . . . The Chinese and Mongol empire is the empire of theocratic despotism.”<sup>29</sup> China and Korea, therefore, appear as stereotypes of Western Orientalist discourse. Drawing a line between Japan and those represented (China and Korea) merely constitutes the means to dissociate Japan from the representation. The characters of “Datsua ron” (“Leaving Asia Behind”) thus could be regrouped and read as “Datsu A-ron,” meaning “Leaving the *Discourse* on Asia Behind.”

Yet, Japan in “the eyes of a civilized Westerner” was part of the representation. Leaving the representation (Asia) behind consequently meant contesting the representation and, eventually, questioning the defining power of Europe as self. “Leaving Asia behind,” thus, at the same time, aims at “leaving Europe behind.” “De-Asianization” becomes the dislocation of Europe from the center of the scheme.<sup>30</sup>

We should note here that, as much as Fukuzawa disliked the Chinese civilization, he was not uncritical of Western civilization, either, or embraced it indiscriminately, without a certain purpose.<sup>31</sup> Note the peculiar way in which Fukuzawa speaks about the advent of Western civilization in Japan: rather than describing the adoption of Western civilization as an action, Fukuzawa likens it to the inevitable outcome of an infection. Like the measles epidemic that gradually spread eastward and ravaged the whole country at around the time Fukuzawa wrote the “Datsua ron” (February and March 1885), so is Western civilization gradually, but inexorably, spreading eastward.<sup>32</sup> Fukuzawa uses the simile deliberately and argues for actively spreading civilization, rather than trying in vain to resist it.<sup>33</sup>

It is difficult to surmise how far Fukuzawa would have carried the analogy. He concedes in the “Datsua ron” that Western civilization may bring harm, much as measles had been a threatening disease in former times.<sup>34</sup> Fukuzawa however adds that Western civilization brings more good than harm. Indeed, having overcome the measles, the body is fortified. And, as his writings show (especially his “Gakumon no susume” [“Encouragement of Learning”], 1872–76), Fukuzawa admired Western learning primarily for its *practical* use in strengthening the individual and the nation (thus, in fact, what he admired was merely a fraction of Western civilization).<sup>35</sup> Yet, much as the benefit of having had the measles lies in one’s future resistance to it, the main reason the leaders of Meiji Japan wanted to “enrich the country and strengthen the army” (*fukoku kyōhei*) was to put up “resistance” to the Western powers. Thus, actively spreading Western civilization functioned, as it were, as a sort of vaccination.

This leads us finally to the question: if Japan should neither belong to Asia nor “join Europe,” which position *did* Fukuzawa envision for Japan? Fukuzawa states in “Datsua ron” that it was the need to preserve independence (*dojuritsu*) that had necessitated the adoption of Western-oriented reforms in the past. Independence, in general, was a ruling principle in Fukuzawa’s early writings,<sup>36</sup> and it is also the rationale for Fukuzawa’s demand to challenge the European “representation” of Japan in Asia: as Japan leaves the position of being represented (Hinohara’s “position of the Oriental” [*Tōyōjin taru no ichi*]) and thereby contests the authority of “those who represent” to include Japan in the representation, it reclaims the power and thereby restores sovereignty. By restoring its sovereignty, Japan regains the position of an integrated subject, capable of fully representing itself in every respect. There is an obvious analogy between this process and the treaty revision process (1871–99), in which Japan tried to restore its powers in judicial and tariff-related matters and thus reclaim the position of a fully sovereign subject in international law.<sup>37</sup>

This leaves the question of how Fukuzawa envisioned the process of reclaiming sovereignty in terms of specific political measures. Fukuzawa ends the “Datsua ron” with the ominous proposal to “deal with [China and Korea] in just the same way the Westerners do.” However, as readers of *Jiji shinpō* were daily regaled with news of the Sino-French War, and

as the Sino-French constellation was frequently understood to parallel the Sino-Japanese conflict,<sup>38</sup> the readers of the “Datsua ron” must have readily understood that Fukuzawa proposed nothing less than war with China.

Fukuzawa’s “Datsua ron” is often explained as the enraged (and thus unusually extreme) reaction to the Kapsin Incident in December 1884.<sup>39</sup> Fukuzawa’s disappointment at the failure of his cherished reform project in Korea might well have been the immediate cause for taking up the pen. Yet, pure emotion does not account for the ratiocination of the text. Why should war with China free Japan from Asia? In fact, Fukuzawa’s answer tries to solve a fundamental problem of Orientalist discourse and the establishing of identities, albeit in a rather cynical way.

It has been observed that Western Orientalism — despite its empiricist pretensions — persistently shut out experiences of the East that would contradict Western views of it and thus constituted a closed system.<sup>40</sup> The ethnocentric subject keeps establishing itself by selectively defining an other, and, to quote Jacques Derrida, “each time that ethnocentrism is precipitately and ostentatiously reversed, some effort silently hides behind all the spectacular effects to consolidate an inside and to draw from it some domestic benefit.”<sup>41</sup> There seems to be no escape from the “inside,” the epistemic enclosure that is the subject.

Fukuzawa proposed to break the epistemic enclosure by force. It has often been overlooked that Fukuzawa advocated war even before the Kapsin Incident and for different (although no better) reasons than rage.<sup>42</sup> In an article written in 1884, Fukuzawa recalled that he once furnished a friend who went to Europe (Hinohara, most probably) with a collection of photos and lithographs depicting the achievements of modern Japan: trains and telegraphs, buildings in the Western style, soldiers conducting drills, cannons, battleships, and so on.<sup>43</sup> With these, his friend set out to persuade disbelieving foreigners that modern Japan really existed.<sup>44</sup> Fukuzawa complained about the lack of information and interest in the West regarding Japan, as this hindered “the expansion of our national powers.” However, there were other means of disseminating information: “If I always argue how important it is that we should build a great number of battleships and let them carry the Japanese flag into all parts of the world, even if there was no urgent business to do so, it is only because of that [i.e., to disseminate knowl-

edge of modern Japan].”<sup>45</sup> It should be noted that Japan, in 1874, had already tried this strategy. The government had sent an expedition to Taiwan to “punish” natives for killing fishermen of the Ryūkyū kingdom three years before (the “Taiwan expedition”). One of the main objectives had been to establish Japan’s claims as a “modern nation.”<sup>46</sup> Fukuzawa continued:

By good chance, the Korean incident of the year before last [the Imo mutiny 1882] opened up a good opportunity to send a small contingent to Seoul. . . . Perhaps, if the Japanese and the Chinese soldiers would put their ability to a test on the real battlefield, this might enhance the reputation of our military system in the eyes of the world. However, one must not seek fighting without a good reason. Moreover, avoiding it is the true nature of military tactics and lies at the core of diplomacy. Thus it is the ultimate blessing of our nation that our soldiers until this day not even once have crossed swords with a foreign country. Yet, Westerners have troubles in measuring the strength and excellence of our army, and this is because they did not have the opportunity to see their ability [in action], yet.<sup>47</sup>

Fukuzawa’s only slightly muted wish for Japan crossing swords with China “in the eyes of a civilized Westerner” (“Datsua ron”) pointed toward the one loophole that seemed to exist in the closed circuit of Oriental discourse (the “eyes” of the epistemic enclosure): if Orientalism was the intellectual representation of power relations, then the one thing that would produce a new perception and break up the closed discourse of European superiority was a shift in the underlying power relations. Thus Fukuzawa invoked the diplomacy of war as a “campaign” to advertise the strength of Japan (and, of course, to attain primacy in Korea). And indeed, the ensuing Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, an event Fukuzawa agitated for immediately, sent ripples of shock through the foreign press.<sup>48</sup> The Western powers were forced to abandon their familiar perception that Japan was much weaker than China and grudgingly recognized Japan’s modernization as genuine (albeit not necessarily equal to the West, yet).<sup>49</sup> Although the first revised treaty that put Japan on a more equal footing with Britain was concluded shortly before the war, it is no accident that all other major powers followed suit soon after the victory. Fukuzawa, in retrospect, saw his dream fulfilled.<sup>50</sup>

Yet, it was understood from the beginning that, as *datsua* sought to establish an original (not derivative) subject that was independent of Europe, the emergence of another independent subject inevitably must lead to a conflict over the power of representation, that is, over “spheres of influence,” in a very specific sense. Already in 1884, Hinohara announced that the Sino-French War marked a new round of European expansion in Asia.<sup>51</sup> And, indeed, the Tripartite Intervention (1895) and Japan’s war with Russia over supremacy in Korea and Manchuria (1904–5) showed that the policy of “leaving Asia behind” led to direct confrontation with European powers. Thus, soon after the Sino-Japanese War, Fukuzawa exhorted his countrymen that “we must not pride ourselves in the vain glory of victory.”<sup>52</sup> Japan, until then, had led a relatively sheltered life. However, now that Japan had been acknowledged by the world (the European powers) as an independent subject, the *real* race was only about to begin.

### **The Concept of Asia in Okakura Tenshin’s *The Ideals of the East***

*The Ideals of the East with Special References to the Art of Japan* was Okakura Tenshin’s first book deliberately addressed to the English-speaking public. Okakura wrote it in 1901–2, while being on a “lecture tour” in India.<sup>53</sup> In 1898, Okakura had resigned from his position as president of the Tokyo School of Fine Arts (Tōkyō bijutsu gakkō) after a dispute over personal and professional issues.<sup>54</sup> Soon afterward, and with the financial help of American friends, he founded with some colleagues the Academy of Fine Arts of Japan (Nippon bijutsu-in). The school bore the motto “Life True to Self.”<sup>55</sup>

Okakura’s English writings are traditionally read as a counter-narrative to Fukuzawa’s “Datsua ron.” According to this reading, Okakura envisioned Japan as the leader of a united Asian resistance, the defender of the weak against Western imperialism.<sup>56</sup> It is in the latter sense that the opening line of *The Ideals* (“Asia is one”) is invoked. However, just as the traditional interpretation of “Datsua ron” falls short in understanding what the term “Asia” implied, so, too, does the traditional interpretation of Okakura’s concept of Asia.

Okakura, like Fukuzawa, distinguishes a geographical and a cultural concept of Asia. It is clear from the outset that “Asia is one” pertains mainly

to the latter concept. However, culturally unified Asia constitutes merely a fraction of the geographical Asia: China and India feature as the two “mighty civilizations” of Asia; Japan emerges as the third Asian country, defining the end of Asia.<sup>57</sup>

Yet, the cultural unity shows no traces in the present, as it signifies merely genealogical continuity. There is only one real Asia left, and Japan is the place where it lies treasured. Waves of Chinese and Indian culture (especially Buddhism and Confucianism) took their meandering course through the Asian continent to reach their final destination (and perfection) in Japan (6–7). After having endowed Japan with these cultural traits, as if their sole function had lain therein, India and China, “through long dystolic centuries” of enfeeblement, foreign conquest, and suppression, fell into a state of spiritual stagnancy (4, 5, 212, 239). Only Japan, through its “unbroken sovereignty, the proud self-reliance of an unconquered race, and the insular isolation” has maintained its independence and thereby become “the real repository of the trust of Asiatic thought and culture” (5). Okakura’s model of Asian evolution shows Japan not only as the product of Asian evolution, but its pinnacle. Whereas the civilization of China and India deteriorated, Japan has preserved its cultural standard and even, through the singular spirit that “welcomes the new without losing the old,” succeeded in becoming a modern power (8). Japan is the end of Asia’s development, in the Hegelian sense. Moreover, as Japan is the sole treasurer of Asia’s soul, the cultural tradition, Japan is also Asia’s self. Japan *is* Asia.

Okakura’s evolutionary model does not stop at the threshold of geographical Asia. Japan as Asia’s self even surpasses Europe. Asian culture, as such, structurally encompasses European culture: Okakura characterizes the “Asiatic ideal” as a “love for the Ultimate and Universal,” “replete with grand visions of the universal sweeping through the concrete and particular,” whereas Western people merely excel in the sciences, as they “love to dwell on the Particular, and to search out the means, not the end in life” (1, 206). The East is spiritual, the West materialistic. However, as the ultimate exceeds the particular, the end dictates the means, mind moves matter, in the same way Asia surpasses Europe. This relation is illustrated in Okakura’s concept of art: “The stream of ideas [the Asiatic ideal] is the real: facts [form, the particular, the West] are mere incidents” (228). The ephemeral

civilization of Europe crumbles before the perennial majesty of Asia. This, Okakura observes, has recently even been acknowledged in the West: “The very trend of Europe itself . . . toward the East, assists us in the recovery of those subtler and nobler visions of human life” (223–24).

Japan as Asia’s self not only surpasses Europe, it is also the only nation capable of living “true to self,” and therefore of living truly at all. Europe has no self: to Okakura, the “stale and old-fashioned goods of Manchester” hold no spirit at all (220). Europe merely consists of a soulless shell, pure form, ephemeral matter. It is therefore Japan that in the modern era could adopt Western science and technique while remaining “true to herself” (222).<sup>58</sup> Asia’s untarnished self possesses the body of the West to live on as a modern nation, and, thereby, is the only nation in the world to have a life at all: “Life lies ever in the return to self” (240) (“Life True to Self” was, we remember, the motto of Okakura’s art school). This is why world history eventually must return to “Asia.”

Okakura in *The Ideals* attempts nothing less than toppling the Western model of civilization by turning it upside down: Hegel postulated that world history “moves from the East to the West; because Europe is the end of world history as such, Asia is the beginning of it.”<sup>59</sup> Now Japan becomes the end of history, whence civilization flows. Whereas in the “Datsua ron” the flow of civilization inexorably moved to the East, now the flow has been reversed and moves inexorably West. Defining power disembodies the subject of Europe and leaves it in the position of the Oriental subjugate. The flow has turned.

Fukuzawa predicted Japan’s rise to sovereignty in case of a victory over China. Okakura, in retrospect, agreed with Fukuzawa: “The Chinese War, which revealed our supremacy in the Eastern waters . . . was a natural outcome of the new national vigour, which has been working to express itself for a century and a half” (223). Okakura interprets the war as “self-expression” and thereby echoes Fukuzawa’s call for war as expression of the independent subject. Yet, although both felt that the Sino-Japanese War had been a momentous turn, it had not fully succeeded in the endeavor to break the epistemic enclosure of Europe, the habitual perception of Japan. True, the majority of Western commentators readily conceded Japan’s ability in warfare. However, there were more skeptical people who felt that Japan,

after all, merely had won “a race run with a lame man.”<sup>60</sup> Moreover, soon after the victory, the Japanese public suffered a shock from the news of the Tripartite Intervention, which denied Japan the rightful spoils of a “righteous war” (in the popular understanding), tantamount to denying Japan the privileges of sovereignty.<sup>61</sup> A new surge of racialist sentiment sought to close off the ranks of the European powers against Japan (as the “yellow peril”). Only in 1902, while Okakura was still writing *The Ideals of the East*, did Britain counteract this tendency by entering the Anglo-Japanese Alliance for strategic reasons.<sup>62</sup> Thus, Japan’s position as equal subject vis-à-vis the European powers (not to speak of its superiority) at the time was a fragile thing that needed to be reasserted time and again. Okakura testifies to this fact when he bemoans that Europe is unable to appreciate the crown of Asia’s civilization, Japanese art ideals: “Any history of Japanese art-ideals is, then, almost an impossibility, as long as the Western world remains so unaware of the varied environment and interrelated social phenomena into which that art is set, as it were a jewel” (10).

*The Ideals of the East* is an attempt to present this “jewel” that is Japan to the still unenlightened Western reader. Instead of sending abroad pictures of soldiers drilling and cannon batteries (as Fukuzawa did), Okakura organized exhibitions of his favored *Nihon-ga* style in New York and Boston.<sup>63</sup> This seems peaceful enough. However, if we bring to mind that Asia’s (Japan’s) superiority lay in its spirituality, and this, in turn, manifested itself most fully in art, we are taken aback by the martiality of Okakura’s art-conception: “Technique is thus but the *weapon* of the *artistic warfare*, scientific knowledge of anatomy and perspective, the *commissariat* that sustains the *army*. . . . Ideals [Asiatic ideals] in turn are the modes in which the artistic mind moves, a *plan of campaign which the nature of the country imposes on war*. Within and behind them lies always the *sovereign-general* [i.e., the emperor], immovable and self-contained, nodding *peace or destruction* from his brow” (230; emphasis added).

It should also be noted that, according to Okakura, victory in the Sino-Japanese War burdened Japan with the responsibility of Asia’s “return to self” (223). As Asia’s self lay in Japan, Asia’s return to self seemed to afford no less than Japan “inexorably moving to the West” (to adapt a phrase of Fukuzawa’s “Datsua ron”). This would inevitably lead to conflict *with* the

West. The consequences of Okakura's argument seems not to have been lost on his first European reader (and assistant in writing the treatise), Margaret Elisabeth Noble ("Sister Nivedita," 1867–1911), who wrote in her preface to *The Ideals*: "It would almost seem as if it were the destiny of imperial peoples to be conquered in turn by the religious ideas of their subjects."<sup>64</sup>

So far, our reading of *The Ideals* seems to indicate that Okakura very much relied on the Western binary scheme of East and West, Asia and Europe, albeit subverting the model to the goal of establishing Japan as self. However, there are inconsistencies that point to an understanding of the binary on a still more fundamental level. If read in the context of Okakura's other aesthetic-political writings, it becomes clear that the geopolitical binary was easily interchangeable, if this served his goal. In 1904, one year after *The Ideals*, Okakura published *The Awakening of Japan*.<sup>65</sup> The book was written in Boston and published in New York when Japan was already engaged in a fierce war with Russia.<sup>66</sup> Swaying American public opinion concerning the Russo-Japanese War was crucial for Japan. Consequently, the divide in *The Awakening* now shifted from the East/West binary to the dualism of civilization and barbarity.<sup>67</sup> Civilization now comprised Japan and Europe, including America (but consciously excluding Russia). Like Nitobe Inazō in *Bushidō*, Okakura is at pains to establish an analogy between Japanese and European culture, thus "building bridges" (Nitobe) and, *en passant*, letting the Japanese claim of fighting barbarity (Russia) appear more creditable.<sup>68</sup> The geopolitical division, therefore, is easily effaced by political expediency. Only Japan remains as the single steadfast point, around which the fluctuating matrix revolves.

Yet even this vanishes as we follow the geopolitical binary from the surface of *The Ideals* through a fissure of inconsistency in the text to a yet more fundamental level of the binary. We have seen that in extolling the virtues of Japan as the apex of evolution, Okakura especially praises Japan's "tenacity true to the Asiatic soul even while it raises her to the rank of modern power" (8). The process of this "incubation" has been already described. Yet Okakura at the same time voices dissatisfaction with modern times. "The mirror of Yamato is clouded" (243), as he chooses to put it, "for the scorching drought of modern vulgarity [those stale and old-fashioned goods of Manchester] is parching the throat of life and art" (244). These seemingly

contradictory statements lead us to the discovery that, at the base of the East/West binary, there might lie the yet more fundamental antagonism between utopian idealism and modern reality. We have seen that Okakura grants to “Asia” idealism, “love for the Ultimate and Universal,” whole and undivided, *unum catholicum*. The West, as antithesis, embodies empiricism (science and knowledge) that has no ideals but anti-ideals (pragmatism, materialism, competitive individualism). We therefore might read the title *The Ideals of the East* simply as *Ideals, only*. From here it is but a short leap of abstraction to understand “Asia” as Okakura’s idealist utopia, whereas the West marks the reality of the present. And, indeed, *The Ideals* have been interpreted as embittered reaction to Okakura’s modern present.<sup>69</sup> Moreover, there were other Japanese intellectuals who seemed to experience the years after the Sino-Japanese War as an era of spiritual crisis and who criticized pragmatism, materialism, and a harmful individualism as the odious “Western” qualities of Japanese society and argued in favor of a better world.<sup>70</sup> However, this fin-de-siècle critique of “Western” reality was not specifically “Eastern.” Ever since the Great Depression of 1873–96 in Europe had shaken European self-confidence, a sense of crisis and irrational fear in Europe congealed in a fundamental criticism of Western civilization from within.<sup>71</sup> Many Americans, moreover, felt deeply disaffected by the vulgarity and superficiality of American culture after the Civil War, which added to the belief that theirs was, as Mark Twain called it, a “Gilded Age.”<sup>72</sup>

Moreover, disaffection with one’s own reality and a sense of crisis led to a search for solutions everywhere: Japanese critics of culture relied heavily on the European and American discourse of crisis, on fin-de-siècle art (Pre-Raphaelite painting)<sup>73</sup> and thought (John Ruskin, William Morris, Max Nordau, Edward Carpenter), or socialist culture critics (Albert Schaffle, Thomas Kirkup).<sup>74</sup> Europeans and Americans, in turn, moved eastward, especially to Japan, in search of an Asian utopia of their own.<sup>75</sup> On the most fundamental level of Okakura’s *Ideals*, then, “Asia” simply constitutes a cipher for utopian discontent with the present, beyond the particularity of the East/West binary.

## Conclusion

Fukuzawa Yukichi's "Datsua ron" and Okakura Tenshin's *The Ideals of the East* are often seen to represent two seemingly antagonist tendencies, Westernization and Asianism. These tendencies correspond to the familiar contrastive scheme of Asia and Europe that is said to govern foreign policy in the Meiji period. However, Japanese intellectuals of the Meiji era were keenly aware of the European provenance and Orientalist nature of the concept of Asia and the implications it had for Japan (subjugation under the assimilative power of Europe as self). It was therefore only to be expected that Japanese intellectuals not only challenged Europe's placement of Japan in this framework, but also translated it into a scheme in which Japan supplanted Europe as the subject of the scheme. A defamiliarizing reading of "Datsua ron" and *The Ideals of the East* reveals that the inferred opposition of the East/West binary vanishes or is subverted, and "Asia" becomes a strategic device to establish the position of Japan as an independent subject or self.

"Asia" in the "Datsua ron," ultimately signifies Western Orientalist discourse on Asia. It is this discourse that Japan had to "leave," albeit not in concert, but in confrontation, with the Western powers. "Leaving Asia" therefore eventually results in the dislocation of Europe as subject.

"Asia" in *The Ideals of the East* inverts Western oriental discourse in favor of Japan: the West becomes subjugated, Orientalized, and Japan as Asia's self advances to the position of center and end of history. However, at a more fundamental level, Okakura's Asia functions as a cipher for utopian discontent with the present, thereby joining a globalized fin-de-siècle discourse beyond the particularism of the East/West binary.

This study initially set out to discover the traces of an "itinerary of recognition through assimilation" that were left in Japan as part of geographical Asia and to discover strategies that Japanese intellectuals might have developed to "keep the ethnocentric Subject from establishing itself by selectively defining an Other."<sup>76</sup> However, a closer look at Fukuzawa's and Okakura's texts revealed the ethnocentric assumptions of this enterprise. Since Asia is a European concept, in Japan we did not find Asia, but only Japan, speaking against or through the concept of Asia. The "itinerary of recognition"

was crossed by another subject that tried to assert itself through a strategy of dislocation (Fukuzawa) or dissimulation (Okakura). Yet the itinerary leads nowhere. As both sides claim the position of subject, both are locked in a complex of “dual narcissism”: “The white man is sealed in his whiteness. The black man in his blackness.”<sup>77</sup> There seems to be no communication, as each side receives merely the echo of its own assimilation. Assimilation takes place on both sides of the enclosure, Orientalism constituting *one* part of it. Epistemic violence is answered by real or aesthetic warfare, which in turn (there is *no* loophole) is assimilated in an effort to consolidate the inside of the self.

Yet, on a more fundamental level, there is movement, too: like the measles that transform the body, Western civilization transforms Japan, and in the process is transformed itself. It has been observed that, in Meiji intellectual history, a mutual transformation of “traditional” and “Western” thought took place to such an extent as to render the categories deceptive, if not meaningless.<sup>78</sup> Okakura gives proof to the fact, by joining a critical discourse of modernity that is beyond petty particularism. Japanese intellectuals felt the transformation, some with an acute sense of loss. However, even this sense of loss gives proof to the universal experience of modernity, as many intellectuals in Europe felt similarly. Yet, just as Fukuzawa stated that there was more good than bad in letting oneself be transformed through the experience of the other, the “loss” incurred in leaving one’s enclosure and meeting the other halfway is to be valued over the vain futility of talking with an echo.

## Notes

People too numerous to mention read this essay at various stages of writing it and offered their valuable comments. I especially benefited from Tom Dowling’s criticism and encouragement. I would also like to thank the journal’s anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. All translations, if not indicated otherwise, are my own.

- 1 Akira Iriye, “Japan’s Drive to Great-Power Status”, in *The Nineteenth Century*, vol. 5 of *The Cambridge History of Japan*, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 750.
- 2 Fukuzawa Yukichi, “Datsua ron” (“On Leaving Asia Behind”), in *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū*

- (*The Complete Works of Fukuzawa Yukichi*), 21 vols. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1958–64), 10:238–40.
- 3 Banno Junji, for example, in *Meiji—shisō no jitsuzō (Meiji—the Real Aspect of Thought)* (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1977), throughout refers to *datsua ron* as a line of argument (Westernization at the expense of Asia). The chapter “Treaty Revision” in vol. 3 of *Meiji Japan through Contemporary Sources* (Tokyo: The Center for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1969–72) opens with a translation of the “Datsua ron” (129–33). However, it has been repeatedly noted that the notoriety of the text is a postwar invention. See Maruyama Masao, “Fukuzawa Yukichi no ‘Datsua ron’ to sono shūhen” (“Fukuzawa Yukichi’s ‘Datsua ron’ and Its Context”), *Maruyama Masao techō (Maruyama Masao Notes)*, no. 20 (2002): 4; Hirayama Yō, “Nani ga ‘Datsua ron’ o yūmei ni shita ka” (“What Made the ‘Datsua ron’ Famous?”), in *Gurōbaru to rokūru (The Global and the Local)* (Shizuoka: Shizuoka Kenritsu Daigaku Kokusai Kankei Gakubu, 2002), 65–100.
  - 4 Maruyama, “Fukuzawa Yukichi,” 3. Thus a standard reference work on modern Japanese foreign policy like *Nihon gaiķōshi, 1853–1972 (A History of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1853–1972)*, ed. Shinobu Seizaburō (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1974), for example, titles its chapter on the period 1884–91 (1:127–58) with “Datsua nyūō” (“Leave Asia, Join Europe”).
  - 5 For a minimal definition of “Asianism,” see Takeuchi Yoshimi, “Ajia-shugi no tenbō” (“A Prospect of Japanese Asianism”), in *Ajia-shugi (Asianism)*, ed. Takeuchi Yoshimi (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1963), 12–13. See also Sven Saaler, “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Overcoming the Nation, Creating a Region, Forging an Empire,” in *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism, and Borders*, ed. Sven Saaler and J. Viktor Koschmann (London: Routledge, 2007), 1–18.
  - 6 Okakura Tenshin (“Kakasu Okakura”), *The Ideals of the East with Special Reference to the Art of Japan* (London: John Murray, 1903).
  - 7 The tradition to present Fukuzawa and Okakura as a “double portrait” may have been started by Takeuchi Yoshimi and Hashikawa Bunzō. See Takeuchi, “Ajia-shugi,” 37–44; Hashikawa Bunzō, “Fukuzawa Yukichi to Okakura Tenshin” (“Fukuzawa Yukichi and Okakura Tenshin”), in *Kindai Nihon to Chūgoku (Modern Japan and China)*, ed. Takeuchi Yoshimi and Hashikawa Bunzō (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun-sha, 1974), 1:17–35. In the sense that the prominence of the “Datsua ron” is a postwar invention (see above), and Okakura’s *Ideals* was first translated into Japanese and thereby entered the discursive frame in 1922—see Pekka Korhonen, “The Geography of Okakura Tenshin,” *Japan Review* no. 13 (2001), 110—the opposition, as such, is an anachronism. See Sun Ge, “How Does Asia Mean? (Part I),” *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* no. 1 (2000): 15.
  - 8 For the “familiar dichotomy,” see Okamoto Kōji, “‘Nihon to Ajia’ ka ‘Nihon no Ajia’ ka” (“Is it ‘Japan and Asia’ or ‘Japan’s Asia’?”) in *Kindai Nihon no Ajia-kan (Views of Asia in Mod-*

- ern Japan*), ed. Okamoto Kōji (Kyōto: Minerva Shobō, 1998), 15. For “contrastive scheme,” see Banno, *Meiji*, 5.
- 9 For a brief survey on the role and function of Asia in the evolution of a European self-perception, see Peter Bugge, “Asia and the Idea of Europe — Europe and Its Others,” *Kontur — tidsskrift for kulturstudier* (*Kontur — Journal of Cultural Studies*) 1 (2000): 3–13; Jürgen Osterhammel, “Vielfalt und Einheit im neuzeitlichen Asien” (“Unity and Diversity in Early Modern and Modern Asia”), in *Asien in der Neuzeit 1550–1950: Sieben historische Stationen* (*Asia in Early Modern and Modern Times, 1550–1950: Seven Historical Chapters*), ed. Jürgen Osterhammel (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1994), 9–25.
  - 10 See, for example, the portrait of the Oriental mind by Evelyn Baring (1841–1917) cited in Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin, 1995), 38–39.
  - 11 Said, *Orientalism*, 1–9, 73. Said, of course, used the term Orientalism originally to describe Europe’s relation to Islamic countries, the latter historically being Europe’s most immediate other. However, in the age of (high) imperialism, the *principle* of Orientalism may be applicable worldwide. For the concept of Orientalism and Japanese historiography, see Stefan Tanaka, *Japan’s Orient: Rendering Past into History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
  - 12 Hinohara Shōzō, “Nihon wa Tōyō-koku taru bekarazu” (“Japan Must Not Be an Oriental Country”), *Jiji shinpō*, November 11, 13, and 14, 1884; see Maruyama, “Fukuzawa Yukichi,” 5–8.
  - 13 Hinohara, “Nihon wa Tōyō-koku,” November 11, 1884. For a short biography of Hinohara, see Okabe Yasuko, “Shōden Hinohara Shōzō” (“A Short Biography of Hinohara Shōzō”), *Fukuzawa techō* (*Fukuzawa Notes*), no. 110 (2001), 12–30.
  - 14 Hinohara, “Nihon wa Tōyō-koku,” November 13, 1884.
  - 15 For the agency of class formation, see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Cary Nelson and Lars Grossberg (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 276.
  - 16 Sugita Teiichi, “Kōa-saku” (“A Policy for Reviving Asia” [1884]), as quoted by Hashikawa Bunzō in “Japanese Perspectives in Asia: From Dissociation to Coprosperity,” in *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions*, ed. Akira Iriye (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 331–32.
  - 17 A good example of this belief is the essay “Kokusai-ron” (“On International Relations”) written by the journalist Kuga Katsunan (1857–1907) and published in 1893 (repr., *Kuga Katsunan zenshū* [*Complete Works of Kuga Katsunan*], vol. 1, ed. Nishida Taketoshi and Uete Michiari [Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1968], 145–81. Although Katsunan rejected the popular social Darwinist notion that “the flesh of the weak is fodder for the strong” (*jakuniku kyōshoku*), he nevertheless conceded that competition was the essence of international relations. For the impact of social Darwinism on Japanese intellectuals, see Nagai Michio, “Herbert Spencer in Early Meiji Japan,” *Far Eastern Quarterly* 14 (1954): 55–64.
  - 18 For the notion of “Europe as self,” see Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 281.
  - 19 See Viktor Shklovsky’s concept of “defamiliarization” in “Art as Technique” (“Iskusstvo,

- kak priyom,” 1917), in *Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays*, ed. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), 3–24, esp. 11–13.
- 20 Fukuzawa, *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū*, 10:239; for a full translation, see *Meiji Japan through Contemporary Sources*, 3:129–33.
  - 21 Fukuzawa, *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū*, 10:240.
  - 22 In the Kapsin Incident (Kōshin jihen), members of the Enlightenment Faction (Gaehwapa) led by Kim Ok-kyun and Pak Yong-hyo staged a coup d'état and ousted the Conservative Party (Sugupa) with the intention of implementing reforms, following the model of Meiji Japan. After three days, the coup d'état was ended by Chinese troops, and the leaders fled to Japan. The Sino-French War was fought over influence on the rulers of the Nguyen dynasty in Vietnam. The war was ended by the Li-Fourmier agreement, in which China renounced all claims of influence in Vietnam.
  - 23 See Tomita Masafumi, *Kōshō Fukuzawa Yukichi (Fukuzawa Yukichi: A Historical Study)*, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), 2:578–602.
  - 24 See the geographical primer “Sekai kunizukushi” (“A Geographical Primer for All Countries of the World”), which Fukuzawa published in 1869, repr. in *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū*, vol. 2; for Asia, see 592–600. In the preface, Fukuzawa clearly states that he has gathered the information for the primer from European textbooks on world geography.
  - 25 See, for example, “Chōsen jihen no shobun-hō” (“How to Deal with the Korean Incident”), *Jiji shinpō*, December 23, 1884, repr. in *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū*, 10:147–51.
  - 26 On the Sino-centric world order and Japanese attempts to overcome it, see Uete Michiari, “Taigai-kan no tenkai” (“Shifting Paradigms in Japanese Views of the World”), in *Kindai Nihon seiji shisō-shi (A History of Modern Japanese Political Thought)*, vol. 1, ed. Hashikawa Bunzō and Matsumoto Sannosuke (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1971), 33–74.
  - 27 Fukuzawa discusses the state of “civilization” (*bunmei*) in Japan again in “Bunmei o kau wa zeni o yō su” (“If You Want Civilization, You Need Money”), *Jiji shinpō*, March 2, 1886; repr. in *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū*, 10:569–72. Fukuzawa complains that, although the Japanese already call themselves “civilized people” (*bunmei-jin*), material civilization lags behind because they do not invest enough into “projects of civilization.” However, this is but a complaint about the *speed* of progress, not about the general commitment to “civilization.” Thus Fukuzawa’s readers did not need any more convincing to “leave Asia” in the sense of adopting (Western) “civilization,” as they were determined to do so anyway.
  - 28 The following discussion of Japan’s “representation” uses the word *representation* in its double meaning of “portray” and “speaking for.” See Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 275–78; and Said, *Orientalism*, 20–21.
  - 29 G. W. F. Hegel, *Die Vernunft in der Geschichte (Reason in History)*, ed. G. Lasson (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1917), 235–36.
  - 30 “De-Asianization” is the translation of “*datsua*” in *Meiji Japan through Contemporary Sources*, 3:129–33.

- 31 See Annette Schad-Seifert, "Constructing National Identities: Asia, Japan, and Europe in Fukuzawa Yukichi's Theory of Civilisation," in *Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan: Autonomy, Asian Brotherhood, or World Citizenship?* ed. Dick Stegewerns (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 57–58.
- 32 See *Kindai Nihon sōgō nenpyō (A Comprehensive Chronology of Modern Japan)*, ed. Iwanami shoten henshū-bu, 4th ed. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001), 102.
- 33 Fukuzawa, *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū*, 10:238.
- 34 Fukuzawa, *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū*, 10:238. On the history of measles in Japan, see Fujikawa Yū, *Nihon shippei-shi (A History of Illness in Japan)* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1969), 175–88.
- 35 The first and most famous part of *Gakumon no susume* is translated in Fukuzawa Yukichi, *Fukuzawa Yukichi on Education*, trans. Eiichi Kiyooka (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1985), 65–72.
- 36 Carmen Blacker, *The Japanese Enlightenment: A Study of the Writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 11–12. For example, see Fukuzawa's *Gakumon no susume*, part 1: "In this way a man may attain his independence, a house its independence, and the nation, too, can attain its independence" (Fukuzawa, *Fukuzawa Yukichi on Education*, 72).
- 37 Concerning the issue of treaty revisions, see J. E. Hoare, *Japan's Treaty Ports and Foreign Settlements: The Uninvited Guests 1858–1999* (Folkestone, Kent: Japan Library, 1994), 97–105.
- 38 Sushila Narsimhan, *Japanese Perceptions of China in the Nineteenth Century: Influence of Fukuzawa Yukichi* (New Delhi: Phoenix Publishing House, 1999), 94, 105–15.
- 39 See, for example, Banno Junji, "Kaisetsu" ("Commentary"), in *Fukuzawa Yukichi senshū (Selected Works of Fukuzawa Yukichi)*, ed. Tomita Masafumi, 14 vols. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1981), 7: 337–38.
- 40 Said, *Orientalism*, 70.
- 41 Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 80.
- 42 See, however, Kimitada Miwa, "Fukuzawa Yukichi's 'Departure from Asia': A Prelude to the Sino-Japanese War," in *Japan's Modern Century*, ed. Edward Skrzypczak (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1968), 15.
- 43 "Kuni no meisei ni kanshite samatsu no koto o sutsu bekarazu" ("Concerning the Reputation of Our Country We Must Not Ignore the Slightest Matter"), in *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū*, 10:67–70.
- 44 However, Fukuzawa remarks that these pictures were very rare and hard to come by, as even the domestic market still seemed to favor those "trite" motives like the "cherry blossom in Ueno," etc. Fukuzawa therefore recommends that the government should specially commission such collections for public relations use abroad (*ibid.*, 68).
- 45 *Ibid.*, 68–69.

- 46 See Robert Eskildsen, “Of Civilization and Savages: The Mimetic Imperialism of Japan’s 1874 Expedition of Taiwan,” *American Historical Review* 107 (2002): 388–418.
- 47 Fukuzawa, *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū*, 10:69.
- 48 For a compilation of reactions in the foreign press, see *Gaiōoku shinbun ni miru Nihon (Japan as Seen through Foreign Newspapers)*, 10 vols. (Tokyo: Mainichi Komyunikēshonzu, 1990), original-language sources (*genbun*), 2:469–592.
- 49 See Donald Keene, “The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 and Its Cultural Effects in Japan,” in *Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture*, ed. Donald Shively (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 172–75; S. C. M. Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
- 50 See his autobiography “Fuku-ō jiden” (1899), in *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū* 7:259.
- 51 Hinohara, “Nihon wa Tōyō-koku,” November 13, 1884.
- 52 “Senshō no kyoei ni hokoru bekarazu” (“We Must Not Pride Ourselves in the Vain Glory of Victory”), *Jiji shinpō*, June 30, 1898; repr. in *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū* 16:30–33.
- 53 On *Ideals*, see F. G. Notehelfer, “On Idealism and Realism in the Thought of Okakura Tenshin,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 16 (1990): 331–38; Korhonen, “Geography of Okakura Tenshin,” 111–14.
- 54 On Okakura’s personal and professional life in general, see Kinoshita Nagahiro, *Okaokura Tenshin: Mono ni kan-zureba tsui ni ware nashi (Okaokura Tenshin: Looking at Things, the Self Eventually Disappears)* (Kyōto: Minerva Shobō, 2005); on Okakura’s reasons for his resignation especially, see 178–80.
- 55 Okakura, *Ideals*, 227.
- 56 See, for example, Notehelfer, “On Idealism and Realism,” 330.
- 57 Okakura, *Ideals*, 5. *Ideals* is hereafter referenced by page number in the text.
- 58 Okakura here obviously echoes the famous formula of Sakuma Shōzan (1811–64): “Eastern Ethics, Western techniques,” (*Tōyō no dōtoku, Seiyō no geijutsu*); see Blacker, *Japanese Enlightenment*, 21–22.
- 59 Hegel, *Vernunft in der Geschichte*, 232–33.
- 60 “The Other Side of the Question,” *North China Herald*, December 7, 1894, repr. in *Gaiōoku shinbun ni miru Nihon*, original-language sources (*genbun*), 2:568.
- 61 Paine, *Sino-Japanese War*, 289–90.
- 62 For the Japanese government’s efforts to overcome (racialist) resistance in Europe and North America, see Robert B. Valliant, “The Selling of Japan: Japanese Manipulation of Western Opinion, 1900–1905,” *Monumenta Nipponica* 29 (1974):415–38; for the psychological effect in Japan of the alliance with the world’s most major power, see Oka Yoshitake, “The First Anglo-Japanese Alliance in Japanese Public Opinion,” in *Themes and Theories in Modern Japanese History: Essays in Memory of Richard Storry*, ed. Sue Henny and Jean-Pierre Lehmann (London: Athlone Press, 1988), 185–93.
- 63 See Notehelfer, “On Idealism and Realism,” 347–54. Christopher Benfey, *The Great Wave*:

- Gilded Age Misfits, Japanese Eccentrics, and the Opening of Old Japan* (New York: Random House, 2003), 98–106.
- 64 Margaret Elisabeth Noble, “Introduction,” in Okakura, *Ideals*, xxi; Noble actually speaks of the Hinduist Ramakrishna movement she belonged to, but, as it is in an exemplary way, this includes Okakura, as well.
- 65 *The Awakening of Japan* (New York: Century, 1904). For a closer discussion of this book, see Korhonen, “Geography of Okakura Tenshin,” 119–22; Notehelfer, “On Idealism and Realism,” 348–51.
- 66 The British edition (London: John Murray) was published in 1905.
- 67 Korhonen, “Geography of Okakura Tenshin,” 119.
- 68 *Bushidō: The Soul of Japan; An Exposition of Japanese Thought* (Philadelphia, PA: Leeds and Biddle, 1900).
- 69 Takeuchi, “Ajia-shugi,” 42. Notehelfer, in “On Idealism and Realism,” sees this conflict as the main driving force in Okakura’s life.
- 70 On antimodernist thought in late Meiji Japan, see Ienaga Saburō, *Nihon kindai shisō-shi kenkyū* (*Studies in the Intellectual History of Japan*) (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1953), 231–61; see also F. G. Notehelfer, *Kōtoku Shūsui: Portrait of a Japanese Radical* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 55–87; Ronald Loftus, “The Inversion of Progress: Taoka Reiu’s *Hibunmeiron*,” in *Monumenta Nipponica* 40 (1985), 191–208.
- 71 Gregor Schöllgen, *Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (The Age of Imperialism)*, 4th ed. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000), 7–16.
- 72 See Benfey, *Great Wave*, xii–xiii.
- 73 Fin-de-siècle aestheticism and Pre-Raphaelite nobleness are, to Okakura, one of the few exceptions of modern Western art (Okakura, *Ideals*, 226); for Natsume Sōseki as a similar case, see my article, “Ich und Du: Chinesische Topoi in Natsume Sōsekis *Kusamakura* (1906)” (“Me and You: Chinese Topoi in Natsume Sōseki’s *Kusamakura* [1906]”), in *Anbauten, Umbauten: Beitrage zur Japan-Forschung (Extensions, Rebuildings: Contributions in the Field of Japanese Studies)*, ed. Wolfgang Seifert and Asa-Bettina Wuthenow (Munich: Iudicium, 2003), 171–86.
- 74 For fin-de-siècle thought, see Loftus, “Inversion of Progress,” 197; for socialist culture critics, see Notehelfer, *Kōtoku Shūsui*, 76.
- 75 For the American case, see Benfey, *Great Wave*.
- 76 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 292, 294. The latter quote comes from a section epitomizing Derrida’s chapter “Of Grammatology as a Positive Science” in *Of Grammatology*, 74–93.
- 77 Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 9–10.
- 78 Maruyama Masao, *Nihon no shisō (Thought in Japan)* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1961), 8.